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Advanced User Authentication for Mobile Devices 
Nathan Luke Clarke 
BEng (Hons) 
Recent years have witnessed widespread adoption of mobile devices. Whereas initial 
popularity was driven by voice telephony services, capabilities are now broadening to 
allow an increasing range of data orientated services. Such services serve to extend the 
range of sensitive data accessible through such devices and will in turn increase the 
requirement for reliable authentication of users. 
This thesis considers the authentication requirements of mobile devices and proposes novel 
mechanisms to improve upon the current state of the art. The investigation begins with an 
examination of existing authentication techniques, and illustrates a wide range of 
drawbacks. A survey of end-users reveals that current methods are frequently misused and 
considered inconvenient, and that enhanced methods of security are consequently required. 
To this end, biometric approaches are identified as a potential means of overcoming the 
perceived constraints, offering an opportunity for security to be maintained beyond point- 
of-entry, in a continuous and transparent fashion. 
The research considers the applicability of different biometric approaches for mobile 
device implementation, and identifies keystroke analysis as a technique that can offer 
significant potential within mobile telephony. Experimental evaluations reveal the potential 
of the technique when applied to a Personal Identification Number (PIN), telephone 
number and text message, with best case equal error rates (EER) of 9%, 8% and 18% 
respectively. In spite of the success of keystroke analysis for many users, the results 
demonstrate the technique is not uniformly successful across the whole of a given 
population. Further investigation suggests that the same will be true for other biometrics, 
and therefore that no single authentication technique could be relied upon to account for all 
the users in all interaction scenarios. As such, a novel authentication architecture is 
specified, which is capable of utilising the particular hardware configurations and 
computational capabilities of devices to provide a robust, modular and composite 
authentication mechanism. The approach, known as IAMS (Intelligent Authentication 
Management System), is capable of utilising a broad range of biometric and secret 
knowledge based approaches to provide a continuous confidence measure in the identity of 
the user. With a high confidence, users are given immediate access to sensitive services 
and information, whereas with lower levels of confidence, restrictions can be placed upon 
access to sensitive services, until subsequent reassurance of a user's identity. 
The novel architecture is validated through a proof-of-concept prototype. A series of test 
scenarios are used to illustrate how IAMS would behave, given authorised and impostor 
authentication attempts. The results support the use of a composite authentication approach 
to enable the non-intrusive authentication of users on mobile devices. 
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Chapter 1- Introduction & Overview 
I Introduction & Overview 
The research presents a novel approach to authentication for mobile devices, enabling 
continuous identity verification of the user, whilst minimising intrusive authentication 
requests that would require explicit interaction. With the growing number and complexity 
of devices, and their future ability to access a prolific range of services, this composite 
authentication architecture solves the problems of weak and intrusive point-of-entry 
authentication techniques and typically requires nothing more than the user interacting 
with the mobile device in a normal manner. 
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1.1 Introduction 
The ability to communicate and work whilst on the move has given rise to a significant 
growth in mobile devices. The term mobile device describes three principal computing 
devices, the mobile handset (or cellular handset), the Personal Desktop Assistant (PDA) 
and the laptop'. The growth of mobile devices has primarily come out of mobile handset 
related technologies with worldwide subscribers now in excess of a billion (UMTS Forum, 
2003). In addition, both the use of PDAs and laptop computers has been growing in 
popularity (Smith, 2004a; Lemon, 2003): behind this growth are wireless technologies 
such as cellular networks and wireless LANs, which enable mobile devices to access a 
range of data-centric services. For instance, future cellular devices will be able to pay for 
products using micro-payments and digital money, surf the Internet, buy and sell stocks, 
transfer money and manage bank accounts, and wireless LAN enabled devices with their 
high bandwidth connections are capable of providing fast access to corporate networks and 
financial information. 
In order to enable delivery of such services, mobile devices have become increasingly 
powerful: mobile handsets in particular have evolved from relatively basic terminals, that 
would handle analogue telephony communications, to digital handsets capable of 
providing a host of data-centric services, turning the handset into a multimedia, multi- 
purpose, mobile communications tool, providing much of the functionality of today's 
PDAs. In fact, a convergence can be seen between mobile handsets and PDAs, with the 
only significant difference at present being the access technology to the wireless network - 
with PDAs typically utilising wireless LAN and handsets using one of many cellular 
' The term mobile device will be utilised throughout this thesis to describe all three types of mobile device. 
Specific reference to individual devices will be made as and where necessary. 
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standards that exist. In parallel with this increase in functionality is the ability for devices 
to store information, with many accepting solid-state memory such as Compact Flash and 
Secure Digital (SD), which are capable of providing storage in excess of 512MB. Laptop 
computers fall somewhat outside of this definition due to their far superior processing and 
storage capability, more similar to desktop computers than the remaining mobile devices. 
Nevertheless, this storage capability enables mobile devices to store large quantities of 
information - much of which may be personally, financially or corporately sensitive. 
Given the widespread popularity, increased functionality and storage, the need to protect 
the mobile device becomes paramount in order to stop misuse. In 2001,700,000 mobile 
handsets were stolen in the UK (Harrington & Mayhew, 2001), leading the government to 
set-up a National Mobile Phone Crime Unit to specifically target the problem (Best, 2003). 
It can be conjectured that the advanced capabilities of future mobile devices will make 
them even more desirable targets. 
Currently, the most popular access security to date takes the form of the password or PIN, 
a secret knowledge approach that relies heavily upon the user to ensure continued validity. 
For example, the user should not use the default factory settings, tell other people, or write 
it down. However, the poor use of passwords and PINs has been widely documented, with 
many laptop owners using simple passwords that dictionary attacks can crack in seconds 
(Denning, 1999) and with many mobile handset and PDA users not even using the security 
which is available (Lemos, 2002). In addition, mobile handsets only request the PIN at 
switch on, with the device remaining on for large periods of the day with no protection 
from misuse. Although this has not been a big issue, as the number of mobile devices 
capable of advanced services and the availability of some wireless networks is limited, this 
will not hold true in the future where the majority of mobile devices will be capable of, and 
3 
Chapter 1- Introduction & Overview 
have access to, an extensive range of services. The financial loss to the user in this case 
would not only be the theft of the device itself, but the services accessed before network 
access is denied and the personal data stored upon the device. 
The aim of this research is to establish an advanced authentication architecture capable of 
providing the increased security required for mobile devices, and extending protection 
beyond point-of-entry as to ensure the identity of the user on a continual basis. In order to 
achieve this continuous authentication, a second aim, that of providing transparent or non- 
intrusive authentication, is deemed imperative in order to minimise user inconvenience and 
increase subsequent user acceptance. By being able to authenticate a user without their 
knowledge, the integrity of the system can be automatically maintained and monitored 
without the user's explicit interaction, until such time as the system deems an impostor is 
accessing the system. 
1.2 Aims & Objectives 
The aim of this research is to define, design and validate an advanced non-intrusive user 
authentication security architecture suited to mobile devices. This has been achieved by 
focussing upon the technology and functionality of mobile devices to evaluate approaches 
that would enable transparent and continuous authentication. 
In order to achieve this, the research can be divided into five distinct phases. 
" To assess the requirement for new and advanced authentication techniques and 
mechanisms for mobile devices. 
4 
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" To investigate the applicability of advanced authentication techniques, for 
deployment on a mobile device. 
9 To design and evaluate a new biometric technique for mobile devices, with the aim 
of increasing the transparent authentication capability available to the device. 
9 To design an architecture to support the aims of continuous and transparent 
authentication on mobile devices thereby ensuring security is maintained. 
" To implement and test a prototype of the system to demonstrate its practical 
effectiveness. 
The first phase provides a comprehensive review and discussion of the need for 
authentication. Through an understanding of the development of mobile devices, and 
where the direction the technology is taking, this phase of the research provides the 
comprehensive arguments and basis for the need for additional authentication. This 
identified the second phase proceeds with a literature review and evaluation of current 
authentication approaches; giving an insight into current authentication techniques with a 
particular focus upon their deployment within a mobile device context. The outcome of 
this phase is to identity a number of authentication approaches that would lend themselves 
towards a mobile device. 
In order to achieve the objective of transparent and continuous authentication it was 
imperative to be able to increase the transparent authentication capability of mobile 
devices. From the identified approaches, one particular technique fulfilled this objective 
5 
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across a wide range of mobile devices. The ability to authenticate a person based upon 
their typing patterns, known as keystroke analysis, would permit all mobile devices with a 
keypad the capacity, in principal, to authenticate users based upon entering a telephone 
number or text message, scheduling a task or composing an email. However, although the 
technology had been proven with a good degree of success on standard keyboards, it was 
unproven on keypads, where the tactile and typing differences might have proven the 
technique infeasible. Therefore, the third phase of the research sought to evaluate the 
feasibility of a keystroke analysis technique upon a keypad. 
However successful keystroke analysis proved to be, it would not be suited to all mobile 
devices. A small number do not have keypads or thumb-sized keyboards making the 
technique obsolete. In addition, it was clear from initial studies of keystroke analysis, the 
performance of the technique would not have proven conclusive enough to be deployed in 
its own right. As a result the fourth phase of the research sought to design an authentication 
architecture flexible enough to encompass all mobile devices, utilising a composite number 
of authentication techniques that draw upon the different hardware components of a mobile 
device. The completion of the final phase was to design and evaluate a prototype of the 
authentication architecture. 
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1.3 Thesis Structure 
The thesis addresses the aforementioned objectives in order and is comprised of the 
following chapters. 
Chapter 2 discusses the need for user authentication, focussing upon the proliferation of 
wireless communication networks, and the growing popularity of mobile devices, 
illustrating from a technological perspective the need to protect mobile devices from 
misuse. The chapter continues, describing the mechanisms currently deployed on mobile 
devices to ensure identity verification, and provides substantial evidence of the weaknesses 
of such approaches. The chapter concludes by analysing results from a survey into the 
attitudes and opinions of subscribers towards security for their mobile handset, determining 
how users currently use their handset and their perceptions of the current authentication 
mechanism. 
Having firmly established the need for authentication, chapter 3 is dedicated to a review of 
biometrics. Having discussed the process behind biometrics, what they are, and the factors 
that affect them, the chapter proceeds to describe a number of biometric techniques that 
lend themselves to application on a mobile device, ensuring the aims of continuous and 
transparent authentication are met. The use of biometrics is supported by the findings from 
the aforementioned survey of subscribers. Finally, considerations into the practical use of 
biometrics are discussed, with particular emphasis upon keystroke analysis. 
Chapter 4 introduces the first of two studies into the feasibility of keystroke analysis on a 
mobile device. The studies have been based upon identifying particular user-handset 
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interactions with which to authenticate the user, in particular, the manner in which users 
enter telephone numbers, enter PINs and compose text messages. Chapter 4 utilises a 
particular keystroke characteristic to classify users based upon the entry of telephone 
numbers and PINs. The chapter compares and contrasts the application of a number of 
pattern classification algorithms based upon statistical and artificial intelligence 
techniques. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the technique. 
Chapter 5 builds on the successes and knowledge of chapter 4 to evaluate the viability of 
authenticating users based upon a second keystroke characteristic, applied to the 
composition of text messages. 
Chapter 6 presents a mechanism for composite authentication. Through the use of multiple 
authentication techniques, the ability to correctly verify the identity of a user becomes 
stronger, as the weaknesses of one technique, are overcome by the strengths of others. In 
addition, the use of a composite authentication approach permits a more transparent means 
of authentication. Keystroke analysis permits the authentication of users during certain 
handset interactions such as entering a telephone number, but not others. By using different 
techniques in varying handset scenarios it is possible to non-intrusively authenticate the 
user during a wider range of handset interactions. The architecture has been designed in a 
flexible, modular and scalable manner in order to meet the differing hardware and network 
variations that reside with mobile devices. The chapter describes the various components 
required in the framework and the processes developed to ensure that the system integrity 
is maintained. 
Chapter 7 proposes an Intelligent Authentication Management System (IAMS) architecture 
which incorporates the aforementioned composite authentication framework. The chapter 
8 
Chapter 1- Introduction & Overview 
proceeds to discuss the development IAMS along with keystroke analysis and a 
commercial biometric into a functional prototype. The chapter describes the process of 
realising the specification within a proof-of-concept prototype, highlighting three key 
system components: 
" The Console Manager, as the administrative tool for controlling, adding and 
monitoring mobile devices; 
" IAMS Manager, as the real-time authentication controller and 
" Client-Side software, providing the end-user interface and biometric capturing. 
Chapter 8 presents an evaluation of IAMS. The chapter details the theoretical performance 
IAMS can achieved under a number of different hardware scenarios and compares this 
against a number of alternative authentication techniques. The chapter concludes by 
providing a practical validation of the IAMS prototype. 
Finally, chapter 9 presents the main conclusions arising from the research, highlighting the 
key achievements and limitations. The chapter contains a discussion on areas for future 
research and development. The thesis also provides a number of appendices in support of 
the main discussion, including experimental procedures and code listings. The appendices 
also contain a number of published papers arising from the research programme. 
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2 Review of Authentication on Mobile Devices 
This chapter investigates and discusses the need for authentication on mobile devices, by 
highlighting the predominant wireless technologies and the services which they enable - 
illustrating their popularity and potential dangers. The chapter proceeds to discuss the 
types of mobile device which utilise these wireless networks and the user authentication 
mechanisms that reside within them - focussing upon the weaknesses and drawbacks of 
current approaches. Finally, the chapter presents further evidence in the form of an end- 
user survey of subscribers, which assessed their attitudes and opinions towards security for 
their mobile handset. 
10 
Chapter 2- Review of Authentication on Mobile Devices 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of authentication is to ensure that access is only given to an authorised person 
or persons. However, the authentication mechanism itself can vary both in complexity and 
in cost, and the level of authentication required is inherently tied to the application within 
which it is deployed. The level of authentication provided by mobile devices to date is 
arguably commensurate with the level of protection required against misuse, when 
considering the financial cost of device misuse, due to the limited services and data that 
can be accessed, versus the cost of implementing an authentication mechanism. 
However, with the popularity of mobile devices, increasing functionality and access to 
personally and financially sensitive information, the requirement for additional and/or 
advanced authentication mechanisms is argued to be essential. Much of this authentication 
need has come about due to the success of wireless networking technologies that have 
given devices access to services and information whilst on the move, beyond what is stored 
within the device itself. As such a secret-knowledge, point-of-entry technique, such as the 
PIN-based authentication that is currently implemented on all but a few mobile devices, 
will no longer be sufficient. 
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2.2 Mobile Devices & Wireless Networks 
Mobile devices have evolved from two contrasting directions. The first is from telephony 
devices that have always had a wireless network connection, but until recently minimal 
computational and storage capability, and so were unable to provide the user with many 
services beyond voice telephony. The second is from devices with reasonable computing 
power but no (simple) method by which they were able to connect to a network outside of 
the office environment. Today, however, with the advancement of mobile handsets and 
wireless networking, mobile devices have both the network access and computing capacity 
to provide users with a diverse range of services. This can be supported by a strong market 
growth in mobile devices, up 62% in 2004 on the previous year (Smith, 2004b), and with 
forecasts predicting wireless revenues being worth up to $126bn by 2008 (ARC Group, 
2003). 
The single most successful wireless technology to date has evolved device technology 
from pure telephony handsets into multimedia multi-functional mobile communication 
tools. The mobile telecommunications industry has experienced a number of revolutionary 
and evolutionary steps during its relatively short existence, with a current subscription 
based of 1.3 billion users worldwide (Cellular Online, 2004a). Table 2.1 illustrates the 
evolution of the mobile handset from the GSM (Global System for Mobile 
Communications) perspective - the most popular cellular standard (GSM World, 2003). 
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Mobile Phone Evolution 
1G 2G 2.5G 3G 4G 
Technical 
Network Type TALS GSM HSCSD GPRS UMTS Internet 
Transmission 
e T 
Analogue Digital Digital Digital Digital Digital 
Data Bandwidth 
bits/sec 9.6K 57.4K' 114K' 2M' >100M 
Frequency 900M 00 & 1800M 18900 
& 
00M 2G 40/60G 
Switching Circuit Circuit Circuit Packet Packet Packet 
Services 
Voice       
SMS      
Internet (WAP) (WAP) (WAP1   
Availability 1983 1992 1 2000 2001 2002 2010 
Theoretical maximum band 
Table 2.1: Evolution of the Mobile Phone 
Within the UK, the four principal network operators are still running 2.5G networks. 
However Vodatbne, T-Mobile and Orange are in the process of enabling data 
communications across their 3G network (Sherriff, 2004). Only Hutchison 3G have a 
working 3G network for public use to date (Hutchison 3G, 2004a). 
The investment made by cellular operators into 3G networks stands as a testament to the 
potential revenue opportunity 3G networks are perceived to present, with UK operators 
alone having cumulatively invested over £22 billion in spectrum licensing (Wakefield, 
2000). This ignores the additional investments required in network infrastructure to 
upgrade the network to 3G. Table 2.2 illustrates several categories of service application 
that have been defined for 3G (Giussani, 2001) and Figure 2.1 illustrates projected revenue 
forecasts for 3G services (UMTS Forum, 2003). 
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3G Category Examples 
Conferencing Video conferencin , voice over 
IP, video streaming. 
Messaging Email messaging, instant messaging, mobile chat, 
multimedia messaging. 
Internet Access/Networking Applications synchronisation, FTP transfers, internet 
access, intranet access. 
Location-Based Services Car navigation, localised information, 
location-based 
mobile commerce. 
Entertainment Internet games, mobile music, online dating, online 
gambling. 
Financial Services Banking, mobile cash, mobile billing, mobile salary, 
stock and share trading. 
Information Services Information alerts, dictionary search, flight 
reservation, virtual home. 
Mobile Commerce Advertising, ticketing, ewallets and shopping 
enhancements, micro-payments. 
Table 2.2: 3G Service Categories 
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Figure 2.1: 3G Revenue Growth until 2010 
It can be seen that 3G revenue worldwide is forecasted to exceed $300 billion by 2010. 
This increase in number and use of services broadens the application of a mobile handset 
and the consequent potential for misuse, substantiating the requirement for secure 
protection. 
Currently, much of what has been discussed has been concerned with European cellular 
networks, although the analogy can certainly be made throughout the world. One network 
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provider in Japan, however, has already gone beyond Europe in its deployment of data 
services and serves as an (additional) example of the popularity and potential revenue 
source data services can be. NTT DoCoMo is Japan's largest mobile network provider with 
over 48 million subscribers (NTT DoCoMo, 2004b). In 1999 DoCoMo introduced Mode, 
a wireless internet service that permits the user to receive news, email, entertainment 
channels and stock news amongst other information (Dubendorf, 2003). This service has 
experienced unprecedented success with over 41 million subscribers (NTT DoCoMo, 
2004c). Since the introduction of Mode, DoCoMo has rolled out third generation 
networks, the first commercial network in the world, with over 3 million subscribers (NTT 
DoCoMo, 2004d). 
Another increasingly predominant wireless networking technology is wireless LAN (also 
known as WiMax or Wi-Fi). A recent study noted organisations with over 100 employees 
were reporting they had experienced saving of $164,000 annually on cabling costs and 
labour (Reynolds, 2003), through the deployment of wireless networks. However, of 
particular interest is the growing number of public Wi-Fi locations, known as "hotspots", 
that are appearing, giving the general public access to broadband connections for their Wi- 
Fi enabled mobile devices. For instance, by the summer of 2004, BT Openzone, just one of 
many Wi-Fi providers in the UK, plans to boost its current 1,700 public hotspots to 4,000 
(Twist, 2004). It has been predicted that by 2006,100 million users worldwide will be 
using Wi-Fi (Reynolds, 2003). 
The terms Wi-Fi and WiMax describe a family of networking standards created by the 802 
Local and Metropolitan Area Networks Standards Committee (LMSC) of the IEEE 
computer Society (IEEE Computer Society, 2001). Work began in 1990, when the LMSC 
formed the 802.11 workgroup to develop a wireless networking standard. The output from 
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this body was to establish a number of standards, which vary in their data capacity and 
operating frequencies (Maxium & Pollino, 2002). A recent report looking into Wi-Fi in 
North America and Europe forecasts Wi-Fi services to be worth $18 billion by 2008 
(Smith, 2003). The wide bandwidth provided by Wi-Fi further expands the range of 
services that can be provided to mobile devices. With these new range of services and the 
financial and personal costs incurred should the device be misused, the need to ensure the 
correct identity of the user becomes far more important than when the number and cost of 
services was limited. 
Much discussion has taken place regarding the role mobile (cellular) networks and Wi-Fi 
have and whether this role is competitive or complementary (Vaughan-Nichols, 2003; 
3G. co. uk, 2003). With trade-offs between mobile networks providing more comprehensive 
service coverage and Wi-Fi having cheaper network infrastructure and faster transmission 
speeds (Reynolds, 2003). Again, it is not the intention of the author to argue the advantages 
and disadvantages of each access technology, but to highlight their existence, level of 
industry support and service capability. It is likely however, due in part to large industry 
backing and financial support that both technologies will co-exist as complementary 
services in the near term. 3GPP (Third Generation Project Partnership), a group of interest 
parties governing the application of UMTS, has already taken the initiative to develop a 
cellular-WLAN internetworking architecture as an add-on to the 3GPP mobile system 
specifications (Ahmavaara, 2003). In any event, high-speed wireless communications are 
here to stay. 
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2.3 Authentication on Mobile Devices 
Wireless networks provide the opportunity for a user to access a wide variety of services, 
from email, bank accounts and share dealing, to location-based services and infotainment 
(UMTS Forum, 2003). But what devices can access these services and what ensures the 
person using the device is the authorised user? 
The majority of mobile devices can be described to fall broadly within three categories: 
" Cellular, Mobile Handset or Smart Phone 
" Personal Desktop Assistant 
" Laptop Computer 
The process of authentication in general is based upon three fundamental approaches 
(Wood, 1977): something the user knows, i. e. passwords and PINs; something the user has, 
i. e. tokens and/or something the user is, i. e. biometrics. This section will examine the user 
authentication mechanisms deployed upon these devices, focussing upon their strengths 
and weaknesses. 
2.3.1 Mobile Handset 
Recent statistics from the UK Home Office has highlighted the issue of mobile handset 
theft, with over 700,000 handsets stolen in 2001 (Harrington & Mayhew, 2001), although 
unofficial reports have put this figure in the region of 1.3 million (Leyden, 2002). It should 
be noted that, not all handset thefts led to handset misuse, in terms of accessing 
17 
Chapter 2- Review of Authentication on Mobile Devices 
information and services on the handset. A number of handsets just have their SIM 
Network 
removed and are shipped to countries were handset costs are greater due to smaller 
hardware subsidies. Unfortunately, the Home Office report does not provide any specific 
statistics on handset misuse. However, this does illustrate that handsets are a target for theft 
and misuse, and additional or more advanced identity authentication will at least help 
protect users' personal information and also curb handset misuse in general. 
The mobile handset, known technically as the Mobile Station (MS) consists of two 
components, the Mobile Equipment (ME) and a Subscriber Identification Module (SIM). 
The SIM is a smart card with, amongst other information, the subscriber and network 
authentication keys. Subscriber authentication on a mobile station is achieved through the 
entry of a 4-8 digit number known as a Personal Identification Number (PIN). This point- 
of-entry system then gives access to the user's SIM, which will subsequently give the user 
network access via the International Mobile Subscriber Identifier (IMSI) and the 
Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identifier (TMSI), as illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
User Mobile Station 
IMEI Code 
%%Z 10 PIN Code £ IMSI Code 
TMSI Code 
PIN - Personal Identification Number 
IMEI - International Mobile Equipment Identifier 
IMSI - International Mobile Subscriber Identifier 
TMSI - Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identifier 
F ; ý, 
:. ". 
.- : _. ý. " 
Figure 2.2: Terminal -Network Security Process 
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The SIM card is a removable token containing the authentication keys required for network 
authentication, allowing in principle for a degree of personal mobility. For example, a 
subscriber could place their SIM card into another handset and use it in the same manner as 
they would use their own phone with calls being charged to their account. However, the 
majority of mobile handsets are typically locked to individual networks, and although the 
SIM card is in essence an authentication token, in practice the card remains within the 
mobile handset throughout the life of the handset - removing any additional security that 
might be provided by a token-based authentication technique. 
The purpose of the IMSI and TMSI are to authenticate the SIM card itself on the network, 
and they do not ensure that the person using the phone is actually the registered subscriber. 
This is only achieved (typically) at switch on using the PIN, although some manufacturers 
also have the PIN mechanism when you take the mobile out of a stand-by mode. As such, a 
weakness of Point-of-Entry systems is that, after the handset is switched on, the device is 
vulnerable to misuse should it be left unattended or stolen. No continuous authentication 
mechanism resides on second generation mobile handsets in order to ensure that the user is 
the registered subscriber throughout the duration the handset remains powered on. 
In addition, the PIN is a secret-knowledge authentication approach, and thus relies upon 
some knowledge that the authorised user has. Unfortunately, secret-knowledge based 
techniques have been found to be inherently insecure, due in many cases to the authorised 
users themselves (Lemos, 2002; Morris & Thompson, 1979). Reasons for insecurity can 
include noting the PIN on paper and telling it to friends. One implementation of the PIN on 
mobile handsets that does curb attacks is by allowing the user to enter the PIN a limited 
number of times (typically three) and thus removing the possibility of brute force attacks 
(entering every possible combination of PIN input). 
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More recently, a few handset operators and manufacturers have identified the need to 
provide more secure authentication mechanisms. For instance, Sagem (2002) developed a 
handset with fingerprint reader showcasing future product functionality and Atrua 
Technologies have developed a directional menu pad (similar in appearance to a mouse- 
pad contained on a laptop) that also provides fingerprint recognition (Atrua, 2004). To date 
however, only one commercial handset exists that provides alternative point-of-entry 
authentication to the PIN, and that has been developed for Japan's NTT DoCoMo network 
operator. The F505i handset comes equipped with a built-in fingerprint sensor, providing 
biometric authentication of the user (NTT DoCoMo, 2004a). Although fingerprint 
technology increases the level of security available to the handset, the implementation of 
this mechanism has increased handset cost, and even then the technique remains point-of- 
entry only and intrusive to the subscriber. 
However, given the introduction of third generation mobile networks, it can be argued that 
handsets will represent an even greater enticement for criminals: 
1. More technologically advanced mobile handsets - 3G handsets will be far more 
advanced than current mobile phones with many having much of the functionality 
of PDAs. As such 3G handsets will be more expensive and subsequently attractive 
to theft, resulting in a financial loss to the subscriber. 
2. Availability of data services - 3G networks will provide the user with the ability to 
download and purchase a whole range of data services and products that would be 
charged to the subscribers account. Additionally 3G networks will provide access 
to bank accounts, share trading and making micro-payments. Theft and misuse of 
the handset would result in financial loss for the subscriber. 
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3. Personal Information - 3G handsets will be able to store much more information 
than current handsets. Contact lists will not only include name and number but 
addresses, dates of birth and other personal information. 3G handsets may also be 
able to access personal medical records and home intranets and their misuse would 
result in a personal and financial loss for the subscriber. 
To combat these security issues, the 3GPP has drawn up standards concerning security on 
3G handsets. In a document called "3G - Security Threats and Requirements" (3GPP, 
1999) the requirements for authentication are outlined, stating: 
"It shall be possible for service providers to authenticate users at the start 
of, and during, service delivery to prevent intruders from obtaining 
unauthorised access to 3G services by masquerade or misuse of priorities" 
The important consequence of this standard is to authenticate subscribers during service 
delivery, an extension of the 2G point-of-entry authentication, which requires continuous 
monitoring and authentication. This could be best achieved through a non-intrusive or 
transparent technique so users would not be aware that authentication is taking place, 
avoiding the user having to stop a call in order to re-enter a PIN for instance. However, 
network operators, on the whole, have done little (with the previous DoCoMo exception 
noted) to improve authentication security, let alone provide a mechanism for making it 
continuous. 
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2.3.2 Personal Digital Assistant 
The name Personal Digital Assistant or PDA, describes a fairly broad range of mobile 
devices with respect to the hardware configuration and computing power. Early models 
provided little more than simple electronic storage of schedules and contact details 
(Forman & Zahorjan, 1994). More recently, PDAs have been enhanced with faster 
processors and enough add-on storage capability to watch movies, as well as various 
additional built-in components such as cameras, microphones, speakers, keypads and touch 
sensitive screens. Figure 2.3 illustrates two such devices, each utilising one of the two 
principal operating systems to be found on PDAs. The HP iPAQ is running Microsoft's 
Windows for Mobile 2003 for Pocket PCs and the Palm Tungsten C which runs the Palm 
OS (HP, 2004; PalmOne, 2004). 
Wi-Fi & Bluetooth 
r 
Speaker 
Biometric 
Fingerprint Reader 
Microphone 
Figure 2.3: (a) HP IPAQ H5550 (b) Palm Tungsten C 
Touch Sensitive 
Screen 
Thumb-Sized 
Keyboard 
Unlike mobile handsets, where the authentication mechanism is determined by the cellular 
standard, such as GSM, and all handsets manufacturers have to conform to at least this 
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level of protection, the authentication mechanism on PDAs is determined by the operating 
system. To date, both the main operating systems have deployed password or PIN based 
authentication, with the occasional high end model containing a fingerprint sensor, as 
illustrated by the HP iPAQ. The additional security provided by this IPAQ really is the 
exception rather than the rule, as only one particular model of iPAQ (incidentally the most 
expensive) contains the sensor, with the remaining models relying upon a password or 
PIN. None of the Palm-based PDAs contain any authentication security beyond secret- 
knowledge based approaches as standard. A number of companies are beginning to provide 
authentication mechanisms for PDAs. Romsey Associates has developed a signature 
recognition approach for use on Palm and Windows based PDAs (PDALok, 2004a), and 
Domain Dynamics, a company specialising in authenticating a person by their voice 
(known as Voice Verification) has designed software compatible with PDAs, although to 
the authors best knowledge, no commercial PDAs have deployed the technique to date 
(Domain Dynamics, 2004). Although, as with NTT DoCoMo's handset with fingerprint 
sensor, this additional security mechanism does not provide any additional security beyond 
point-of-entry. 
Similarly to mobile handsets, the use of any authentication approach on a PDA is optional, 
with a user having (where applicable) the choice of which technique to use, a PIN or a 
password. However, due to the lack of education and a perception that PDAs are not as 
susceptible to misuse and attack as normal desktop computers a large number of users do 
not utilise any technique. A survey has found one in four corporate respondents do not 
protect their device, with two out of three firms having no PDA guidelines on security 
(Kelly, 2002). Although this argument or approach may well have been appropriate with 
older PDAs with reduced functionality and importantly no wireless access technology, this 
is no longer true today. With PDA's able to access the internet and corporate networks 
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independently of their desktop computer through technologies such as Wi-Fi, corporate 
networks once thought to be secure are finding their networks open to attack due to the 
weaknesses PDAs introduce (Moore, 2001). Conversely, however, a recent survey of 230 
business professionals found that 81% felt that the information on the PDA was either 
somewhat or extremely valuable and 70% were interested in having a security system for 
their PDA, with 69% willing to pay more for a PDA with security than one without (Shaw, 
2004), clearly demonstrating a need for more secure authentication on PDAs. 
An additional problem found with PDAs is that they tend to be used as a store for 
passwords that can be used for other computer systems, such as their office computer 
(Protocom, 2003). A typical reason for this is due to network administrators who are aware 
of the weaknesses of password based authentication mechanisms, requesting their 
employees to regularly change their password. Moreover, network administrators also 
place conditions on the selection of passwords, such as they must contain a mixture of 
upper, lower case characters and numbers, and exceed 8 characters, which places an extra 
burden upon the employee to remember their password (Federal Information Processing 
Standards, 1985). Some companies go as far as generating random passwords to be used by 
employees. To remember such passwords, employees have traditionally tended to write 
them down and place the post-it-note on the under side of the keyboard or under the mouse 
pad (Smith, 2002); however more recently PDAs are being used. However, as PDA's 
themselves quite frequently have no authentication security, the subsequent misuse of the 
PDA would provide the impostor not only with the information stored upon the PDA, but 
with the means of accessing a number of additional computing systems. 
In all, PDAs in general suffer the same authentication weaknesses as their handset 
counterparts, but have the additional problem that misuse of the PDA does not only 
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compromise the data stored upon the device and the services which can subsequently be 
accessed by the device, but the PDA can also compromise corporate network security and 
act as a loophole for impostors to access what (perhaps) were secure networking 
infrastructures. The importance therefore to continually ensure user identity becomes even 
more paramount for corporate businesses. 
2.3.3 Laptop Computer 
The laptop computer, comparable to traditional desktop computing in terms of 
computational and storage capacity than other mobile devices, represents the largest of the 
mobile devices. The authentication mechanisms deployed on a laptop can therefore be 
quite diverse and mimic those deployed on standard PCs. This section focuses upon the 
traditional and widely adopted method of authentication. Unsurprisingly, this method has 
been password based. Although, as previously mentioned, network administrators and 
operating systems can be configured to accept passwords that are more difficult to hack 
and attack, the weakness of password based techniques on PCs and laptops has been well 
documented over the years. A noted book by Denning (1999), describes a number of 
techniques used to attack passwords, such as brute force attacks, packet sniffing, the use of 
malware (malicious software, i. e. Trojan horses) and social engineering, to name a few of 
the principal approaches. 
These weaknesses of secret knowledge based techniques have been identified and 
addressed by a number of companies that have required high level security protection for 
their laptop. Typically, this protection has taken the form of either an integrated or add-on 
fingerprint sensor, such as Acer's Travelmate 740 (Lemon, 2001). The UK government has 
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gone a stage further when computerising the ministerial red box by providing 
authentication of the person through their fingerprint and a special personal signet ring 
(token based approach), as illustrated in Figure 2.4, providing two-factor authentication 
(BBC News, 1998). 
Figure 2.4: Secure Ministerial Red Box with Fingerprint & Token Authentication 
It can be noted the principal authentication mechanism for all categories of mobile device 
is a secret-knowledge based approach. The technique in itself is not necessarily weak, with 
sufficiently long and random passwords providing a strong mechanism against brute force 
attacks. Table 2.3 illustrates an analysis of the Average Attack Space required in order for 
a brute force attack to compromise the password (Smith, 2002). The Average Attack Space 
is calculated based upon the number of permutations a password can take. For instance a 
truly random 4-digit number will have 104 possible permutations. As the number of 
permutations tends to increase significantly with larger password lengths, it is normal to 
translate this number into the Average Attack Space by logging (to the base 2) the number 
of permutations and rounding up (as it is not possible to have a partial bit). 
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Example Number of Permutations Average Attack Space 
4-digit number based upon a date 512 (336 not rounded) 9 bits 
Random 4 digit number 16,384 (10,000 not rounded) 14 bits 
Random 10-letter English text 65,536 16 bits 
Average Attack Space = log2(m") 
Where m= number of random characters; n= number of digits 
Table 2.3: Average Attack Space of Secret-Knowledge Approaches 
From Table 2.3 it can be seen how the Average Attack Space is significantly reduced from 
14 bits to 9 bits when the password or PIN is not chosen randomly, reiterating the 
importance of choosing random passwords. 
Although theoretically the foundations of secret knowledge approaches can be strong, they 
also have many weaknesses. These are typically based upon technological weaknesses and 
in appropriate use by the end-user. Taking a broader look at the deployment of secret 
knowledge approaches within a more mature computing environment such as desktop PCs, 
the password from a technical perspective has repeatedly been shown to be lacking, with 
applications developed to hack, capture and circumvent passwords. Although many of 
theses techniques have not currently be found on PDAs and mobile handsets, the 
increasing functionality and popularity of these devices will undoubtedly make them 
targets in the future. From a usability perspective, Kevin Mitnick, a leading figure in IT 
security and infamous former computer hacker has argued how the end-user is the weakest 
link in the security chain (Temple & Regnault, 2002). Using authentication techniques that 
rely on the user for their validity would therefore inherently make secret-knowledge based 
techniques insecure, as previous studies have highlighted (Protocom, 2003; Morris & 
Thompson, 1979). 
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In addition, Microsoft's Chief Architect and co-founder Bill Gates has recently been 
quoted as saying "passwords are dead" (Kotadia, 2004), citing numerous weaknesses and 
deficiencies that password based techniques experience. Unfortunately for mobile devices, 
the authentication technique Mr. Gates recommends is the deployment of token based 
authentication and/or one-time passwords. As previously explained within the context of a 
mobile handset, token based authentication was originally envisaged to be provided by the 
SIM card itself. However, due to the mobile nature of the device, both the device and the 
authentication token in its traditional from would tend to be left together removing any 
security the token may have provided. This does not however discount token-based 
approaches altogether. Through utilising proximity sensors it would be possible to develop 
tokens that could be worn, such as jewellery, but authenticate wirelessly without any 
physical connection. The range of the sensor can be carefully controlled to ensure neither 
the device or the person is too far away without locking the device. 
Although this technique is feasible, and arguably increases user convenience over 
traditional approaches, as no interaction is required, the use of the token-based approach 
still requires the user to remember to wear the token, relying on the primary weakness of 
security, the user. A second potential weakness, depending on the form the token takes, is 
from theft. If a person is able to steal the mobile device they could also arguably have the 
opportunity of taking the token, allowing authentication free misuse. Finally, the cost of 
manufacturing and deploying this technique must be considered. Both software and 
hardware would need to be developed and deployed across a large number of mobile 
devices. In addition, mechanisms must also be present to replace lost and broken tokens, 
increasing the customer service cost of providing the mechanism. 
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2.4 A Survey of Subscriber Attitudes 
The previous sections have described the authentication mechanisms deployed on mobile 
devices, giving technological arguments to their weaknesses. The introduction and success 
of any new product or technology, however, will rely heavily upon customer perceptions. 
If a customer perceives a product or service to be unreliable, even though it perhaps is not, 
then the product or service is likely to encounter poor adoption. Mobile devices and 
authentication are by no means an exception to this rule so a survey was commissioned to 
evaluate subscribers' attitudes and opinions towards security. Given the wider adoption of 
mobile handsets over other mobile devices, this survey was focussed directly at the users 
of mobile handsets in particular. The survey was designed to evaluate: 
" current and future handset and service requirements, 
" current and future attitudes towards authentication. 
The survey ran for a period of two years, and a total of 297 respondents completed the 
online questionnaire. A copy of this questionnaire, along with the raw results can be found 
in appendix A. 
2.4.1 Demography 
The survey was distributed online with a single stipulation, the respondent had to be a 
current or past user of a mobile handset. Due to the natural distribution of the survey, 
amongst a majority of engineering and computing students, it was found a large proportion 
of respondents were male in the 17-24 age bracket. In all, 86% of the respondents are male 
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and 71% of the respondent's population fall into the 17-24 age bracket. Although this is 
likely to skew the results from an age dependent analysis, the magnitude of this variation is 
not as large as it might initially appear, as the 15-24 year age bracket has been shown to 
have the largest mobile phone penetration of all age groups, with an 86% penetration 
(Competitive Commission, 2003). In addition, a recent study performed by the 
international research group NOP, found there were no large differences in the willingness 
to spend more for mobile services between men and women (Cellular Online, 2004b). 
An analysis of the respondents' service providers choice as illustrated in Table 2.4 shows a 
variation in overall market share in comparison to the actual UK figures, with 38% of the 
respondents connected to Orange compared to a national figure of 28%. Although the 
reasons why this percentage difference occurred are unknown, it can be argued that with a 
mobile handset population of 45 million in the UK (Competition Commission, 2003) 
operator variations will arise with such a small sample population such as this survey. The 
nature of this difference should not affect the results of the survey with respect to service 
and authentication as all network operators currently have very similar service offerings 
and an identical authentication mechanism. 
Company 
UK Market 
Share In 2001 
oýa +r 
Network Share of 
Surveyed Users (%) 
Orange 28 38 
02 25 8 
T-Mobile 23 22 
Virgin (included within T-Mobile) 2 
Vodafone 25 25 
Other - 5 
'Source: Competition Commission, 2003 
Table 2.4: Network Operators Market Share 
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The mobile manufacturer Nokia has a 54% share of respondents handsets with the nearest 
competitor Motorola having 8%, followed by Samsung and Siemens, This is also reflected 
with global handset sales in Q3 of 2003 with Nokia, Motorola, Samsung and Siemens 
having 50%, 15%, 11% and 5% (Cellular Online, 2003). So customer preferences towards 
a particular brand of handset and features should be adequately reflected within the 
respondent population. 
2.4.2 Handset Purchasing Considerations 
With many key mobile markets becoming saturated, with over 70% of Europeans using a 
mobile (3G, 2003), mobile handset manufacturers and network operators are looking to 
generate revenue from current subscribers upgrading their existing handset to a newer and 
more advanced handset. It was decided to gauge the relative importance of numerous 
factors subscribers placed upon deciding which network operator and handset to purchase, 
looking in particular how security was viewed within this context. 
Table 2.5 illustrates what factors customers take into account when considering which 
network operator to subscribe to. The most important factor is the price of the handset deal, 
which is not unsurprising as cost tends always to be a key deciding factor. Network 
coverage and reliability came next, which again are fundamental to the operation of the 
handset. Security features along with operator loyalty came last. This could be due to the 
fact that currently all network operators provide an identical mechanism for authentication 
of the user, so the subscriber has no means of differentiating between operators, or 
alternatively could be an indication that users do not feel security to be a particularly big 
issue. 
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C id ti 
Rank % 
ons era on Low Medium Hi h 
Choice of Handset 12 40 =- 48 
Network Coverage 2 27 71 
Operator LoLoyalty 21 = 51- 28 
Prices, Deals etc 4 19 77 
Reliability 3 28 70 
Security Features 26 51- 23 
Table 2.5: Considerations when Choosing your Network Operator 
However, when respondents where asked to rank the factors affecting their choice of 
mobile handset, security features came second to battery life suggesting customers are 
indeed security conscious, but perceive the issue to be a handset dependent rather than 
network operator one. Functionality such as personalising your handset through swappable 
features, games and accessories are low on the list of customer's priorities. 
Consideration Rank 
Low Medium High 
Accessories 39 44 17 
Batte Life 5 33 61 
Brand Loyalty 32 -42 26 
Games 57 33 10 
Infra-Red/Bluetooth 37-- 35 28 
Security Features 27 - 50 23 
Swappable Fascias - 62, 32 6 
Table 2.6: Considerations when Choosing your Mobile Handset 
2.4.3 Present & Future Mobile Handset Usage 
The need for advanced authentication mechanisms has been argued to have come about 
due to the more advanced features and functionality of mobile devices, in addition to the 
relative weakness of secret knowledge based authentication approaches. However, the 
level of authentication security must be commensurate with the cost incurred with its 
misuse, otherwise the solution would be both costly and inconvenient. If subscribers only 
wish to use their handset for telephony, then the argument for more advanced 
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authentication mechanisms has been somewhat diminished. This section will analyse 
current and future handset usage in order to gauge from a customer perspective the need 
for security. 
The need to be accessible via a mobile handset is apparent from how long respondents 
leave their handset switched on for. 85% of those questioned said they kept their handset 
on for more than 10 hours a day, with only 2% leaving the handset on for less than one 
hour. This tends towards a couple of implications: 
" The need to leave the handset on comes in part from the need to stay in touch. So is 
the mobile handset the users' principal means of achieving this? Those switching 
on for less than one hour are likely to be users who only switch on when they wish 
to use the handset, thus either not wishing to be kept in contact with or they have 
another principal means of communication such as a landline telephone. Those 
users leaving their handset on for a long period of time are likely to consider their 
handset to be their major means of contact, illustrating both the reliance users place 
in their mobile and a long-term commitment to the technology. 
" As a large proportion of respondents are leaving their handset on for long periods 
of the day, an issue of security arises particularly for those users with no standby 
PIN protection - this particular approach requests the user to enter the PIN in order 
to take the handset out of standby mode. However, this tends to be a very intrusive 
authentication approach, and this is reflected by many of the manufacturers not 
implementing this function. From the survey, 82% of respondents do not use any 
form of secondary PIN protection. This results in a significant number of handsets 
being unlocked and unprotected for long periods of the day, introducing the 
possibility of authentication free masquerade attacks. 
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The survey suggests that current mobile handset usage is dominated by two services, 
telephony and text messaging, as illustrated in Figure 2.5. 
Figure 2.5: Present Mobile Handset Usage 
Although usage for other data services is lower, with 36% accessing WAP services and 
26% accessing Information Services, it has to be noted that these are growing services. A 
recent report stated users accessed 947 million WAP page impressions in November 2003, 
up from 897 the previous month (Broersma, 2004). In addition, an analysis of future 
handset usage trends, illustrated in Figure 2.6, shows the majority of future services 
suggested would be used to a favourable degree. MMS (Multi-Media Messaging), now 
currently available on handsets, and GPS (Global Positioning Service) are the most popular 
with 80 and 82 percent respectively. Video conferencing, music downloading and video on 
demand are also popular with over 60% of respondents. 
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Figure 2.6: Future Mobile Handset Usage 
Interestingly, eCommerce (known as mCommerce for mobiles - Mobile Commerce) was 
not overly popular, with only 48% of respondents wishing to use such a service, which 
given the level of investment towards online commerce might be disappointing to some 
(Nohria & Leestma, 2001). 
Additional services and functionality that were suggested by respondents included, "digital 
money", "digital camera", "true internet access", "remote link to car and house alarms", 
"infra-red remote control" and "a security code to access SMS inbox". Many of these ideas 
already exist with cameras a common occurrence on handsets. The suggestion of a security 
code to access the SMS inbox is a reflection upon the lack of security provided to the 
handset whilst it is on, with their privacy being affected as others read their text messages. 
Overall, 90% of respondents have answered positively towards one or more forms of 
additional service. 
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2.4.4 Current Authentication Approaches 
As previously discussed, the primary method of security for a mobile handset is the PIN. 
66% of respondents reported to use PIN authentication at switch on, with 18% of users also 
utilising the secondary standby mode authentication. If this figure were to be extrapolated 
to the global population of mobile users, the 34% of users not using the PIN could 
currently represent some 438 million subscribers with no authentication security (Cellular 
News, 2004). Almost a third of respondents (30%) consider the PIN to be an inconvenient 
approach to security, with only 25% being confident or very confident in the protection it 
provided. It is worth noting however, that the largest proportion of respondents (42%) 
believed the PIN to provide an adequate level of security (which given the limited storage 
capacity and functionality of current handsets is understandable). 
Identifying potential weaknesses of the PIN, it can be seen from Figure 2.7, that 45% of 
respondents have never changed their code. The reasons for this are likely to be a 
combination of users who have never used the PIN and those who have enabled the 
facility, but never changed the number from the default factory setting. In addition, a 
further 42% of respondents have only ever changed the PIN once, after initially purchasing 
the handset. Only 13% of respondents have ever changed their PIN number more than 
once. 
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Figure 2.7: Changing the PIN Code 
Other questions concerning weaknesses of the PIN show 36% of respondents use the same 
number for multiple services. Thus should an attacker determine the code for one device, 
then they will have potentially free access to a number of others. Table 2.7 illustrates the 
user's responses to a number of tampering and misuse related questions. Although the 
degree of misuse is fairly low, with handset theft and no misuse having the highest 
response of 11%, these results do reiterate a common problem with the current 
authentication mechanism - if the handset is on, the device has little protection against 
misuse. It is also worth noting, the percentage of users who have had their handset misused 
without their knowledge but not stolen is likely to have been underrepresented, as the 
authorised user will be unaware of some misuse occurring. Overall, 28% of respondents 
have experienced one of the four options of misuse or theft. 
Yes % No 
Been borrowed and tampered 11 89 
with without my permission 
Been borrowed and calls were 11 89 
made without my permission 
Been stolen but no calls were 11 89 
made 
Been stolen and calls were made 5 95 
Table 2.7: Handset Misuse 
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The incorrect entry of the PIN three times results in the handset locking down and requires 
a PIN Unlock Code (PUK) to be obtained from the network operator. Whilst the handset is 
locked no access is given to the device, with the exception of emergency service calls. 
Over a third of respondents (38%) have had to unlock their phone using the PUK code at 
some point, a task which is both intrusive and time consuming. This highlights another 
undesirable effect of secret knowledge based approaches. It is not only inconvenient to the 
subscriber but an additional undesirable expense for the network operator having to 
provide the additional customer service support. 
With mobile handset technology progressing and subscribers being given access to 
additional services, as already outlined in this chapter, it was encouraging that 85% of 
respondents were in favour of additional handset security. Only 2% thought it was a bad 
idea (the remaining were indifferent). An important distinction should be made between 
the need for improving security due to the advancements in services provided and the 
subsequent risks they pose and the need for improving security for current handsets. This 
result seems to suggest that respondents are aware of the need for security with respect to 
their current handsets, negating the technological arguments due to future advancements. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The growth and popularity of mobile devices and wireless networking technologies has 
increased the need to ensure the validity of the user. Information stored and accessed by 
these devices is no longer limited to names and numbers, but can hold a wide variety of 
personally and commercially sensitive information. This trend of increasing services and 
mobile computing is only set to continue, as users integrate technology within their lives 
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and unlock themselves from the desktop computer. However, research from the Gartner 
Group, suggests around 90% of mobile devices to date are lacking the security to prevent 
hackers from gaining access (Gold, 2004). 
This chapter has discussed the relative merits of a secret knowledge based approach using 
PINS and found them some what lacking in the necessary authentication security required 
for mobile devices. These weaknesses were then subsequently reinforced through an end- 
user survey, which found that a large number of users are not using the PIN. Of those that 
did, many had infrequently (or never) changed the PIN code, and almost a third had 
experience handset theft or misuse in some form. Using a token authentication approach, 
where the token and device have to be physically connected, does not lend itself 
particularly well in this situation either. For example, many users will leave the token 
within the mobile handset for convenience, citing subscriber use of the SIM card, which 
was designed as a token. Token based approaches, similarly to secret knowledge based 
techniques, fundamentally rely on the user to remember something to ensure security, 
whether this is to remember the password or PIN, or to remember to pick up the token 
along with the handset. The third approach to authentication, "something the user is", 
known generally as biometrics, does not rely on the user to remember anything, just on 
being themselves. 
On the basis of these findings, it is evident that alternative and stronger authentication 
approaches are required for mobile devices. These techniques must be capable of securing 
access to sensitive services and information throughout the duration of a session, in a user- 
friendly and convenient fashion. Possible foundations for such an approach are considered 
in the next chapter. 
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3 Biometric Authentication 
Having established the need for advanced authentication mechanisms for mobile devices, 
this chapter presents and discusses the use of biometrics to solve this problem. The chapter 
begins by describing a generic biometric model and the factors that affect the system. An 
overview of biometric techniques is presented, focussing and exemplifying a number of 
approaches for their specific applicability within a mobile device. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The use of biometrics, or specifically unique human characteristics, has existed for 
hundreds of years in one form or another, whether it is a physical description of a person or 
perhaps more recently a photograph. Consider for a moment what it is that actually allows 
you to recognise a friend in the street, or allows you to recognise a family member over the 
phone. Typically this would be their face and voice respectively, both of which are 
biometric characteristics. However, the definition of biometrics within the IT community is 
somewhat broader than just requiring a unique human characteristic(s) and describes the 
process as an automated method of determining or verifying the identity of a person 
(Nanavati et al., 2002). 
The deployment and application of biometric systems, although currently small in 
comparison to password based approaches, is becoming more widespread. Some mobile 
devices introduced in chapter 2 included a fingerprint sensor for additional security. In 
addition, the CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey has shown an increase in 
biometric deployment from 8% to 11% over 2000-2004 (Richardson, 2003; Gordon et al., 
2004), illustrating that the field of biometrics is beginning to become more mainstream. 
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3.2 A Generic Biometric System 
Many commercial biometric techniques exist, with new approaches continually being 
developed in research laboratories. The underlying process, however, remains identical. 
Biometric systems can be used in two distinct modes, dependent upon whether the system 
wishes to determine or verify the identity of a person. 
" Verification - determining whether a person is who they claim to be. 
9 Identification - determining who the person is. 
The particular choice of biometric will greatly depend upon which of these two methods is 
required, as performance, usability, privacy and cost will vary. Verification, from a 
classification perspective, is the simpler of the two methods, as it requires a one-to-one 
comparison between a recently captured sample and reference sample, known as a 
template, of the claimed person. Identification requires a sample to be compared against 
every reference sample, a one-to-many comparison, contained within a database, in order 
to find if a match exists. Therefore the unique characteristics used in discriminating people 
need to be more distinct or unique for identification than for verification. The majority of 
biometrics are not based upon completely unique characteristics. Instead a compromise 
exists between the level of security required and thus more discriminating characteristics 
and the complexity, intrusiveness and cost of the system to deploy. It is unlikely however, 
in the majority of situations that a choice would exist between which method to implement. 
Instead, different applications or scenarios tend to lend themselves to a particular method. 
For instance, PC login access is typically a verification task, as the user will select their 
username. However, when it comes to a scenario such as claiming benefits, an 
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identification system is necessary to ensure that the person has not previously claimed 
benefits under a pseudonym. 
A generic biometric system is illustrated in Figure 3.1, showing both of the key processes 
involved in biometric systems: enrolment and authentication. Enrolment describes the 
process by which a user's biometric sample is initially taken and used to create a reference 
template for use in subsequent authentication. As such, it is imperative that the sample 
taken during enrolment is from the authorised user and not an impostor, and that the 
quality of the sample is good. The actual number of samples required to generate an 
enrolment template will vary according to the technique and the user. Typically, the 
enrolment stage will include a quality check to ensure the template is of sufficient quality 
to be used. In cases where it is not, the user is requested to re-enrol onto the system. 
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Figure 3.1: A Generic Biometric System 
Source: CESG, 2004. 
Authentication is the process that describes the comparison of an input sample against one 
or more reference samples - one in the context of a verification system, many with an 
identification system. The process begins with the capture of a biometric sample, often 
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from a specialised sensor. The biometric or discriminatory information is extracted from 
the sample, removing the erroneous data. The sample is then compared against the 
reference template. This comparison performs a correlation between the two samples and 
generates a measure or probability of similarity. The threshold level controls the decision 
as to whether the sample is valid or not, by determining the required level of correlation 
between the samples. This is an important consideration in the design of a biometric, as 
even with strong biometric techniques, a poorly selected threshold level can compromise 
the security provided. Finally, the decision is typically passed to a policy management 
system, which has control over a user's access privileges. 
3.3 Authentication Approaches 
Biometric approaches are typically subdivided into two categories, physiological and 
behavioural. Physiological biometrics are based upon classifying a person according to 
some physical attribute, such as their fingerprints, their face or hand. Conversely, 
behavioural biometrics utilise some unique behaviour of the person such as, their voice or 
the way in which they write their signature. It is often argued that many biometrics could 
fit into both categories, for instance, although fingerprints are physiological biometrics, the 
way in which a user presents a finger to the sensor, and the subsequent image that is 
captured, is dependent upon behaviour. However, it is common to select the category based 
upon the principal underlying discriminative characteristic - in this particular example the 
fingerprint itself. 
The following section will briefly introduce a number of different biometric approaches 
that currently exist within both commercial and research arenas. 
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3.3.1 Physiological Biometrics 
The majority of core biometric techniques commercially available are physiologically 
based and tend to have a more mature and proven technology. In addition, physiological 
biometrics typically have more discriminative and characteristic invariant features, and as 
such are often utilised in both verification and identification systems (Woodward et al., 
2003). 
" Ear Geometry 
This approach looks at the shape and the ridges of an ear to perform authentication. 
The uniqueness of the ear is currently untested, with various governments currently 
accepting and rejecting its admissibility within criminal courts (BBC News, 1999; 
Morgan, 1999). Although no commercial implementations of this technique 
currently exist, the robustness of the discriminating features suggests this is a 
technology with potential (Woodward et al., 2003). 
" Facial Recognition 
Utilising the distinctive features of a face, facial recognition has found increasing 
popularity in both computer/access security and crowd surveillance applications, 
due in part to the increasing performance of the more recent algorithms and its 
transparent nature (i. e. authentication of the user can happen without their explicit 
interaction with a device or sensor). The actual features utilised tend to change 
between proprietary algorithms but include measurements that tend not to change 
over time, such as the distance between the eyes and nose, areas around cheekbones 
and the sides of the mouth (Nanavati et al., 2002). A number of commercial 
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products are currently on the market such as Imagis Technologies ID-2000 (2004) 
and Identix Face IT (2004), with newer products based upon three-dimensional 
facial recognition (Biovisec, 2004). 
" Facial Thermogram 
A non-commercialised biometric, facial thermogram utilises an infra-red camera to 
capture the heat pattern of a face caused by the blood flow under the skin. The 
uniqueness is present through the vein and tissue structure of a user's face. 
However studies to date have not quantified its reliability within an identification 
system (Woodward et al., 2003). Recent studies have shown the external factors 
such as surrounding temperature play an important role in the performance of the 
recognition (Socolinsky & Selinger, 2004). This technique has significant potential 
as recognition can be provided transparently, night or day and if implemented 
within a facial recognition system (as a multi-modal biometric2) would improve 
overall authentication performance. 
9 Fingerprint Recognition 
The most popular biometric to date, fingerprint recognition, can utilise a number of 
approaches to classification including minutiae-based (irregularities within 
fingerprint ridges) and correlation-based to authenticate a person (Maltoni et al., 
2003). The image capture process does require specialised hardware, based upon 
one of four core techniques: capacitive, optical, thermal and ultrasound, with each 
device producing an image of the fingerprint. Fingerprint recognition is a mature 
and proven technology with very solid and time invariant discriminative features 
2 The combination of two or more biometric samples or techniques to constructively improve system 
performance (Maltoni et al., 2003). 
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suitable for identification systems. Although the uniqueness of fingerprints is not in 
question, fingerprint systems do suffer from problems such as fingerprint 
placement, dirt and small cuts on the finger, and are inherently an intrusive 
authentication approach, as the user is required to physically interact with the 
sensor. To date fingerprint recognition has been deployed in a wide variety of 
scenarios from access security to computer security on laptops, mobile phones and 
PDA's. 
" Hand Geometry 
The second most widely deployed biometric is hand geometry. The technique 
involves the use of a specialist scanner which takes a number of measurements such 
as length, width, thickness and surface area of the fingers and hand (Smith, 2002). 
Different proprietary systems take differing numbers of measurements but all the 
systems are loosely based on the same set of characteristics. Unfortunately, these 
characteristics do not tend to be unique enough for large-scale identification 
systems, but are often used for time and attendance systems (Ashbourn, 2000). The 
sensor and hardware required to capture the image tends to be relatively large (IR 
Recognition Systems, 2004) and arguably not suitable for many applications such 
as computer-based login. 
" Iris Recognition 
The iris is the coloured tissue surrounding the pupil of the eye and is composed of 
intricate patterns with many furrows and ridges. The iris is an ideal biometric in 
terms of both its uniqueness and stability (variation with time), with extremely fast 
and accurate results (Daugman, 1998). Traditionally systems required a very short 
focal length for capturing the image (e. g. physical access systems), increasing the 
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intrusiveness of the approach. However, newer desktop based systems for logical 
access are acquiring images at distances up to 18 inches (Nanavati et al., 2003). 
Cameras are still however sensitive to eye alignment causing inconvenience to 
users. 
" Retina Scanning 
Retina scanning utilises the distinctive characteristics of the retina and can be 
deployed in both identification and verification modes. An infra-red camera is used 
to take a picture of the retina highlighting the unique pattern of veins at the back of 
the eye. Similarly to iris recognition, this technique suffers from the problems of 
user inconvenience, intrusiveness and limited application as the person is required 
to carefully present their eyes to the camera at very close proximity. As such, the 
technique tends to be most often deployed within physical access solutions with 
very high security requirements (Nanavati et al., 2002). 
Additional physiological biometrics have been proposed such as odour, vein and fingernail 
bed recognition, with the research continuing to identify body parts and other areas with 
possible biometric applications (Woodward et al., 2003). 
3.3.2 Behavioural Biometrics 
Behavioural biometrics classify a person on some unique behaviour. However, as 
behaviours tend to change over time due for instance, to environmental, societal and health 
variations, the discriminating characteristics used in recognition also change. This is not 
necessarily a major issue if the behavioural biometric has built-in countermeasures that 
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constantly monitor the reference template and new samples to ensure its continued validity 
over time without compromising the security of the technique. In general, behavioural 
biometrics tend to be more transparent and user convenient than their physiological 
counterparts, however, at the expense of a lower authentication performance. 
Keystroke Analysis 
The way in which a person types on a keyboard has been shown to demonstrate 
some unique properties (Spillane, 1975). The process of authenticating a person 
from their typing characteristic is known as Keystroke Analysis (or Dynamics). The 
particular characteristics used to differentiate between people can vary, but often 
includes the time between successive keystrokes, also known as the inter-key 
latency and the hold time of a key press. The unique factors of keystroke analysis 
are not discriminative enough for use within an identification system, but can be 
used within a verification system. Authentication itself can be performed in both 
static (text dependent) and dynamic (text independent) modes. However, although 
much research has been undertaken in this field due to its potential use for 
computer security, only one commercial product to date has been deployed and is 
based on the former (and simpler) method of static verification. BioPassword 
(2004) performs authentication based upon a person's username and password. A 
major downside to keystroke analysis is the time and effort required to generate the 
reference template. As a person's typing characteristics are more variable than say a 
fingerprint, the number of samples required to create the template is greater, 
requiring the user to repetitively enter a username and password until a satisfactory 
quality level is obtained. 
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" Service Utilisation Profiling 
Service Utilisation describes the process of authenticating a person based upon their 
specific interactions with applications and or services (Furnell et al., 2001). For 
instance, within a PC, service utilisation would determine the authenticity of the 
person dependent upon which applications they used, when and for how long, in 
addition to also utilising other factors. Although the variance experienced within a 
user's reference template could be far larger than with other biometrics, it is 
suggested that sufficient discriminative traits exist within our day to day 
interactions to authenticate a person. Although not unique and distinct enough to be 
used within an identification system, this technique is non-intrusive and can be used 
to continuously monitor the identity of users whilst they work on their computer 
system. However, this very advantage also has a disadvantage with regard to users' 
privacy, as their actions will be continually monitored, and such information has the 
potential to be misused (e. g. the capturing of passwords). Although no 
authentication mechanisms exist utilising this technique, a number of companies 
are utilising service utilisation as a means of fraud protection (Graham-Rowe, 2001; 
Rogers, 2001). 
" Signature Recognition 
As the name implies, signature recognition systems attempt to authenticate a person 
based upon their signature. Although signatures have been used for decades as a 
means of verifying the identity of a person on paper, their use as a biometric is 
more recent (Woodward et al., 2003). Authentication of the signature can be 
performed statically or/and dynamically. Static authentication involves utilising the 
actual features of a signature, whereas dynamic authentication also uses 
information regarding how the signature was produced, such as the speed and 
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pressure. Numerous commercial applications exist, including for use within 
computer access and point-of-sale verification (PDALok, 2004b; CIC, 2004). 
However, due to the behavioural aspect of the technique and the variability between 
signatures, it is not recommended for use within an identification system. 
" Voice Verification (or Speaker Recognition) 
A natural biometric, and arguably the strongest behavioural option, voice 
verification utilises many physical aspects of the month, nose, and throat, but is 
considered a behavioural biometric as the pronunciation and manner of speech is 
inherently behavioural (Woodward et al., 2003). Although similar, it is important 
not to confuse voice verification with voice recognition, as both systems perform a 
distinctly different task. Voice recognition is the process of recognising what a 
persons says, whereas voice verification is recognising who is saying it. Voice 
verification, similarly to keystroke analysis, can be performed in static (text 
dependent) and dynamic modes (text independent), again with the former being a 
simpler task than the latter. Numerous companies exist providing various 
applications and systems that utilise voice verification, for instance Nuance (2004) 
provide static authentication for call centres, and Anovea (2004a) who provide 
static authentication for logical access solutions. To the author's best knowledge no 
true commercial dynamic-based approaches exist, based upon anything a user 
might say. Pseudo-dynamic approaches do exist, which request the user to say a 
random two numbers which have not been particularly trained for during enrolment 
(VeriVoice, 2004). But as the user is told what two numbers to repeat, the 
technique cannot be truly dynamic. 
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The list of biometrics provided should not be considered exhaustive as new techniques and 
measurable characteristics are constantly being identified. It does, however, outline the 
main biometric approaches to date with an insight into the newer techniques. For further 
updates on new biometric techniques refer to the International Biometrics Group (2004) 
and Biometrics Catalogue (2004). 
3.4 Factors Affecting a Biometric System 
As previously explained, all biometrics work on the basis of comparing a biometric sample 
against a known template, which is securely acquired from the user when they are initially 
enrolled on the system. However, this template matching process gives rise to a 
characteristic performance plot between the two main errors governing biometrics: the 
False Acceptance Rate (FAR), or rate at which an impostor is accepted by the system, and 
the False Rejection Rate (FRR), or rate at which the authorised user is rejected from the 
system. The error rates share a mutually exclusive relationship - as one error rate 
decreases, the other tends to increase, giving rise to a situation where neither of the error 
rates are typically both at zero percent (Cope, 1990). Figure 3.2 illustrates an example of 
this relationship. This mutually exclusive relationship translates into a trade off for the 
system designer between high security and low user convenience (tight threshold setting) 
or low security and high user convenience (slack threshold setting). Typically, a threshold 
setting that meets the joint requirements of security and user convenience is usually set. A 
third error rate, the Equal Error Rate (EER), equates to the point at which the FAR and 
FRR meet and is typically used as a means of comparing the performance of different 
biometric techniques. These performance rates when presented are the averaged results 
across a test population, therefore presenting the typical performance a user might expect 
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to achieve3. Individual performances will tend to fluctuate dependent upon the uniqueness 
of the particular sample. 
False Rejection Rate (FRR) 
100 False Acceptance Rate (FAR) 
Rate Equal Error Rate (EER) 
(%) 'I 
0 
Slack Tight 
Threshold Setting 
Increasing User Rejection 
Increasing Security 
Figure 3.2: Mutually Exclusive Relationship between the FA & FR Rate 
The actual performance of different biometric techniques varies considerably with the 
uniqueness and sophistication of the pattern classification engine. In addition, published 
performances from companies often portray a better performance than typically achieved 
given the tightly controlled conditions in which they perform their test. The National 
Physical Laboratory (2001) on behalf of the Communications Electronics Security Group 
(CESG) conducted an independent evaluation of a number of biometric systems, giving a 
more realistic perspective upon the performance that can be achieved. The results from this 
study are illustrated in Table 3.1. 
3 The performance rates presented in this thesis will be the averaged performance for the complete system, 
unless otherwise indicated 
by superscript "i" for individual. 
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Biometric Technique EER (%) Company 
Hand Geometry 1.5 Recognition Systems HandKey II 
Facial Recognition* 2.5 Identix FacelT 
Voice Verification 3.5 OTG SecurPBX 
Fingerprint (chip)* 4.5 Infineon VeriTouch 
Fingerprint (chip)* 6 Infineon VeriTouch 
Facial Recognition* 7 Identix FacelT 
Fingerprint (optical) 9 Company name not disclosed 
Vein 9 Neusciences Biometrics Veincheck Prototype 
'Altemative enrolment and verification algorithms were provided 
Table 3.1 A Comparison of Biometric Performance Rates 
However, it is important to realise no single biometric exists that would satisfactorily suit 
every application, because although security is a key factor in any decision, other 
considerations play an intrinsic role in the choice of biometric for any given authentication 
application. As such it is difficult to quantify what level of performance is needed for 
successful deployment. It can be noted however, all the biometric systems illustrated in 
Table 3.1, with the exception of the VeinCheck Prototype, are commercially available4. 
The International Biometric Group (IBG) considers four factors to be important in the 
choice of biometric, shown in Table 3.2 and has produced a Zephyr diagram to plot these 
factors for a number of key biometrics, as illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
User Criteria Technology Criteria 
Effort - How much time and effort is required on Cost - Cost of hardware capture device the art of the user. 
Intrusiveness - How intrusive the users Distinctiveness - How well the system identifies 
perceives the system to be individuals 
Table 3.2: Factors Affecting the Choice of Biometric 
4 Subsequent performance comparisons within this thesis will therefore be made against these figures. 
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Figure 3.3: Zephyr Analysis of Biometrics 
The Zephyr diagram illustrates the comparative strengths and weaknesses of a number of 
biometrics, ranked from (outside) better to (inside) worse using the four major factors. 
Taking an example from the figure, some techniques perform better in some areas than in 
others, for instance, keystroke analysis performs relatively well with both cost and 
intrusiveness factors, principally because the solution requires no additional hardware (the 
keyboard is usually already present) and thus is a software only solution and authentication 
is achieved by monitoring natural typing patterns. The effort required for keystroke 
analysis is relatively small, although successful systems to date do require the user to type 
in a specific keyword such as a username and/or password rather than dynamically 
authenticating the user by a previously unknown character string. The major disadvantage 
with keystroke analysis systems to date is their accuracy, with fairly substantial false 
acceptance and false rejection rates. 
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Voice, face, keystroke and fingerprints have the most favourable results when compared 
against these four factors. 
3.5 Biometric Approaches Applicable to a Mobile Device 
When considering the hardware and form factor of a mobile device, a number of biometric 
techniques are found to be more applicable for deployment than others. For instance, in its 
present form it would not be possible to deploy a hand geometry technique as the 
equipment used to create the image is both bulky, expensive and requires the hand to be 
spread flat on a surface rather than simply to be holding a device. Figure 3.4 illustrates a 
number of biometrics that would in principle be applicable to a mobile handset. 
4v 
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Signature 
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Figure 3.4: Mobile Phone Applicable Biometrics 
The inclusion of a camera for video conferencing -a standard service for third generation 
networks - would permit the use of facial recognition. Given sufficient picture clarity, iris 
scanning could also be utilised. The microphone, present for telephony services, would 
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open the potential for voice verification, and the keypad would allow a keystroke analysis 
technique to be applied. For handsets or PDAs without a keypad, a touch sensitive screen 
is usually provided as the human-computer interface, where signature recognition could 
subsequently be utilised. 
The use of biometrics on mobile devices can be supported by further results from the 
survey introduced in chapter 2. In all, 83% of respondents thought biometric authentication 
to be a good idea. Asking respondents which authentication techniques they are aware of 
and would use resulted in some both predictable and surprising outcomes, as illustrated in 
Figure 3.5. Predictable were the favoured biometrics of fingerprint and voiceprint 
recognition, which were also most known about through the respondent population. 99% of 
the respondents aware of fingerprinting were also happy to use the technique on a mobile 
handset. Surprising results were iris scanning, a technique often felt to be quite intrusive, 
being more popular and more familiar to those questioned than the less intrusive facial 
recognition technique. In absolute terms, keystroke analysis proved least favourable. 
However, as a percentage of respondents aware of the technique and who were willing to 
use the approach, facial recognition was least popular. An analysis of the results shows that 
the popularity of a biometric is intrinsically linked to the awareness of the approach - as a 
user is unlikely to use a technique about which they have no knowledge. With the 
exception of facial recognition, all of the techniques achieved over 60% of respondents 
who have knowledge of the technique would also use it. It could therefore be hypothesised 
that a user's willingness to adopt a particular technique is high and could well be increased 
through a degree of education. 
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Figure 3.5: Respondents Awareness & Preference towards Biometric Authentication 
An advantage of biometric-based techniques is their ability to perform the authentication 
on a continuous basis rather than a one-off judgement such as the PIN. Respondents were 
therefore asked whether a continuous and non-intrusive authentication mechanism would 
be allowable. A non-intrusive approach would be favourable since the subscriber would be 
highly unlikely to stop a voice call in order to authenticate themselves. The results revealed 
that 61 % of respondents were in favour of a continuous and non-intrusive authentication 
approach. Although very encouraging, it must be noted that some authentication 
techniques lend themselves to non-intrusive authentication more than others, for instance 
voice recognition whilst the user is speaking on the handset. Fingerprint recognition is an 
intrusive approach as it requires the user to explicitly place or swipe their finger across the 
sensor. 
For all authentication techniques including secret-knowledge approaches, such as the PIN, 
some information needs to be stored so that a comparison can be performed when the 
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device is challenged. For all biometric techniques this information, known as a profile or 
template, will be person dependent and represent that person's unique biometric. The final 
objective of the survey was to establish where respondents would prefer this biometric 
signature to be stored, i. e. on the handset or within the network. There are relative 
advantages and disadvantages of both approaches, such as storing the template within the 
network would remove the majority of computer processing away from the handset 
improving memory and battery life. It would also permit a greater degree of personal 
mobility, as users would be able to use any handset and have their usage billed to their own 
personal account. Conversely, information on the handset will remove any network traffic 
caused by the authentication requests, and remove the need for any personal information to 
leave the mobile device. The respondents were in favour of a handset centric model with 
50% of the vote, with 34% in favour of a network centric model (the remainder were 
indifferent). This is not an unusual result, in that respondents would tend to be thinking of 
factors affecting them personally, such as the loss of their biometric signature, rather than 
factors such as increasing personal mobility and network traffic, and as such would 
consider having personal control over their biometric profile to be the safest option. 
From a subscriber's perspective, it can be suggested that the use of biometric techniques 
would be an acceptable method of authentication, with a majority of users willing to utilise 
this authentication in a continuous and transparent manner. However, when considering 
which biometrics to implement within a mobile device, one must consider all the factors; 
of cost, accuracy, intrusiveness and effort, in addition to user preference. Table 3.3 
illustrates how these key factors vary for different biometric techniques with a specific 
focus on their applicability within a mobile device. Given the already high cost of 
hardware, the cost factor has been converted into whether a device would already normally 
or potentially contain the hardware required to capture the biometric sample - based upon 
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products currently on the market. Information on whether the hardware used to capture the 
biometric sample is reusable is also included. Hardware that can be utilised for a multitude 
of applications is arguably a far better use of resources and is more likely to be included 
within the device on a wider scale. A (subjective) accuracy category has been assigned to 
each of the biometrics. Given techniques with no empirical data on performance, a 
performance indication is included based upon the potential uniqueness of the technique. 
Also, each of the techniques have been assigned to either an intrusive or non-intrusive 
category. This factor is slightly different to the definition applied in the previous section 
and describes the practical intrusiveness and subsequent effort required in using the 
biometric. A non-intrusive label is assigned to a technique which has at least the potential 
to be implemented within a mobile device where the capture and subsequent authentication 
of the user can be performed without the knowledge of it occurring, for example, the use of 
facial recognition whilst the user is in a video conference. This would remove any effort 
required by the user to authenticate themself. It does not consider how intrusive the 
technique is perceived to be by the user. Conversely, an intrusive technique is one where a 
user is explicitly asked or required to present a sample. 
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Biometric Mobile Handset PDA Laptop Hardware Accuracy 
Intrusive/ 
Non- Technique Hardware Hardware Hardware Reusable Intrusive 
Ear 
Reco nition 
Maybe No No No Good Intrusive 
Facial 
Recognition Yes Maybe No Yes Very Good 
Non- 
Intrusive 
Facial No No No No Good' Non- Thermogram Intrusive 
Fingerprint 
Recognition Maybe Maybe Maybe No Excellent Intrusive 
Iris 
Reco nition 
Maybe Maybe No No Excellent Intrusive 
Keystroke Yes Yes Yes Yes Good Non- Analysis Intrusive 
Retina 
Scanning No No No No Excellent Intrusive 
Service Yes Yes Yes Yes Okay' Non- Utilisation Intrusive 
Signature 
Recognition No Yes No Yes Good 
Non- 
Intrusive 
Voice 
Verification Yes Yes Yes Yes Very Good Intrusive 
Accuracy (Subjective) 
Table 3.3: Compatible Biometric Techniques for Mobile Devices 
Given the apparent disparity identified in chapter 2, between users wanting more 
authentication security, but not currently using what is available, and the relatively high 
inconvenience factor experienced by users, the use of transparent authentication using 
biometrics would solve both the technological requirement for a more secure 
authentication mechanism and the user's need to remove any inconvenience from the 
authentication process. Unfortunately, biometric approaches with excellent accuracy are 
also the intrusive techniques. A compromise between the level of security provided by a 
technique and the inconvenience to the user is required. This pattern can be seen to 
continue, with techniques such as service utilisation and keystroke analysis having very 
good non-intrusive potential but with lower accuracy rates. However, a number of 
techniques can be identified as appropriate for deployment on mobile devices in general: 
" Facial Recognition, 
" Keystroke Analysis, 
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" Signature Recognition, 
" Speaker Recognition and 
9 Service Utilisation. 
This selection is based upon the hardware available on mobile devices and the possible 
non-intrusiveness of its application. It does not take into account other factors, such as the 
computational and storage requirements of the techniques. The reason for this is two-fold. 
Mobile devices are increasing in their computing power and storage capacity on an almost 
yearly basis, with devices of today already being comparable to basic desktop computers of 
three or four years ago. Therefore, in all likelihood, mobile devices of the future will not 
have problems processing the data required for enrolment and authentication. In the short- 
term, the widespread use of wireless networking technologies would permit the use of a 
client-server topology for authentication - where the server is given responsibility for the 
computationally intensive tasks and storage of biometric templates. 
Further analysis illustrates their potential for use within mobile devices under different 
circumstances. As previously described, facial recognition can be used on mobile handsets, 
however, with the proviso of a front-facing camera, PDAs and laptop computers could also 
utilise this technique. Keystroke Analysis could be deployed on all three categories of 
device to perform transparent authentication whilst the user is entering text messages, 
scheduling a meeting, or typing a document. Signature recognition could be used as a user 
is entering words using the transcriber function of PDA or the notepad function of a tablet 
PC. Speaker recognition has the potential to be deployed on all three devices with the 
presence of a microphone. However, its greatest application would be in telephony, where 
dynamic authentication of the user can take place during a normal telephone call. Service 
62 
Chapter 3- Biometric Authentication 
utilisation also has the potential to monitor behavioural patterns on all three categories of 
device, flagging possible misuse when the user deviates from their typical routine. 
In practice however, many of these techniques do not currently have the functionality to be 
deployed in this manner. In fact, only facial recognition could be used "as-is ", with all the 
remaining techniques requiring varying degrees of modification or development. 
Keystroke analysis, although commercially available for static-based authentication on PC 
keyboards, currently has no dynamic-based approach - although this technique has been 
thoroughly researched (Leggett, 1991; Napier et al., 1995). Of more concern is the 
applicability of keystroke analysis on a mobile handset or PDA, where the keypad or 
thumb sized keyboard represents a different tactile environment with which the user must 
interact. The feasibility of authenticating a user based upon a keypad is currently 
undocumented. Signature recognition has been developed commercially to provide 
intrusive authentication of the user based upon a signature, but not on general words signed 
through transcriber. Speaker verification has also been developed for static (and pseudo- 
dynamic) authentication, but does not currently perform dynamic authentication of the 
user. Finally, although service utilisation techniques have been applied within fraud 
detection scenarios, their use as a real-time authentication technique is also unproven. It is 
clear therefore, that the majority of techniques require at least adaptation, if not a complete 
feasibility study before practical implementation of the technique can occur. 
Of all the applicable techniques, keystroke analysis represents the most favourable 
technique due to the transparent nature of authentication and its possible deployment 
across all three categories of mobile device (with the proviso of a keypad or keyboard 
being present). This next section presents a brief overview of the research performed in 
keystroke analysis. 
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3.6 Literature Study of Keystroke Analysis 
A number of studies have been performed in the area of keystroke analysis since its 
conception in 1975 (Spillane, 1975). Although the studies tend to vary in approach from 
what keystroke information they utilise to the pattern classification techniques they 
employ, all have attempted to solve the problem of providing a robust and inexpensive 
authentication mechanism. Table 3.4 illustrates a summary of the main research studies 
performed to date. All, with the exception of Ord and Fumell (2000), were based upon 
classifying users on full keyboards, with Ord and Furnell utilising only the numerical part 
of the keyboard. 
d St Static/ Keystroke Metrics Classification # of FAR FRR u y Dynamic Inter-Key Hold-Time Technique Participants %) % 
Joyce & Gupta 1990 Static  Statistical 33 0.3 16.4 
Le ett et al. 1991 Dynamic  Statistical 36 12.8 11.1 
Brown & Rogers 1993 Static V,  Neural Network 25 0 12.0 
Napier et al 1995 Dynamic   Statistical 24 3.8% (combined) 
Obaidat & Static  Statistical 0.7 1.9 
Macchairolo 1997 Neural Network 15 0 0 
Monrose & Rubin 1999 Static  Statistical 63 7.9 combined 
Cho et al. 2000 Static   Neural Network 25 0 1 
Ord & Furnell 2000 Static  Neural Network 14 9.9 30 
Table 3.4: Summary of Keystroke Analysis Studies 
At first glance, it would appear both of the dynamic based studies have performed well 
against static based approaches, given the more difficult task of classification, however, 
these results were obtained with users having to type up to a hundred characters before 
successful authentication. Its applicability to a mobile device in this instance is therefore 
limited. However, all of the studies have illustrated the potential of the technique, with 
Obaidat and Macchairolo (1997) performing the best with a FAR and FRR of 0% using a 
neural network classification algorithm. In general, neural network based algorithms can 
be seen to outperform the more traditional statistical methods, and have become more 
popular in later studies. Notably, the original idea of keystroke analysis proposed that a 
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person's typing rhythm is distinctive and all the original studies focussed upon the 
keystroke latency (the time between two successive keystrokes); however, more recent 
studies have identified the hold time (the time between pressing and releasing a single key) 
as being as discriminative. The most successful networks implemented a combination of 
both inter key and hold time measures, illustrating that the use of both measures has a 
cumulative and constructive effect upon performance. 
It is very difficult to directly compare and contrast many of these studies in terms of their 
verification system and performance, as their method for evaluating (and calculating) the 
error rates differ depending upon the aim of the study. For example, while some were 
static-based verifiers, others were dynamic-based with varying character lengths. For a 
detailed description and analysis of these studies refer to Appendix B. 
A point identified in a number of studies is the failure of keystroke analysis to perform 
successfully for a minority cross section of users. These users tend to have high inter- 
sample variances and have few distinctive typing rhythms. As such, any authentication 
system that implements a keystroke analysis technique would also have to consider the 
small number of users that will exhibit too high an error rate in order to ensure both the 
security and user convenience factors required by the overall system are met. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
Given the three categories of authentication, authenticating a person based upon their 
unique characteristics represents the only plausible approach that results in improving the 
level of security provided, without further increasing any user inconvenience. It has been 
identified that, through the intelligent application of biometric techniques, authentication of 
the user can (in theory) take place transparently enabling them to be authenticated 
numerous times without inconvenience, as samples are captured during a users normal 
interaction with the device. 
The principal weakness surrounding biometrics is the accuracy of the approaches, with 
techniques varying in strength from very strong techniques, such as retina scanning, to 
weak options, such as service utilisation. However, no matter how strong a technique is, 
the effectiveness of discriminating between users is determined by the threshold level. A 
poorly selected threshold level in retina scanning could degrade its performance below a 
well selected threshold level in service utilisation. It is imperative therefore to ensure 
threshold levels are chosen correctly for individual techniques and possibly even on a per 
user basis. 
The survey has clearly demonstrated users' willingness to adopt biometric authentication 
and a number of biometric approaches have been identified for use within one or more 
types of mobile device. Facial recognition in particular has been shown to be useful, with 
little or no modification required to the technique. The remaining biometrics identified 
require some level of development. Other particularly useful biometrics include speaker 
verification, keystroke analysis and signature recognition. Both speaker verification and 
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signature recognition have some level of development continuing with respect to their 
application within mobile devices. However, the use of keystroke analysis on a keypad 
represents an intriguing proposal given that keypads are present on the majority of 
handsets, and because it also represents the simplest and most transparent authentication 
technique - as users can be authenticated as they enter general data on the keypad. As 
such, the next two chapters proceed to give some further focus to the feasibility of the 
technique within a mobile handset. 
67 
Chapter 4- Verification of Identity through Numeric Input Data 
4 Verification of Identity through Numeric Input Data 
The previous chapter discussed biometrics in general, with subsequent focus upon 
techniques that lend themselves to a mobile device. The inexpensive and transparent nature 
of keystroke analysis makes the technique an ideal authentication mechanism. However, 
the viability of the approach, due to the differing tactile qualities of keypads, has not been 
documented to date. This chapter presents a study into authenticating users based upon 
numerical entry utilising the inter-keystroke latency. The chapter compares and contrasts a 
number of statistical and neural network based pattern classification techniques in order to 
evaluate overall system performance. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Given the large number of mobile handsets that have keypads and indeed a growing 
number of PDAs with thumb size keyboards (such as Palm Tungsten W/C and Sharp 
Zaurus) - more similar to keypads than to full-size keyboards in practicality, keystroke 
analysis has the potential to enable authentication of users in a cost effective and efficient 
manner. If authentication of users were possible during their normal interaction with the 
handset (such as entering telephone numbers) then authentication could be performed non- 
intrusively and potentially continuously throughout the duration of usage. 
In order to provide a robust evaluation of keystroke analysis on a mobile handset, both 
keystroke characteristics introduced in section 3.6 were tested across two typical handset 
interactions: 
" Authentication of users based upon their entry of telephone numbers, using the 
inter-keystroke latency metric, 
" Authentication of users based upon typing text messages, using the hold time of the 
most recurrent characters. 
These characteristics were chosen due to the degree of discriminatory information they 
bring to the pattern classification problem. Previous studies had identified their potential 
(see Appendix B), whereas it is anticipated that other measurable characteristics such as, 
the mean typing speed and mean error rate would not offer the same capability. The inter- 
keystroke latency represents the traditional approach to keystroke analysis and performs 
classification on the time between key presses. The hold-time is the time taken to press and 
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release a key for a particular character. This chapter will focus upon the first of these two 
handset interactions with the following chapter detailing the second. 
4,2 Data Collection 
The purpose of this investigation is to determine the feasibility of identifying a user by the 
way in which they enter numbers on a mobile handset keypad. To this end, three input 
scenarios were developed to encompass the different input scenarios a user might 
experience. 
1. Entry of a fixed four-digit number, analogous to the PINS used on many current 
mobile handsets. 
2. Entry of a fixed eleven-digit number, analogous to the telephone numbers that you 
would enter on a handset. 
3. Entry of a varying eleven-digit number, again analogous to the telephone numbers 
that you would enter on a handset. 
The first and second input scenarios represent static keystroke analysis, in that they attempt 
to authenticate a person from the way in which they enter a specific number. However, in 
the telephone number scenario it would be unlikely the user would repeatedly enter an 
identical number - as the more common numbers would be stored in the phonebook, so the 
classifier would have to be able to classify users on unknown telephone numbers. This type 
of authentication is known as dynamic authentication, and forms the basis for the third 
input scenario. From the three scenarios several objectives can be achieved. The four-digit 
input will firstly help determine how successful a small input vector can be in classification 
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as compared to the longer 11-digit, and secondly whether the PIN code currently used on 
mobile handsets could be hardened with a keystroke analysis biometric producing a two- 
factor authentication technique (Monrose et al., 1999). The varying 11-digit input will 
indicate how well a keystroke analysis technique works based upon real input data, using 
the static 11-digit input as a basis for comparison - the 11-digit static input will represent 
the upper performance boundary for inputting numerical telephone numbers, as static 
authentication approaches have performed significantly better than their dynamic 
counterparts (Umphress & Williams, 1985; Joyce & Gupta, 1990). 
A total of thirty two test subjects were asked to enter the data for the three input scenarios. 
The number of input samples chosen for each study, thirty samples for the first and second 
input scenarios and fifty for the third, was based upon the requirement to keep the number 
of samples to a minimum. In a practical system it would not be plausible for the user to 
input an excessive number of samples before authentication could subsequently take place. 
The actual number were based on a successful study by Ord and Furnell (2000), with the 
sample size of the varying 11-digit input scenario increased to allow for the larger 
variations in input characteristic, as would be expected by a dynamic authentication 
approach. The break-down of the input data is illustrated in Figure 4.1. Two thirds of the 
dataset was utilised in the generation of the reference template or profile, with the 
remaining third used as validation samples. The pattern classification tests were performed 
with one user acting as the valid authorised user, whilst all the other users were acting as 
impostors. 
71 
Chapter 4- Verification of Identity through Numeric Input Data 
4-Digit Input 
Scenario 
11-Digit Fixed 
Input Scenario 
30 Samples 
20 Training 10 Validation 
Samples Samples 
11-Digit Varying 
Input Scenario 
50 Samples 
30 Training 20 Validation 
Samples Samples 
1 30 Samples 
20 Training 10 Validation 
Samples Samples 
Figure 4.1 Break Down of Input Data 
A specially written application was developed to collect the sample data, a screenshot of 
which is illustrated in Figure 4.2; a copy of the source code can be located in Appendix D. 
Figure 4.2: Numeric Input Profiler Screenshot 
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Figure 4.3: Modified Mobile Handset for Data Capture 
A standard numerical keypad on a PC keyboard was not deemed to be an appropriate 
means of data entry, as it differs from a mobile handset in terms of both feel and layout, 
and users would be likely to exhibit a markedly different style when entering data. As 
such, the data capture was performed using a modified mobile phone handset, interfaced to 
a PC through the keyboard connection, as illustrated in Figure 4.3. 
4.3 Procedure 
The investigation of numerous pattern recognition and neural network classifiers was 
developed using mathematical software developed by MathWorks called MatLab (2002). 
To make development simpler, MatLab comes complete with statistical and neural network 
toolboxes, amongst other functions, thereby removing the requirement to develop much of 
the source code from elementary math functions. 
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From the literature survey a number of pattern classification techniques were introduced 
that performed well in studies. These algorithms broadly fall into two categories: 
" Statistically based, and 
" Neural Network based. 
As such, a number of algorithms from both categories were applied in order to determine 
the most optimal level of system performance. Figure 4.4 illustrates an overview of 
keystroke analysis system. For detailed information on what these algorithms are and how 
they were deployed refer to the background information in Appendix C. In addition 
specific page references to the appendix are made as and where necessary throughout this 
section. 
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In order to investigate the classifiers, a number of program scripts were generated to 
perform various tasks, such as manipulation of the input data, generation of neural 
networks and the subsequent evaluation of the performance. Several of these function 
scripts were utilised in each of the classification algorithms and form the following 
common components: 
" Data Extraction Function - Extracts user's data from a number of text files, 
providing error checking and returns the input data for each of the thirty two users. 
" Outlier Removal Function - Removes outliers from the input data based upon 
`individual users' mean and standard deviation. An outlier being defined as an 
input whose value lies outside three standard deviations of a users mean. The 
figure of three standard deviations is based upon a Gaussian or Normal distribution 
where 99% of a user's samples should theoretically reside within three standard 
deviations of the user's mean. 
" Dataset Split Function - Splits the data into the required training and validation 
datasets based upon approximately 2/3 of the data contributing towards the training 
dataset and 1/3 towards the validation dataset, evenly extracted throughout the 
complete dataset. 
The parent-child function scripts utilised in the statistical recognition techniques are 
illustrated in Figure 4.5 with each of the parent scripts calling the child scripts in order 
from right to left. The application and evaluation of each statistical technique is performed 
by the respective parent script. 
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Figure 4.5: Statistical Recognition Program Function Tree 
Similarly, Figure 4.6 illustrates the neural network series of parent and child function 
scripts. The neural network series of scripts includes two further child scripts, a network 
script (of which there are two versions, one for each parent script, which create and train 
the neural networks) and an evaluating script which completes the error rate calculations 
and generates the overall system performance. Each of the neural network control scripts 
define the network parameters and performs the iterative tests required to optimise network 
configurations. 
---------------------------------------------- 
FF MLP RBF & GRNN 
Control Control 
Function Script Function Script 
Parent 
'-------- ------ 
Scripts 
----------- ----------------- 
r--------------- ------------- ------------ -------- -------------- ---------- 
Evaluate 
--- ---- 
Network Dataset Spilt Outlier Removal Data Extraction i 
Function ý ý8ý Function Function Function i 
i Child Scripts Function 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------' 
Figure 4.6: Neural Network Program Function Tree 
A copy of all these scripts can be found within Appendix D, along with detailed 
descriptions of their operation. 
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4.4 Results 
The results from the classification of numeric input vectors are divided into the 
classification algorithms. However, the first section describes (from a descriptive statistics 
perspective) the difficulties any classification algorithm will encounter with the input data. 
Many of the classification algorithms (in particular the neural network based approaches) 
have performed many iterations, changing the various network parameters in order to 
optimise the performance of the classifier. Over 1200 tests have been completed in total. 
With such a large number of tests, the results section focuses in detail upon the most 
successful algorithm configurations, detailing where applicable the differences in 
performance with respect to particular algorithm parameters. A complete set of results with 
all combinations can be found within appendix D. 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Analysis of the input data permits an insight into the complexities of successfully 
discriminating between the users. The problem is that latency vectors observed from a 
single user may incorporate a fairly large spread of values. This spread, otherwise known 
as variance, is likely to encompass input vectors that closely match other users. Because 
user's latency vectors do not exist on clearly definable discriminative regions, the problem 
is made much more complex for the classification algorithms. 
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Two types of variance can be extracted from the latency data: 
" Inter-sample variance, which ideally would be zero, so that every sample a user 
inputs would be identical and therefore easier to classify. 
" Inter-user variance, a measure of the spread of the input samples between users, 
which would be ideally as large as possible in order to widen the boundaries 
between users. 
For illustration purposes, the figure below shows a mean and standard deviation plot of 
users' input data across the three input scenarios. The figure presents each users mean 
latency value and also the variance of users input values by calculating the standard 
deviation, giving an estimate to the inter-sample variance for a user. 
900 
800 
700 
Mean + Standard Deviation 
600 
Mean 
E 500 
27 
400' J Mean -Standard 
Deviation 
300 
2001 
100 
0 
05 10 15 20 25 30 35 
User 
(a) 4-Digit Input 
78 
Chapter 4- Verification of Identity through Numeric Input Data 
1000 - 
900 
800 
700 
600, 
E 
500, 
C a, 
4001 
300' 
200 
100 
(I ) () Q 
0 0 5 10 15 20 
User 
25 
(b) 11-Digit Input 
', 
+ ý' 1 
30 35 
1600 T 
14001 
1200 
1000'' 
E 
800 
C 
I (D () () () CD () 
ý 
Nt , 
600 
400 
200 
00 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 
User 
(c) Varying 11-Digit Input 
Figure 4.7: Latency Mean & Standard Deviation for each User 
Although, an initial analysis of the inter-sample variance indicates that they are not ideal, 
however, some users obviously have smaller inter-sample variances than others. 
Significant differences can be noted between the three input scenarios, such as generally 
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smaller standard deviations and the lower average latency for the 11 -digit input compared 
to those from the varying 11-digit input scenario. This is expected, in the sense that users 
would become used to entering the fixed 11-digit number, and therefore the inter-sample 
variation would progressively decrease. However, it is the 4-digit input that shows the 
lowest inter-sample variance, possibly indicating strong classifiable regions. 
Notable in all three input scenarios is the large number of users that have latency spreads 
that coincide with a number of others, illustrating that they have very low inter-user 
variance. The latency spread being defined as the range of a users input vectors that reside 
between lower (mean minus a standard deviation) and upper (mean plus a standard 
deviation) latencies. This will make classification more difficult as users input vectors are 
more likely to be similar, or within similar boundaries as other users. 
Through an analysis of the inter-user variance it is possible to construct a table describing 
which users have the largest inter-user variance; with a view to indicating which users 
input data would be most successfully classified. Table 4.1 illustrates the top four users 
with the largest inter-user variance for the 4-digit and 11-digit input scenarios - the varying 
11-digit input was omitted due to the lack of discernable features because of the relative 
similarity in the user's inter-user variance. This table identifies Users 5,8,10 and 11 with 
the 4-digit input and Users 6,7,8 and 28 with the 11-digit input. According to the 
hypothesis regarding the inter-user variance (i. e. the larger the variance the more 
classifiable a user will become) these users should achieve good classification results. 
However, this technique can at best only identify a couple of networks and certainly cannot 
be exclusively used as a means of illustrating the relative complexity of users input data. 
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Rank User # 
1 10 
2 8 
3 5 
4 11 
Rank User # 
1 6 
2 28 
3 8 
4 7 
Table 4.1 Participants with Largest Inter-User Variance (a) 4-digit (b) 11-digit 
Also, what has not been taken into account is the multi-dimensional nature of the input 
data. Both the inter-sample and inter-user variances are calculated on a one-dimensional or 
scalar basis, whereas the input vector itself represents an n-dimensional vector, where n is 
equal to the number of latencies within the input vector (either 4 or 11). The calculation of 
the vector similarity in a multi-dimensional space is a complex task, and is essentially what 
the classification algorithms aim to achieve. Figure 4.8 illustrates a 3-dimensional plot of 
an individual users' input data with the varying 11-digit input scenario. Because it is 
impossible to pictorially present an image in more than 3-dimensions, the figure only plots 
the first 3 latency values in each input vector. 
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Figure 4.8: 3D Plot of a Latency Values for a Single User 
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The vector plot already appears fairly complex in having to derive efficient decision 
boundaries, without compounding the problem by increasing its dimensionality from 3 to 
11 (4 for the 4-digit input). Figure 4.9 illustrates how difficult the classification problem 
then becomes when the remaining users are also plotted. The correct classification of users 
in a multi-dimensional space is no simple task, and although the inter-sample and inter- 
user variances go some way in explaining the inherent relationships, indicating possible 
users that would result in good classification, it does not fully explain what the multi- 
dimensional relationships are at work here. 
A Graph to Show the Latency Plots in 3D Space For All Users 
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Figure 4.9: 3D Plot of Latency Values for All Users 
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4.4.2 Mean & Standard Deviation Algorithm 
The results from the mean and standard deviation technique are, due to the more 
rudimentary algorithm employed, fairly poor. Refer to page 4 of Appendix C for an 
explanation of the technique. However, for the 11-digit input scenario, this technique did 
prove to be the most successful statistical pattern recognition technique, with an EER of 
18%. A number of variables exist within the algorithm that permits the designer to 
optimise the performance. These include: 
" Number of valid latencies within any individual input vector - how many of the 
latencies in a single input vector are required to fall within the mean and standard 
deviation boundary? 
" Number of standard deviations - how large should the conditional boundary be? 
" Minimum number of repeated digraphs (for varying 11-digit input only) - to ensure 
only those digraphs that have been repeated at least the minimum number of times 
are used in the classification algorithm. 
For the 11-digit input scenario, the optimum conditions were obtained with the standard 
deviation set to 1.2 and the number of valid latencies within a input vector set to 8 (8/11= 
73% of the input vector). The optimum conditions for the 4-digit input scenario was with 
the standard deviation set to 1.4, with the number of valid latencies set to 3 (3/4=75%), 
giving rise to an EER of 18%. The optimum conditions for the varying 11 -digit input 
scenario were unusually somewhat smaller, with the standard deviation boundary set to a 
very small 0.5 but with the number of valid latencies set to 1 far lower than other scenarios 
(1/11=9%). The reason for this is likely to reside with the large standard deviations of users 
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input latencies. As such the EER for the varying 11-digit input is considerably higher at 
46% in comparison to its fixed 11-digit counterpart (18%). The following three figures 
illustrate how the performance of the classifier is affected by varying the design variables. 
The legend in each of these figures illustrates the FRR and FAR given the number of valid 
latencies required for authentication. For instance, Figure 4.10, the legend shows the FRR 
and FAR given 2,3 and 4 valid latencies respectively. 
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Figure 4.12: Mean & STD: Varying 11-Digit Input 
As each of the figures illustrate, it can be seen that as the number of valid latencies 
required are increased, the standard deviation required to achieve some level of 
classification also increases. This is not unexpected as the classifier is required to match 
more of the input data, which will likely require a larger input space to counter the 
variations in a user's input. Analysing individual responses more closely shows the worst 
result is User 26 with an EER' of 62% in the varying 11-digit input scenario, as illustrated 
in Table 4.2. Conversely however, the best result was achieved by User 11 in the 4-digit 
input scenario with an EER' of I%. 
Best Performance Worst Performance 
User EER % User EER % 
4-Digit 11 1 24 35 
11-Di it 14 2 16 41 
Varying 11-Di it 16 30 26 62 
Table 4.2: Best & Worst Users Utilising the Mean & STD Algorithm 
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4.4.3 Linear Minimum Distance Algorithm 
The minimum distance algorithm comprised of the Euclidean technique. In order to 
achieve optimal results the algorithm utilises the classification distance (the distance at 
which a user is deemed to be authentic or an impostor). This process is performed on an 
individual basis for each user, thereby further reducing the error rates. For information on 
this technique refer to page 5 of Appendix C. 
The 4-digit input scenario using a Euclidean classifier was the most successful, with an 
EER of 18%. The results for the minimum distance algorithm are illustrated in Table 4.3. 
However, as with any biometric, these performance rates are determined by defining a 
threshold value -a trade off between security and user convenience, which is illustrated in 
Figure 4.13, with an EER residing at a Euclidean distance of 280. 
Euclidean 
FAR FRR EER 
4-Digit 18 18 18 
11-Digit 22 22 22 
Varying 11-Di it 36 36 36 
Table 4.3: Minimum Distance Algorithm Results 
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Figure 4.13: FA & FR Variations in the 4-Digit Euclidean Technique 
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An analysis of individual user's performances has identified Users 8 performing the best, 
with the lowest EER' of 0% achieved with the 11-digit input. The worst individual result 
was obtained by User 6, with an EER' of 58% with the varying 11-digit input. The best and 
worst individual classifier performances for the minimum distance technique, across the 
three input scenarios are illustrated in Table 4.4. 
Euclidean User/EER' % 
Worst Best 
4-Digit 17/35 11/8 
11 -Diit 25/56 8/0 
Varying 11-Di it 6/58 21/15 
Table 4.4: Best & Worst Users Utilising the Minimum Distance Algorithm 
4.4.4 Hypothesis Test 
The hypothesis test utilised in this study was the t-test. Information on how to implement 
this technique can be found on page 7 of Appendix C. The level of significance, a, was 
varied in order to optimise algorithm performance. The most optimal level of a was 
determined for each individual user thereby further improving the performance rates. 
Figure 4.14 illustrates how the average FAR and FRR vary dependent upon the level of 
significance applied to the test. 
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Figure 4.14: FA & FR Variations in the 4-Digit T-Test 
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The results, as illustrated in Table 4.5, indicate that the minimum distance algorithm 
previously presented outperformed the t-test in all three input scenarios. The best result the 
t-test achieved was an EER of 23% with the 4-digit input scenario. 
T-Test 
FAR FRR EER 
4-Digit 24 22 23 
11-Digit 32 30 31 
Va in 11-Digit 38 37 38 
Table 4.5: Hypothesis Test Results 
Analysing the individual performances shows a broad range of results, as illustrated in 
Table 4.6 with the worst EER' of 56% with the varying 11-digit input scenario. 
Conversely, the best EER' of 2% was experienced in the 11-digit input scenario. Again, 
this table illustrates the variability in the performances achieved by users. 
T-Test 
User/EER' %) 
Worst Best 
4-Digit 16/34 8/5 
11-Digit 3/43 8/2 
Varying 11-Di it 12/56 3/17 
Table 4.6: Best & Worst Users Utilising the Hypothesis Tests 
4.4.5 Feed-Forward Multi-Layered Perceptron 
The feed-forward MLP networks are amongst the most user configurable neural network 
topologies. A detailed explanation of neural networks and their application can be found on 
page 9 of Appendix C. Unfortunately, due to the lack of design techniques governing the 
value of the parameters, a large number of iterative tests are required in order to achieve an 
optimal performance. From previous research (Clarke, 2001) two design variables listed 
below were identified as performing well to the classification problem: 
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9 Transfer Function - Hyperbolic tangent sigmoid function 
" Training Algorithm - Gradient descent with momentum and adaptive learning rate 
The following network parameters were varied in order to gauge network performance 
variations, with the view of achieving the most optimal performance rates: 
" Number of network layers - varied between 2 and 3 hidden layers 
" Number of neurons per layer - varied between 1 and 35 
9 Number of training epochs - varied between 1000 and 9000 
As each user creates an individual neural network and therefore respective FA, FR and EE 
rates, the results illustrated are an average of all the users' EERs. The most successful FF 
MLP networks are illustrated in Table 4.7, with the 11-digit input scenario achieving the 
lowest equal error rate of 13%. This was achieved utilising a two-layer neural network with 
11 input nodes, 31 neurons in the hidden layer and 1 neuron in the output layer, having 
been trained with 7000 epochs. It was noticeable the most complex input scenario (the 
varying 11-digit input) achieved its best results using the simplest of all three networks 
with 15 hidden neurons and 7000 training epochs. This would seem to suggest that the (FF 
MLP) neural networks are unable to generate the discriminative boundaries required and 
subsequently the most successful networks are those capable of generating more general 
decision boundaries. 
Network D scrip Lion 
Structure Epochs 
4-Digit 3191 5000 17 14 16 
1111-Digit 311 7000 15 11 13 
Varying 11-Di it 151 7000 27 25 26 
Table 4.7: Most Successful Feed-Forward MLP Networks 
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The results also show that the 4-digit input scenario requires a network configuration very 
similar to the 11-digit input, even though there is a 7-digit difference in the two input 
vectors. Based upon this, it could be conjectured that the 11-digit results might improve 
further given larger network configurations. Unfortunately, due to processing constraints, it 
is not possible to increase the number of neurons in a hidden layer beyond 35 in order to 
test for any further improvements to be gained in network performance, although this 
would seem doubtful as the network performance is tending not to increase above 30 
neurons. 
Monitoring the individual error rates, the EER varies considerably between users. For 
example, using the most successful networks as depicted in Table 4.7, Table 4.8 illustrates 
the best and worst performing user networks with their corresponding EER. Both the 4- 
digit and 11-digit input scenarios achieved EERs' of below 1%, with up to seven 
participants using a number of the network configurations with EERs' below 10%. 
However a number of users, such as Users 16 and 17, continually perform poorly, to such 
an extent that an argument could be made about the lack of applicability a keystroke 
analysis technique has with these particular users using this particular classification 
technique. 
Best Worst 
User EER % User EER % 
4-Digit 2 0 17 30 
11-Digit 8 0 16 33 
Varying 11-Digit 3 3 4 40 
Table 4.8: Best & Worst Individual EER's (FF MLP) 
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4.4.6 Radial Basis Function Networks 
RBF networks in comparison to FF MLP networks are far more easily configurable, with 
only two network variables - the performance goal and spread. In order to optimise the 
networks both variables were changed independent of each other with the performance 
goal starting at a value of 0.1 and finishing at 20, and the spread was varied between 0.1 
and 1.0. A description of the neural network can be located on page 16 of Appendix C. 
The most successful RBF networks are illustrated in Table 4.9, where the 11-digit input 
scenario again outperforms the 4-digit input, with an EER of 14%. All three input scenario 
results are worse overall than their FF MLP counterparts, with the worst increase in the 
varying 11-digit input scenarios EER from 26% in the MLP configuration to 29% in the 
RBF configuration. 
Performance 
Goal Spread FAR (%) FRR (%) EER (%) 
4-Digit 12 0.2 15 19 17 
11-Digit 8 0.6 14 13 14 
Varying 11-Digit 16 0.9 28 29 29 
Table 4.9: Most Successful RBF Networks 
An analysis of the individual network performances gives rise to a large spread of results 
with the 11 -digit input scenario, achieving an EER' of 1% for User 14 and a worst result of 
42% for User 25. These results were obtained through individual analysis of the most 
successful networks, as depicted in Table 4.9 and the complete set of results is illustrated 
in Table 4.10. 
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Best Worst 
User EER % User EER 
4-Digit 2 0 17 40 
11-Digit 14 1 25 42 
Varying 11-Di it 14 4 7 50 
Table 4.10: Best & Worst Individual EER's (RBF) 
4.4.7 Generalised Regression Neural Networks 
GRNN's are, in terms of implementation, the simplest of neural network configurations, 
with only a single network parameter to define. Using the (user-defined) spread value 
GRNN's can be quite successful. For more information regarding this approach refer to 
page 19 of Appendix C. Typically values for the spread range from 0.01 through to 1.0. 
The most successful GRNN's are illustrated in Table 4.11. The 4-digit input scenario 
achieved an EER of 13%, the most successful result across all the neural network and 
pattern recognition techniques. The varying 11-digit input marginally improved its EER in 
comparison to the RBF networks achieving an EER of 28%. However, this is still 2% 
greater than the FF MLP. 
Spread FAR % FRR (%) EER 
4-Digit 0.1 14 12 13 
_ 11-Digit 0.2 11 17 14 
Varying 11-Digit 0.4 23 32 28 
Table 4.11: Most Successful Generalised Regression Networks 
Bearing in mind the simplicity and speed of implementation, the GRNN initially appears to 
be a successful network configuration. Although it is relatively successful, care needs to be 
taken as small changes in the spread can cause large changes in the resultant EER. So 
unlike both FF MLP and RBF networks, GRNNs are very sensitive to network changes 
which from a practical standpoint could prove troublesome. 
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An analysis of the individual network performances, as illustrated in Table 4.12, highlights 
the differences in the EER between individual network performances, with some users 
performing better than others. For instance both the 4-digit and 11-digit input scenarios 
achieved worst EERs greater than both the FF MLP and RBF networks, but equally 
achieved 0% ERR' with User 7 in the fixed 11-digit input scenario. 
Best Worst 
User EER % User EER % 
4-Di it 11 0 17 35 
11-Digit 7 0 3 49 
Varying 11-Digit 14 9 5 48 
Table 4.12: Best & Worst Individual EER's (GRNN) 
From an analysis of all the results from the GRNN investigation, the results from the 11- 
digit input scenario proved most interesting, with a number of users experiencing low 
EERs'. For instance, across all the spread settings Users 7 and 8 both have EERs' of 0%, 
with 8 further users with EERs' below 5%. 
4.4.8 Extension to the Neural Network Investigations 
The results obtained by the neural network based classification techniques have proved 
promising, and have therefore given rise to three extended investigations: 
1. Best Case Neural Network - combining the best individual network performances 
from the various network configurations. 
2. Gradual training FF MLP - ensuring each individual network is utilising the most 
optimal number of training epochs. 
3. Area Code Input Scenario - authentication of users based on the area code of a 
telephone number. 
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4.4.8.1 Best Case Neural Network 
During the evaluation of the neural network techniques it was identified that individual 
network performances varied quite considerably between network configurations, with 
some user networks performing well and others poorly. This resulted in an average overall 
performance for a given network, as previously presented. From a feasibility perspective it 
would be of interest to combine these neural network results in order to appreciate how 
well the neural network techniques can discriminate between users. The resulting figures 
would thus portray the theoretically best possible results that can be achieved in any one 
given network configuration per user. 
Figure 4.15: Best Case Neural Network Result: 4-Digit Input 
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Figure 4.16: Best Case Neural Network Result: 11-Digit Input 
Figure 4.17: Best Case Neural Network Result: Varying I I-Digit Input 
As the figures illustrate there has been a significant improvement in the results, with the 
11-digit input scenario achieving an EER of just 5% with the 4-digit input achieving an 
EER of 9%. Analysis of the individual results shows that the 11-digit input scenario has 16 
of the 32 users achieving an EER' of below 2%, with 26 of the users achieving an FRR' of 
0%. The varying 11-digit input scenario has also seen a strong improvement in its results, 
with an overall EER of 18%, which given the dynamic nature of the input is a more 
promising result. 
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From an implementation perspective, iterating through several hundred network 
configurations in order to determine the most optimal configuration for each user would be 
far too time consuming and computationally intensive. However, what these results have 
shown is the ability of neural networks to correctly discriminate users dependent upon how 
they type numbers, and additionally, identified a series of network configurations that 
perform particularly well. Therefore future implementations would either need to iterate 
through a small number of network configurations and choose the best configuration, or 
develop an algorithm that can (from an analysis of the input data) determine the most 
appropriate network configuration for each user. 
4.4.8.2 Gradual Training Method 
The "Gradual Training Method" sought to compensate for the possible lack of 
generalisation. One technique employed to combat the issue of generalisation is "early 
stopping", where the data set is split into three -a training set, a validation set, and a test 
set. Both the training and validation datasets are used in the creation and training of the 
network, with the network being trained using the training dataset, but after each epoch the 
network error is calculated using the validation dataset. When the network error increases 
for a specified number of iterations, the training is stopped and the test dataset is utilised to 
gauge the network performance. Unfortunately, due to the relatively small size of the 
dataset it would be unrealistic to divide the dataset into three. As such, a gradual training 
investigation was sought where the dataset was split into the usual two, training and test 
datasets and the network performance was calculated at defined intervals in the number of 
epochs. This differs from "early stopping" as the training dataset is not used to prematurely 
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stop the training process and can therefore be used to calculate the performance of the 
network. 
The results achieved by this process are encouraging, with the 4-digit input scenario 
achieving an EER of 9 %, and the 11-digit input scenario achieving an EER of 8%. The 
results for the 4-digit and 11-digit input scenarios are illustrated in Figure 4.18 and Figure 
4.19. Although these results are not as good as the "best case" neural network results stated 
previously, they do show a marked improvement over the general results using only a 
single network configuration. The best result achieved previously with a single network 
with the 4-digit input using the GRNN configuration was 13% (EER), compared with 9% 
using this technique. The optimal number of epochs required by each user varies 
considerably with some users requiring as few as 500 epochs and others requiring 350000 
plus epochs. 
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Figure 4.18: Gradual Training Performance: 4-Digit Input 
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Figure 4.19: Gradual Training Performance: l1-Digit Input 
A problem with FF MLPs is ensuring that the network is large enough to solve the problem 
but not too large that it forms too complex discriminatory boundaries thereby adversely 
affecting the network performance. This technique begins to overcome this problem by 
permitting the network designer to over-estimate the complexity of the problem by using a 
large neural network and then fine tune the network using the number of training epochs, 
thereby effectively controlling the complexity of the discriminatory boundaries that are 
formed - the more epochs, the more complex the boundaries become in an attempt to 
minimise the network error created by the training dataset. 
4.4.8.3 Pseudo Dynamic Classification 
The "Pseudo Dynamic Classification" looks at overcoming the problems of dynamic 
authentication highlighted by the relatively poor performance of the varying 11-digit input 
scenario. In order for keystroke analysis to prove useful in any practical implementation it 
is important for the technique to be able to perform dynamic authentication. This extension 
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looks into simulating dynamic authentication by utilising the more static components for a 
telephone number, i. e. the area code. It could be hypothesised that a typical user might dial 
telephone numbers that come from a limited number of areas. As such, the investigation 
utilises the data obtained from the static 11-digit input scenario having removed the latter 6 
latencies from each input vector to leave just the latencies corresponding to the dialled area 
code. 
The results, as illustrated in Table 4.13, are promising with an overall EER of 11%. The 
gradual training technique was utilised with a FF MLP network configuration. Both 
configuration 1 and configuration 2 in the table represent the results obtained from a single 
network configuration, with the combined network results representing the overall result 
obtained from the individual results. The results are obviously worse than the static 11- 
digit input scenario as the input vector has been reduced from 11 latencies to 5, but are an 
improvement over the varying 11-digit input scenario. 
FAR % FRR % EER % 
Configuration 1 17 19 18 
Configuration 2 18 18 18 
Combined Net 13 9 11 
Table 4.13: Network Performance Utilising the Area Code of the 11-Digit Input 
So authentication on varying telephone numbers can be achieved through a two stage 
approach. If a user enters a varying telephone number where a network exists to 
authenticate the person by the area code, then a static approach can be used, otherwise, a 
dynamic authentication network could be utilised. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
The investigations have shown the ability for classification algorithms to correctly 
discriminate between users with a relatively good degree of success, with neural network 
approaches performing significantly better than their pattern recognition counterparts. The 
general performance of the 4-digit input vector (analogous to the PIN) suggests that the 
entry of the PIN on a mobile handset has a quite unique dialling pattern, perhaps due to 
user's previous experience of having to enter such short sequences on a regular basis, and 
could form a good basis for a hardened password approach as suggest by Monrose et al. 
(1999). Classification algorithms typically find classification simpler when the input vector 
is large, as it would arguably contain more discriminative information. Overall, this was 
found to be the case, with the 11-digit input generally outperforming the 4-digit input, but 
not always by a large margin. 
The inter-user variances generated in the descriptive statistics section, illustrated in Table 
4.1, highlighted a number of possible users who it was hypothesised would (due to their 
large inter-user variance) perform well in classification. A comparison of these users with 
the results from the combined neural network investigation shows all 8 users from both 4 
and 11 digit input scenarios achieving some of the lowest EERs' with all of them having 
achieved an EER` of below 10%. This supports the argument for the inter-user variance 
being used as a soft indicator towards possible classification success. 
The degree to which varying network configurations effects the overall network 
performance is somewhat negligible, with the optimal network configurations only 
improving the EER by 2-3% over the original results. However, the different network 
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configurations do appear to have a large effect on individual performance rates, as 
illustrated by the performance of the "best case" neural network results in Figure 4.15, 
Figure 4.16 and Figure 4.17. Performance comparisons of all the classification techniques 
for the 4-digit and 11-digit input scenarios are illustrated in Figure 4.20 and Figure 4.21. 
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Figure 4.20: Overall Classification Results for the 4-Digit Input 
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Figure 4.21: Overall Classification Results for the 11-Digit Input 
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From an analysis of the classification algorithms, it is clear that some of the individual 
network performances experienced 40%+ false acceptance and false rejection rates. This 
would indicate one of two problems. The first problem is that, a user's input varies too 
much from input to input for even a static keystroke analysis technique to prove useful. 
The second is that, the classifier may not be sensitive enough to the user's data. Both of 
these problems could be counteracted as the user enters more and more data to the 
classification engine. Currently, however, this error rate would be completely 
unsatisfactory, and any keystroke analysis algorithm developed will need to monitor a 
user's individual error rates and determine the level of security provided given the current 
input data. Conversely, a number of classifiers (particularly the neural network based 
techniques) experienced a number of users achieving a FAR' and FRR' of 0%, reiterating 
the ability for users' keypad interactions to be discriminative. 
Although classifiers were relatively successful based upon static inputs, to work effectively 
any practical implementation of keystroke analysis would depend on the ability to provide 
classification of dynamic inputs in order to provide non-intrusive, ad hoc authentication. 
Although the results for dynamic input classification have been poor in comparison with a 
static approach they are nevertheless encouraging, especially considering the small datasets 
with which the classifier was trained and validated. It may also be possible to improve 
dynamic authentication performance by utilising the more static elements of a varying 
input. For example the area code of a telephone number - this resulted in an EER of 11% 
using the area code of the 11-digit input scenario. 
Having established a successful method of authenticating users based upon numerical data, 
the next chapter will evaluate the feasibility of character-based classification, using a 
different keystroke characteristic. 
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5 Verification of Identity through Alphabetic Input Data 
Chapter 4 sought to evaluate the ability to verify subscribers by the way in which they 
typed numerical inputs. A second popular handset interaction, due primarily to the 
popularity of SMS messaging, is the composition of text messages. Therefore, this chapter 
has focussed upon on the ability to verify users by the way in which they type alphabetic 
characters on a mobile handset. Building upon the findings of Chapter 4, the classification 
algorithms utilised in this study are based on feed-forward MLP neural network 
configurations. The chapter will conclude with a comprehensive discussion on the viability 
of keystroke analysis on a mobile handset. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The numerical input investigation utilised the inter-keystroke latency or time between two 
successive keystrokes as the discriminatory characteristic for classifying a user's input 
vectors. This study looked into discriminating users by utilising another characteristic 
typing trait identified during the literature study, that of the time taken to press and release 
a single key, otherwise known as key hold time. This was chosen for two reasons; firstly 
and predominately in order to evaluate the feasibility of another keystroke characteristic, 
and secondly due to the increased number of digraph pairs (different permutations of two 
keys) character-based authentication introduces. In a numeric input scenario, the number of 
digraph pairs is 100, as there are 10 numbers. In a character-based input scenario where 
there are 26 characters, the resultant number of possible digraph pairs increases to 676. 
Many of the digraph pairs will not naturally appear in the English language reducing this 
number, and although it would also be possible to develop classification algorithms based 
on a small number of the most recurrent digraphs, a user could not be guaranteed to enter 
those digraph pairs in any one situation. 
Through utilising the hold-time of a key, the number of possible combinations is reduced 
from over 600 to just 26, making classification both simpler and more likely to occur in 
any one given text message. The hold time in this particular investigation is somewhat 
different from the traditional definition of the word, as keypad keys have to be pressed 
several times in order to type many of the characters (e. g. the letter `b' requires the number 
2 button to be pressed twice). The hold time in this study is therefore defined as the time 
taken from when the first key depression event has occurred to the final key press release. 
As described by the calculation of the hold time, this study utilises the traditional text 
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message entry method where users have to repeatedly press a key to enter some characters. 
It was decided not to utilise a predictive texting input method for two reasons: 
1. A key would only need to be pressed once for each character, thereby arguably 
reducing the discriminatory information contained within the hold time. 
2. As each key is only required to be pressed once, the number of digraph pair 
combinations reduces back to 100, therefore permitting the inter-keystroke 
characteristic to be implemented, as presented in Chapter 4. 
Although the initial classification concept for this investigation is to perform dynamic 
keystroke analysis on the text messages - due to the very large number of character 
combinations, a normal static approach where individual networks are developed for each 
word or even sentence is impractical. However, from Chapter 4 it is evident that static 
based approaches perform substantially better than their dynamic counterparts. As such, it 
was decided that by utilising the more static components of the text message, classification 
can be achieved statically. Therefore, by designing neural networks whose inputs to the 
network are based upon the most recurrent characters, classification can be obtained 
statically on text messages independent of the actual word(s) or sentence being composed. 
5.2 Data Collection 
The data collection stage of this investigation required new subscriber interaction data to 
be obtained. As such, thirty participants were obtained and they entered a total of thirty 
text messages each, ten text messages over three sessions, where each session was 
separated by a least a week. By using multiple sessions it was hoped to obtain more robust 
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and user-indicative input data - an improvement based upon reviewing the numerical input 
investigation procedure. The text messages themselves were a collection of quotes, lines 
from movies and typical SMS messages, where the only proviso was to ensure enough of 
the characters were repeated to enable classification -a list of the messages can be found 
in Table 5.1. No importance was placed on achieving a particular distribution of character 
repetitions as in a practical implementation the algorithm would dynamically adapt to the 
most recurrent characters within an individual users captured dataset. 
# Text Message 
1 the quick brown fox jumped over the lazy cow 
2 a lie gets halfway around the world before the truth has a chance to get its pants on 
3 hi John can not make lunch will phone you later 
4 love cures people both the ones who give it and the ones who receive it 
5 in a meeting at present will conference call you later 
6 everything is funny as long as it is happening to somebody else 
7 lack of will power has caused more failure than lack of intelligence or ability 
8 fancy a couple of drinks tonight down the local 
9 it is a rock tommy it does not have any vulnerable spots 
10 i will meet you in town by the bus station at one 
11 i love the smell of napalm in the morning 
12 master yoda says I should be mindful of the future 
13 a father is a guy who has snapshots in his wallet where his money used to be 
14 a man knows when he is growing old because he begins to look like his father 
15 all that stands between the graduate and the top of the ladder is the ladder 
16 if computers get too powerful we can organise them into committees 
17 a diplomat is a man who always remembers a womens birthday but never remembers her age 
18 i refuse to admit that I am more than fi two even if that makes my children illegitimate 
19 all of lifes great lessons present themselves a ain and a ain until mastered 
20 do you want the job done right or do you want it done fast 
21 a good marriage would be between a blind wife and a deaf husband 
22 A man is a success if he gets up in the morning and gets to bed at night and In between he does what he 
wants to do 
23 to educate a man in mind and not in morals is too educate a menace to society 
24 advice is what we ask for when we already know the answer but wish we did not 
25 immaturity is the incapacity to use ones intelligence without the guidance of another 
26 a positive attitude may not solve all your problems but it will annoy enough people to make it worth the 
effort 
27 a great obstacle to happiness Is expecting too much happiness 
28 consistency requires you to be as ignorant today as you were a year ago 
29 adults are just children who earn money 
30 children are natural mimics who act like their parents despite every effort to teach them good manners 
Table 5.1 Text Message Dataset 
Table 5.2 illustrates the break-down of character repetitions from the input dataset. Based 
upon the numerical input investigation, those characters with repetitions of thirty or greater 
could be utilised in the classification process if necessary. 
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Character # Reps Character # Reps Character # Reps Character # Reps 
A 140 B 28 C 45 D 55 
E 202 F 30 G 35 H 74 
107 J 4 K 14 L 70 
M 46 N 115 0 129 P 29 
Q 2R 73 S 90 T 151 
U 47 V 14 W 45 X 2 
Y 33 Z 1 
Table 5.2: Break-Down of Character Repetition 
In order to obtain and log this input data a second data capture application was developed, 
with built-in error detection to ensure the participants did indeed complete the sentence 
correctly. Screenshots of both the participant registration screen (Figure 5.1) and input 
interface screen (Figure 5.2) are illustrated below. The application source code and 
participants raw data can be found in Appendix D. 
Welcome To The SMS Rofile Generator 
PIo Enlei Yw FW Nana AM Settm Numbs 
RA Name: man 
Session ID 
" One 1 Two Thee 
Icl Copyi 2002 Nathan Gnike 
.. 
OK.., Cancel Heb 
-' 
Figure 5.1: Participant Registration Screenshot 
Figure 5.2: Input Interface Screenshot 
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The modified mobile handset developed for the numeric-based investigation in Chapter 4 
was re-used in this investigation in order to keep the same tactile qualities. 
5.3 Procedure 
The investigation required the generation of a series of new function scripts that had the 
ability to handle character-based input data - the format of which differed greatly from the 
numeric input data, although the overall procedure of data extraction, outlier removal and 
dataset splitting remained the same. The parent-child function scripts utilised in this 
investigation are illustrated in Figure 5.3 (please refer to section 4.3 for function script 
descriptions). Due to the larger number of reoccurrences within this set of input data, it 
was possible to perform an additional test on the feed-forward MLP paradigm that would 
improve the generalisation of the network. The technique known as "early stopping" 
performs a similar function to the gradual training test performed in the first investigation. 
However, unlike the gradual training scheme (where the system designer decides the epoch 
levels), early stopping will stop the number of epochs on an individual user basis and 
within a single epoch, thereby theoretically optimising the neural networks further. In order 
to achieve this test it was therefore necessary to create a specialist control and network 
function script capable of handling the modified function calls (not illustrated in Figure 
5.3). 
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r------------------------------: 
FFMLP 
Control i 
Function Script 
Parent Scripts 
----------------------- 
------------- ------------ r---- ý- ---- -------; 
Evaluate Network Dataset Spilt Outlier Removal Data Extraction i 
Function MLP Function Function Function i 
Child Scripts Function 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------ý 
Figure 5.3: Character Verification Program Function Tree 
The investigation itself utilised only one of the neural network paradigms, Feed-Forward 
MLPs. The RBF networks were removed, as they were the worst performers in the 
previous investigation. Due to the one-to-one mapping of input vectors to neurons that 
GRNN networks require, and the larger the input dataset (up to 94 input vectors per 
person5), the network was deemed inappropriate in this investigation as they would require 
several hundred neurons plus in order to provide classification (94 multiplied by number of 
users). Such a number of neurons would be both impractical and too computationally 
complex. 
By manipulation of the MLP network parameters the investigation has sought to minimise 
classification performance error. In addition to varying the network parameters as defined 
in the first investigation, this investigation has also varied the number of inputs to a neural 
network in order to establish the optimal number of input characters required to 
successfully authenticate a subscriber. A trade-off exists between utilising a longer input 
vector (thereby improving classification but to the detriment of increasing network 
complexity), and leaving the input vector with null values - since there are no guarantees 
5 94 input vectors are generated after outliers had been removed from the dataset. 
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that a text message may contain the characters you require to make up the input vector. 
Table 5.3 illustrates the number of the input vectors being investigated, along with the 
characters being utilised in the construction of the vector itself. 
Number of In uts Characters In Input Vector 
2 ET 
3 ETA 
4 ETAO 
5 ETAON 
6 ETAONI 
Table 5.3: Input Vector Construction 
5.4 Results 
The results from the verification of character-based input vectors are split into the 
classification algorithms. However, the first section outlines the descriptive statistics of the 
input data with respect to the thirty participants, allowing for an intuitive overview of the 
classification problem. 
Similarly to the first investigation, a large number of iterations were necessary in order to 
optimise the performance, and the following results illustrate the most successful network 
configurations. However, a complete listing of all the results can be found in Appendix D. 
5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics stage is an important aspect in the designing of a classification 
system as it permits an insight into the relationships that occur within the data. By 
performing mean and standard deviation examinations 
it is possible to establish the degree 
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to which input data is similar or dissimilar. Two types of variance were introduced in 
Chapter 4 which explained what the required similarities were between a users' individual 
input data and the unwanted similarities between different users' input data, i. e. inter- 
sample and inter-user variances. 
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Figure 5.4: User Mean & Standard Deviation 
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Figure 5.4 illustrates these relationships with each users' mean and standard deviations 
plotted, for the four most recurrent characters; `e', `t', `a' and V. It can be seen that many 
of the users share a similar mean and standard deviation plot, e. g. Users 2 and 4 with 
character `e' and Users 19 and 21 with character `t' (far more so than in the first 
investigation), thereby giving rise to poor network performance due to the networks 
inability to discriminate between them. However, this is not necessarily the case, as the 
similarity in mean and variance does not continue throughout all characters (as indicated in 
the figure), and since the input vector to the neural network is constructed from a number 
of characters it is hoped this should provide the sufficient disparities required in input data 
for the network to discriminate against users correctly. 
An analysis of the inter-user variance has presented a number of users that continually 
reappear with large inter-user variances when compared to the remaining users, as 
illustrated in Table 5.4. Using this technique assists in predicting which users would be 
expected to perform well in classification if the argument of inter-user variance stands true. 
Rank User 
1 23 
2 11 
3 10 
4 17 
Table 5.4 Participants with Largest Inter-User Variance 
In order to appreciate the difficulties involved in discriminating between users 
successfully, Figure 5.5 illustrates 2D plots of the input data. Figure 5.5(a) illustrates a2 
character input vector (characters `e' and `t') for a single user, with a fairly large spread of 
values, and Figure 5.5(b) illustrates the same 2 character input vector with all users' input 
data included. This problem is compounded when larger input vectors are introduced, 
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thereby increasing the dimensionality of the problem and the subsequent complexity of the 
neural network required. However, a trade-off situation occurs as increasing the length of 
the input vector can also have a positive effect with respect to network performance, as it 
can introduce more positive discriminative information to the classification system. 
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Figure 5.5: 2D Plot of Hold-Time Vectors 
From Figure 5.5 it is possible to identify a regular pattern forming with respect to the 
distance between vector points (appearing as horizontal lines), illustrating a somewhat 
discrete set of input data. The reason this occurs is to due to the keyboard-computer 
interface, where the keyboard functions under a make/break connection with a scan code 
identifying the key pressed being sent to the computer when a key is pressed down. This 
same scan code is repeated until a key up message is sent when the user releases the key. 
As such, the time difference between the key down event and key up event will always be 
a multiple of the clock cycle required to send the scan code (plus the time required for the 
interrupt to be processed by the computer), thus giving rise to a number of boundaries 
where vector points do and do not exist. Although the input data ideally should be 
continuous, thereby providing more discriminative information, the large number of 
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discrete stages in the input data should still be sufficient to generate the correct classifiable 
boundaries. 
5.4.2 Feed-Forward Multi-Layered Perceptron 
The feed-forward MLP network is the most suitable neural paradigm given this type of 
classification problem. Unlike the numerical input investigation, this study has 
significantly more input data with which to train the networks. Unfortunately, the resultant 
effect of this is that many of the network paradigms considered suitable in Chapter 4 are 
not suitable here due to the one-to-one mapping of input vectors to neurons. Feed-forward 
MLPs, due to the complex mesh of inter-connections between neurons, do not require this 
same level of input neuron mapping. 
The most successful FF MLP networks are illustrated in Table 5.5, with the 5-digit input 
scenario achieving the lowest EER of 20%. Although at first glance these results seem a 
little high, it must be remembered that the neural networks only utilising the hold-time of 
up to six characters for classification. These results were achieved utilising a network 
configuration of 28 neurons in the first hidden layer and a single output neuron as usual, 
with 100 epochs using the Levenberg-Marquardt training algorithm6. It would be expected 
that the larger input vector neural networks would outperform their smaller counterparts, as 
they would typically contain more discriminative information. A possible reason for this 
disparity is that the extra character in the 5 and 6 input neural networks does not contain 
any additional positive discriminative information, but contains no discriminative or even 
6 The Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm was utilised in this study as the traditional Gradient Descent 
algorithm was, given the larger datasets to process, very time consuming. Although the Levenberg-Marquardt 
algorithm is quicker in providing training, a trade-off exists, as the Gradient Descent algorithm provide more 
stable results (Demuth & Beale, 2001). 
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negative discriminative information. Alternatively, these larger input vector neural 
networks, due to the additional information contained within the vector, might require a 
larger and more complex neural network to compensate for the increased dimensionality of 
the problem. 
# of Inputs FAR (%) FRR (%) EER (%) 
2 26 28 27 
3 23 26 24 
4 21 23 22 
5 20 20 20 
6 23 18 21 
Table 5.5: Most Successful Feed-Forward MLP Networks 
Monitoring the individual error rates taken from the best performing network 
configurations previously presented in Table 5.5, the EER can be seen to vary 
considerably, as illustrated in Table 5.6. Of most concern is the 6-digit input scenario, 
where the worst case result was with User 26 being unclassifiable -a situation where the 
FAR' is equal to 100% with the FRR' equal to 0% or vice versa. It is worth noting, 
however, that User 26 is not unclassifiable with all 6-digit input network configurations. In 
this circumstance, with this network configuration, the classification algorithm is unable to 
discriminate between the authorised user and the impostor. Having said this, EERs' of 33% 
and greater as illustrated in Table 5.6 are in any practical sense also unacceptable. 
fI t # Best 
Worst 
npu s o User EER % User EER % 
2 17 12 22 47 
3 7 12 22 41 
4 23 10 22 36 
5 13 9 22 33 
6 10 5 26 UNCLASSIFIABLE 
Table 5.6: Best & Worst Individual EER's (MLP) 
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The practicalities of such a result would mean the user would currently be unable to use 
this particular network in a character-based keystroke analysis technique to authenticate 
themselves. There are two possible solutions to this issue. The first would be to obtain 
more discriminative input samples and retrain the network, or indeed try another network 
configuration. Alternatively, and more simply, the classifier would utilise one of the 
remaining neural networks residing with the other input scenarios. Through utilising the 
network that performed the best, user authentication can be made possible for all users 
(within of course certain performance boundaries). 
5.4.3 Gradual Training Multi-Layered Perceptron 
The gradual training MLP algorithm was developed in the first investigation as a means of 
improving generalisation and subsequent network performance, since traditional 
techniques such as early stopping could not be used due to the very small nature of the 
input data. This is not the case for the second study where "early stopping" can be utilised. 
However, the use of a gradual training scheme is not lost in this investigation, as it enables 
the network designer to closely monitor the changes in network performance as the number 
of epochs varies. Also, in a practical sense this could also be utilised as an authentication 
system to authenticate a user using a small dataset for training, very much like in the first 
investigation. 
The network configuration utilised in this algorithm consisted of 22 neurons in the first 
hidden layer, 5 in the second and 1 output neuron. The training epochs were varied by 15 
between the lower boundary of 15 epochs to the upper boundary of 150 epochs. The EERs 
for each of the input scenarios across each of the participants are illustrated in Figure 5.6. 
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The spread of values between each user is very large with User 23 's network achieving the 
lowest EER' of 6% with the 6-digit input scenario and User 22 achieving an EER' of 39% 
with the 3-digit input scenario. Users 8,9,22 and 27 all have high EERs' that would be 
undesirable in a practical authentication system. However, it is encouraging that seven of 
the users have EERs' below 10%, with a 14 further users having EERs' of below 20%. 
.n 
Figure 5.6: Gradual Training Network Performance 
An analysis of the network performance between input scenarios shows a downward trend, 
with the larger input vectors having lower EERs, and average EERs for the 2-digit through 
6-digit of 25%, 23%, 20%, 18% and 19% respectively. This would indicate that more 
information is contained within the longer input vectors - the result of which has its 
advantages and disadvantages. The longer the input vector the higher the dimensionality of 
the problem becomes, and therefore the easier it becomes to find a linear solution to the 
problem. Also, the more information the training input vectors can bring to the network the 
better the discriminatory boundaries can be. However, as the dimensionality of the problem 
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increases so does the complexity of the neural network required to solve the problem, and 
perhaps this is one reason why no real improvement was gained between the 5-digit and 6- 
digit input scenarios when utilising an identical network configuration. 
5.4.4 Early Stopping Multi-Layered Perceptron 
"Early stopping" is a traditional technique for preventing poor generalisation - the problem 
where networks are either over or under trained resulting in poor network performance. 
Despite similarity in approach to gradual training, "early stopping" has distinct differences, 
which were explained previously. 
As the number of training epochs was relatively low in this test (5-100), it was possible to 
utilise a much larger neural network than would otherwise be possible due to 
computational complexity and subsequent time to train. The network utilised varied with 
the most successful consisting of 18 neurons in the first hidden layer, 18 in the second and 
the usual 1 output neuron, and although the number of training epochs was arbitrarily 
capped at 5000 none of the networks passed 125 epochs. 
From the results, illustrated in Table 5.7, on average the 6-digit input scenario proved the 
most successful in terms of network performance, achieving an EER of 21%. The results 
also show the EER improving as the size of the input vector was increased from 2-digits 
through to 6, which given the increased size of the neural network, would substantiate the 
argument that more discriminatory information is held within the longer input vectors 
given a large enough neural network capable of constructing more complex discriminatory 
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boundaries. However, it is important to note these EERs are still higher than those 
achieved previously. 
# of Inputs FAR (%) FRR (%) EER (%) 
2 25 29 27 
3 27 24 26 
4 22 25 24 
5 22 22 22 
6 20 22 21 
Table 5.7: Most Successful Early Stopping Networks 
An analysis of the individual network performances gives rise to a large spread of values, 
with the best EER' being achieved by User 17 in the 6-digit input scenario of 8%. The 
worst result was an EER' of 43%, by User 22 in the 2-digit input scenario. 
f In uts # 
Best Worst 
p o User EER % User EER 
2 17 13 22 43 
3 17 13 8 42 
4 23 10 22 43 
5 17 10 8 37 
6 17 8 15 43 
Table 5.8: Best & Worst Individual EER's (Early Stopping) 
It would be expected that the "early stopping" algorithm, due to the one epoch resolution 
and larger network size, would outperform the gradual training algorithm; however this 
was not the case. The most probable reason for such a result is due to the difference in 
dataset splits. The dataset split in the gradual training algorithm may have given rise to a 
training dataset that is a true representation of the test data set whereas the dataset split 
with early stopping might have given rise to the data in the training and validation datasets 
being representational to each other but not completely representational of the test dataset, 
giving rise to artificially poorer network performance. This error arises purely as a product 
of having to split the input data into datasets in order to evaluate network performance, and 
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could therefore be removed in any practical situation by further training with the validation 
and test datasets. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The study has shown the ability for classification algorithms to correctly discriminate 
between users with a relatively good degree of accuracy based on a user's hold-time of a 
key. Although network performance has been consistently poorer than the static 
approaches presented in the numeric input study, these results do compare well if not better 
on the whole to the dynamic verification approach performed previously, illustrating that 
in terms of performance the hold time characteristic resides in between static and dynamic 
based authentication using the inter-keystroke latency characteristic. The ability for an 
authentication system to provide authentication independent of what the user is typing is 
important if continuous and non-intrusive authentication is to be achieved. 
A comparison of the inter-user variance predictions of good classifiable users again proved 
correct, with Users 10,11,17 and 23 all achieving EERs` of below 10% (see Figure 5.6 for 
a comparison). The inter-user variance measure could also have a second use in selecting a 
small number of users with which to train each user network. Currently training of each 
user is performed with one user acting as the authorised user with the remaining users 
acting as impostors. In a practical situation, with many thousands of users, it would not be 
practical or desirable for a network to be trained with so many users. Instead the inter-user 
variance measure could be used to determine those users with the most similarity in their 
input data to the authorised user and for the network to only use a number of those users. 
For instance, by using only the users with small inter-user variances in comparison to the 
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authorised user, the network does not have to contend with input data that has no similarity 
to its own and would be automatically rejected. 
The overall results, as illustrated in Figure 5.7, indicate a strong relationship between input 
vector length and network performance, with longer input vectors achieving better EERs, 
and the best result achieved by the best case neural network technique with an EER of 15% 
with the 6-digit input scenario. Although this investigation has only progressed as far as 6- 
digit input vectors, there is no reason why, in a practical system, the input vector length 
could not be determined intelligently dependent upon the available data to train the 
network and a user's typical length of text message (i. e. if a user's typical text message is 
rather long it is more likely to contain the characters required to generate the input vector 
for subsequent authentication), thereby making further improvements in the overall 
performance of the system. 
Figure 5.7: Overall Classification Results for Character-Based Authentication 
Similarly to the numerical input study, a number of users' handset interactions were found 
to be too general for a neural network to successfully discriminate between input samples. 
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Although this technique for character-based authentication is word independent and would, 
under the majority of circumstances, meet the requirement of continuous and non-intrusive 
authentication, implementing a static approach on commonly reoccurring text message 
words might provide the discriminative information required to authenticate users with a 
greater degree of accuracy, in particular those who currently cannot be discriminated using 
this pseudo-dynamic approach. 
Chapters 4 and 5 have thoroughly investigated the feasibility of authenticating users based 
upon their typing characteristics on a mobile handset - showing both the keystroke latency 
and hold-time as viable discriminative characteristics. In particular, this study has shown in 
general the ability of neural networks to more successfully discriminate between users over 
traditional statistical techniques. The overall process of discrimination would arguably be 
improved if both typing characteristics could be used in conjunction with each other, which 
could be implemented for numerical-based authentication. However, the process of 
continuous and non-intrusive authentication does not easily permit this technique for 
character-based authentication due to the large number of digraph pairs that exist. 
From the results from this study, keystroke analysis has shown promise when compared 
against commercial biometrics, as illustrated in Table 3.1. Although, the ability for 
classification algorithms to correctly discriminate between users very successfully is low, 
the majority of users are experiencing a fair to good performance. However, as with all 
biometrics, a number of users remain that are unable to be correctly authenticated to a 
reasonable degree. Therefore, any practical implementation of keystroke analysis would 
require a flexible framework, ensuring that even those users for whom keystroke analysis 
is not a viable approach are still provided with a adequate level of security (but equally 
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ensuring that the majority of users that are classifiable using keystroke analysis benefit 
from the higher level of protection provided by the technique). 
The results presented however, must be considered in context. Two feasibility studies were 
performed in controlled conditions, with users entering data repeatedly. Within a practical 
environment, the variability of the users' input data is likely to be larger, as users may be 
walking whilst typing, consuming alcohol or performing other tasks, making the process of 
authentication more difficult. Therefore, it would not be viable to use this technique, where 
a user is accepted or rejected based upon a single keystroke analysis result. However, due 
to its transparent nature, it would be possible to use an unsuccessful authentication request 
as a trigger for a heightened level of monitoring on the device. Therefore keystroke 
analysis is capable of increasing the transparent authentication capability of devices with 
keypads. 
Chapter 3 identified a number of additional biometric techniques capable of increasing the 
transparent authentication ability of a device. However, given the varying hardware 
configurations of devices, in addition to the performance of the techniques, it is clear that 
no single technique would suffice. On this basis, it is proposed that a mechanism is 
required that is adaptable to the differing hardware configurations, and capable of utilising 
an array of authentication tools to maintain the integrity of the system. The next chapter 
proceeds to describe such a composite authentication mechanism and the processes 
required to maintain security. 
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6A Novel Mechanism for Composite Authentication 
This thesis has described many types of authentication technique. Secret-knowledge based 
approaches have been generally found lacking, and individual biometric techniques only 
go so far in solving the problem. Chapters 4 and 5 have demonstrated that the use of 
keystroke analysis will increase the level of transparent authentication provided by a 
device, but does not provide sufficient performance to be deployed as the only 
authentication mechanism. As such, this chapter will describe the processes and algorithms 
required to provide a novel composite authentication mechanism capable of utilising a 
suite of authentication techniques both biometric and secret-knowledge based in order to 
provide a robust and dynamic authentication mechanism. 
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6.1 Introduction 
It is envisaged that a successful authentication mechanism for mobile devices must meet a 
number of objectives: 
" to increase the authentication security beyond secret-knowledge based approaches; 
" to provide transparent authentication of the user (within limits) to remove the 
inconvenience factor from authentication; 
" to provide continuous or periodic authentication of the user, so that the confidence 
in the identity of the user can be maintained throughout the life of the device; 
" to provide an architecture that would function (to one extent or another) across the 
complete range of mobile devices, taking into account the differing hardware 
configurations, processing capabilities and network connectivity. 
This has been achieved through utilising a combination of secret knowledge and biometric- 
based techniques within an appropriately flexible framework. The framework operates by 
initially providing a baseline level of security, using secret knowledge approaches, which 
progressively increases as the user interacts with their device and biometric samples are 
captured. Although user authentication will begin rather intrusively (e. g. when the device 
is switched on for the first time), with the user having to re-authenticate periodically, the 
system will however quickly adapt, and as it does so the reliance upon secret knowledge 
techniques is replaced by a reliance upon biometrics - where the user will be continuously 
and non-intrusively authenticated. The result is a highly modular framework that can 
utilise a wide-range of standardised biometrics, and which is able to take advantage of the 
different hardware configurations of mobile devices - where a combination of cameras, 
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microphones, keypads etc can be found. The proceeding sections will describe the 
components and processes of the composite authentication mechanism. 
6.2 Process Engines 
The computational backbone of this framework, from template generation to file 
synchronisation is provided by four process engines: 
" Data Collection Engine 
9 Biometric Profile Engine 
6.2.1 Data Collection Engine 
" Authentication Engine 
Communications Engine 
The Data Collection Engine is required to provide the capturing of a user's input 
interactions. The actual samples to be captured by the engine will be dependent upon the 
hardware contained within the device - as the hardware configuration of devices can vary 
considerably, with a mixture of cameras, microphones, keypads and even fingerprint 
sensors on some devices. However, as an example, the typical hardware configurations on 
a third generation mobile handset, will permit the framework to capture the following types 
of input sample: 
" Keystroke latencies from a keypad whilst the user is typing - including entering 
telephone numbers and the typing of text messages. 
" Images from a camera whilst the user is interacting with the device 
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" Sound from a microphone whist the user is voice dialling 
The Data Collection Engine, as illustrated in Figure 6.1, obtains the input data through a 
number of Operating System (OS) dependent interfaces, one for each type of input data, 
and a system monitor. With the exception of the system interface, each of the interfaces 
capture and log samples from their respective input devices. The system interface monitors 
device activity in order to establish which services and applications the user is accessing, 
so that the Authentication Manager (described in section 6.4) can ensure the user has the 
correct authentication level or, System Integrity, required to access them. 
----- --------------- Data Collection Engine rI-- 
Biometric OS Dependent 
Pre-Processing Software Interface 
(Optional) I 
I 
System 
Face Camera 0rß 
Authentication 4 Keystroke Keypad _101 ` Manager Data Collection I 
Controller 
Input Cache Voice Microphone 
L----------- I -----------J 
Figure 6.1: Data Collection Engine 
The type of input data captured by each individual interface is dependent upon the 
corresponding biometric algorithm contained within the Biometric Profile and 
Authentication Engines. For instance, voice verification can be performed in both static 
and dynamic modes. However, should the Biometric Profile and Authentication Engines 
only contain the algorithm for a static approach then the Data Collection Engine will only 
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be required to capture static input samples from the user device. The control of this is 
achieved through the Authentication Manager and a lookup table which contains the 
master list of compatible biometrics for a particular user, referred to as the Authentication 
Assets, which will be described in section 6.3.2. 
Once the software interfaces have captured a user's interactions, the next stage of the Data 
Collection Engine is to pre-process this data into a biometric sample - thereby removing 
any erroneous data from the sample, leaving only the information which is required for the 
authentication. This stage is optional in the client-server topology, but recommended to 
minimise the size of the template file that has to be sent across the network - thereby 
reducing network traffic. The task of pre-processing (and other biometric specific 
operations such as template generation and authentication) is dependent upon the 
individual biometric technique - each one will pre-process the input data in a different 
way. For instance, pre-processing of keypad input data to be used by keystroke analysis 
involves the calculation and scaling of timing vectors, whereas the pre-processing of a 
sound file for use by a Voice Verification technique would involve the extraction of key 
sound characteristics. 
In order to achieve modularity - so that the framework can utilise one or more biometric 
techniques in any given device - the system must be compatible with a wide-range of 
different biometric techniques from a number of biometric vendors. Although all the 
algorithms associated with a biometric technique are proprietary, a standard programming 
API exists for biometrics called BioAPI (BioAPI Consortium, 2003). Through BioAPI, the 
framework is able to make standard function calls to whichever proprietary algorithms are 
necessary, requesting for sample pre-processing, template generation and authentication - 
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thereby negating the requirement for any custom software development of biometric 
algorithms. 
After the pre-processing the Data Collection Controller will proceed to send a control 
message to the Authentication Manager, informing it what input data has been captured. 
This enables the manager to utilise the most appropriate input sample in a given situation. 
It will also send the biometric sample to the Input Cache for temporary storage and 
possible subsequent use in authenticating the user. 
The actual run-time content of the Input Cache is dependent upon the type of input data 
being collected, which is in turn dependent on the hardware configuration of the device - 
identified by the Authentication Assets. However, the general structure of the Input Cache 
consists of a table (per user) containing date, time, technique, sub-category and file 
location information on the biometric sample (and also secret knowledge techniques). 
Table 6.1 illustrates the table format using facial recognition, keystroke analysis, voice 
verification and intrusive responses as an example. 
ID Date 'Time Technique's"'ý' .; 
Sub- 
Cate o 
File Location 
1 19/05/04 09: 32 Facial Recognition None Wnput ut cache\Face001 
2 19/05/04 14: 48 Keystroke Analysis Text \\in ut cache\Ke stroke Tele 002 
3 19/05/04 15: 03 Keystroke Analysis 
Telephone 
Dynamic \\input_cache\Keystroke 
Text067 
4 19/05/04 15.15 Voice Verification Phrase 2 \\in ut cache\Voice003 
5 19/05/04 15.16 Intrusion Face \\in ut cache\lntrusive Face011 
6 19/05/04 15.18 Intrusion 
Cognitive 
Res onse 
\\input_cache\lntrusive_Cognitive002 
Table 6.1: Input Cache Database 
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As a number of the biometric approaches have several algorithms that enable the technique 
to classify users due to the different types of input, such as static and dynamic samples, the 
sub-category entry is included within the input cache tables to identify which algorithm to 
use. It also identifies in the case of an intrusive response which technique has been utilised. 
The File Location entry acts as a pointer to the biometric sample, for voice and facial 
verification this means a sound and image file (dependent on pre-processing). 
Once the input data has been used to authenticate the user, the subsequent result will also 
indicate whether it is believed the data belongs to the authorised user or an impostor. If the 
data is found to be valid then the sample can be passed on to the Profile storage element for 
use in calibrating future classification algorithms. If the data is found to be from an 
impostor then the sample is removed and deleted from memory. 
6.2.2 Biometric Profile Engine 
The Biometric Profile Engine's primary role is to generate the biometric templates that 
enable subsequent classification by the Authentication Engine. This is achieved through a 
series of template generation algorithms, which take the biometric sample (pre-processing 
it if necessary) and output a unique biometric template. The contents of this biometric 
template will differ between biometric techniques - the facial recognition template might 
consist of a number of distance measurements between key features of a face, the voice 
template might consist of amplitude measurements at discrete moments in time, and the 
keystroke analysis template might consist of a number of weight values corresponding to a 
trained neural network for the authorised user. The Biometric Profile Controller, as 
illustrated in Figure 6.2, then takes both the biometric sample and biometric template and 
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stores them within the Profile Storage element - the template is utilised in the 
authentication mechanism and the sample can be used again in re-generating or re-training 
the biometric template. The data control to the Authentication Manager is bi-directional, as 
the Authentication Manager initiates profiling and the Controller communicates with the 
Authentication Assets table, via the Authentication Manager, updating the usability status 
of the respective technique, thus enabling the Authentication Manager to subsequently 
utilise the technique should it wish to. 
---------, Biometric Profile Engine 
I Template Generation i Sub-Category 
Algorithms 
Area Code (Static) Face 
Character (Dynamic) 
Keystroke 
Telephone (Dynamic) 
Authentication 
Manager Biometric Profile I PIN/Cognitive (Static) Controller 
Profile I 
Dynamic 
I 
Voice 
Static 
II 
II 
I 
Figure 6.2: Biometric Profile Engine 
As the framework utilises a number of biometric techniques (each of which can themselves 
have many different input types) it raises the problem of template generation. It would be 
implausible for the system to request the user to provide all the input data required to 
generate the templates at initial device registration - especially keystroke analysis, where 
the template generation algorithm requires as many as thirty samples before the template 
can be created. This problem is solved 
due to the philosophy behind the framwork itself - 
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which initially provides no security beyond what is currently available on cellular, mobile 
devices (i. e. secret-knowledge approaches such as the PIN or password) and for the 
biometric security to gradually increase as the user naturally interacts with their device. 
Apart from initially setting the PIN code and cognitive question(s), this will remove any 
requirement to generate any templates, which given the number of input scenarios, could 
take a significant period of time to setup, with the secondary and subsequent effect of 
ensuring the input data is truly representative of the natural users device interaction. 
However, it is likely that some biometric templates maybe generated during device 
registration, such as facial recognition. If the device has the hardware available, several 
images of the user can be taken whilst the user is setting the cognitive responses and can be 
subsequently used to generate the template. 
The nature and storage of the user's input data within the Profile storage element is 
illustrated in the tables below. The Profile storage element contains two types of 
information. The first is a Biometric Template database containing a list of biometric 
templates that have been generated, including re-train dates and file location of the 
template. It is this table which both the Biometric Profile Engine and Authentication 
Engine will utilise in order to re-train algorithms and perform authentication requests. 
9D Date Retrain' 
Date 
Technique 
; ý. 
Technique 
Sub-Category 
',, Threshold 
Scale 
Template Storage .: y 
10/06/04 24/11/02 Keystroke Static: 4 1 \\ rofile\tem Tate\ke stroke 4 
2 15/06/04 N/A Keystroke Co nitive 1 \\ rofile\tem Tate\ke stroke coq 
3 19/06/04 N/A Keystroke Static: 5 1 \\ rofile\tem Tate\ke stroke 5 
4 19/06/04 N/A Voice Static: 2 1 \\ rofile\tem Tate\voice static 1 
5 21/06/04 N/A Keystroke Static: 11 1 \\ rofle\tem late\ke stroke 11 
6 23/06/04 25/11/03 Facial 1 \\ rofile\tem Tate\face 
7 25/06/04 N/A Voice Static: 4 1 \\ rofile\tem late\voice static 4 
Table 6.2: Biometric Template Database 
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The second type of information consists of a series of tables which contain the raw input 
data from the authorised user. One master table is present for each biometric technique that 
exists on the device, containing the file location of the raw data. For keystroke analysis this 
means another database containing each of the various sub-categories of technique, as 
illustrated in Table 6.3. For facial and voice verification, the file locations pin-point the 
original (pre-processed) image and sound files, as illustrated in Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 
respectively. In addition to the biometric tables, a cognitive response table is also required 
to store a users' cognitive questions and answers, from which samples can be subsequently 
compared. 
ID " Date Time Sub-Category file Location ° 
2 20/11/03 14: 48 Static: 4 \\ rofile\ke stroke\ke data. mdb - PIN Table 
3 22/11/03 10.03 Dynamic \\ rofile\ke stroke\ke data. mdb - Tele Table 
4 23/11/03 13: 01 Character \1 rofile\ke stroke\ke data. mdb - Char Table 
Table 6.3: Profile Storage: Keystroke Dynamics 
AD Date' 'ý Time File Location 
1 19/11/03 09: 32 \\ rofile\face\rawl. ' e 
2 20/11/03 14: 48 \\ rofile\face\raw2. ' e 
3 22/11/03 10.03 \\ rofile\face\raw3. e 
Table 6.4: Profile Storage: Facial Recognition 
ID ' Date . Time ' Sub-Cate o t"File Location- 1 19/11/03 09: 32 Static: 10 \\profile\voice\rawl. wav 
2 20/11/03 14: 48 Static: 4 \\ rofile\voice\raw2. wav 
3 22/11/03 10.03 Dynamic \\profile\voice\raw3. wav 
Table 6.5: Profile Storage: Voice Verification 
, ID 1 Date ' Tlme Cognitive, -, Question-' 
Cognitive 
Response ! 
Keystroke 
Ä Enabled: 
Template 
Generated 
1 19/11/03 09: 32 Date of Birth 19/05/78 True 12/06/04 
2 20/11/03 14: 48 PIN 354621 False 
3 22/11/03 10.03 
Mothers 
Maiden Name Kent True 14/06/04 
Table 6.6: Profile Storage: Cognitive Response 
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A user's input data is stored even after template generation, so that the biometric 
algorithms can perform re-training in order to achieve a better performance rate. However, 
a limit will exist on how much data the system wishes to store and for how long - as user's 
characteristics will change over time and early input samples may not still be suitable. As 
such the system administrator will need to define a period of storage - which in a 
standalone scenario is likely to be largely dependent upon the storage capabilities of 
device. 
The biometric template database also contains a column referred to as the "Threshold 
Scale". This is a numerical scale which permits the framework a level of flexibility with 
regard to the threshold setting of the numerous biometric techniques. The threshold level, 
as discussed in detail in Chapter 3, determines the level of security provided by a biometric 
approach versus inconvenience - as too higher a security level would result in the 
authorised user being falsely rejected more often. In practice, the setting of this threshold 
tends to prove problematic. Setting a threshold level of 0.8 might work well for one user 
but not another, and neither does this value translate into a meaningful performance level. 
In principle, the main method of setting the threshold level is determined by the security 
setting for an individual, whether it is set to high, medium or low. It is suggested that these 
threshold settings are calculated based upon: 
-Z 
Ouput 
_ 
Level 
_ 
Of 
_ 
Sample 
Medium = Average_Output_Level_Of _Samples - No_Of 
-Samples 
With the low and high level settings based upon the average +/- the difference between the 
average output level and the highest output level achieved divided by two. 
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((Highest - 
Output Level - Average ) Low = Average_ Output - 
/I 2 
(Highest_ Output_ Level - Average 1 High =Average - 
Output + 
/I 2 
6.2.3 Authentication Engine 
The Authentication Engine is controlled by the Authentication Manager, and performs the 
actual authentication. When requested, the Authentication Engine will perform the 
authentication by retrieving the required input data from the Input Cache and the 
corresponding biometric template from the Profile Cache, as illustrated in Figure 6.3 . 
If 
the Authentication Engine passes the input sample, the data is moved from the Input Cache 
into the Profile Cache by the Authentication Controller, for use in subsequent re-training. 
If the sample fails, it is deleted from the Input Cache. 
Authentication Engine I 
Authentication I Sub-Category 
Algorithms 
Area Code (Static) Face 
I Character (Dynamic) 
Keystroke 
Telephone (Dynamic) 
Authentication 
Manager Authentication PIN/Cognitive (Static) 
Controller 
i 
Input Cache 11. 
Dynamic 
Profile Voice 
Voice Dialling (Static) 
Figure 6.3: Authentication Engine 
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The result of the authentication is reported to the Authentication Manager, with the 
subsequent response being dependent upon a decision process based on variables such as 
the system integrity, confidence level of authentication and authentication level of the 
system. These are all discussed in detail in section 6.3. 
6.2.4 Communications Engine 
The Communications Engine provides a means of connecting server and client. The actual 
mechanism by which this is achieved is independent upon the wireless access technology 
available to the mobile device, but is a function of the device rather than the authentication 
architecture. The role of the engine to transfer information based upon six categories, as 
illustrated in Figure 6.4. 
----------------- Communications Engine 
Communication Function I 
I 
Authentication Samples (Biometric/Secret) 
I 
Biometric Template Synchronisation 
Client Device 
Authentication Authentication Response Parameters 
Manager Communications 
Input Cache 44 
Controller 
System/Client Parameters 
Profile 
Intrusive Authentication Request 
I 
I 
Security Status Information I 
I--------------------I 
Figure 6.4: Communications Engine 
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The authentication samples will vary in nature dependent upon the biometric techniques 
available to a particular mobile device. Within a third generation mobile handset, it is 
envisaged this data will include facial images, timing vectors and voice waveforms, in 
addition to cognitive responses or password based data. If the client-server topology is 
defined, where some or all of the authentication techniques are performed locally, then it is 
imperative the Communications Engine performs biometric template synchronisation to 
ensure the most up to date and relevant template is being employed. Authentication 
Response and System/Client parameters allow server and client to know what mode of 
operation they are working in, which side performs authentication and for which 
authentication techniques. For instance, it would be plausible to perform the less 
computational complex functions, such as password/cognitive response verification, on the 
mobile device, reducing network overhead, but leave the server to perform the more 
complex biometric verifications. Although not defined by this mechanism it is assumed the 
communication and storage of the biometric samples are performed securely to ensure no 
manipulation of the templates can occur. The Communications Engine also enables the 
server to provide feedback to the user, either through requesting they intrusively 
authenticate themselves or via a Security Status -a mechanism that enables the user to 
monitor the protection provided to the device. 
6.3 System Components 
This section addresses the various remaining components of the framework (with the 
exception of the Authentication Manager), which helps to provide the system parameters 
and define the authentication techniques. This section is split into the following: 
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" Security Status 
" Intrusion Interface 
" Authentication Assets 
" System Parameters & Administration 
" Authentication Response Assignment 
6.3.1 Security Status & Intrusion Interface 
The Security Status and Intrusion Interface components represent the two output processes 
of the framework. The Security Status simply provides information to the end-user 
regarding the level of security currently provided by the device, the success or failure of 
previous authentication requests and the System Integrity. Although it is perceived that the 
majority of users will have no interest in viewing this, it is included as an informational 
guide to the user. 
Each mobile device must be able to establish the level of security with which it can 
provide. This is achieved by determining which authentication techniques are currently 
enabled (i. e. have a template generated or/and password enabled). As the performance of 
biometric techniques varies (as identified in Chapter 3) a process is required to ensure 
weaker authentication techniques do not compromise the level of security. To this end, 
each of the authentication techniques is given a confidence level depending on the error 
rate. As illustrated in Table 6.7, the confidence levels are separated into two types, those 
concerned with biometric techniques and those based on secret knowledge techniques. The 
biometric techniques are categorised on their published false acceptance rate for the 
139 
Chapter 6-A Novel Mechanism for Composite Authentication 
system7, with the system having more confidence the lower the FAR. The secret 
knowledge techniques are split into two levels, P0, which represents PIN, password or 
cognitive based responses, and P2 which represents the administrator password or the PUK 
code in cellular network terms. 
Biometric Secret Knowledge 
Confidence Level FAR Level Confidence Level Input Required 
BO 10-20% PO PIN/Cognitive 
BI 5-10% P1 PUK (Operator)/ Administrator Password 
B2 2-5% 
B3 0-2% 
Table 6.7: Confidence Level Definitions 
These confidence values are also used in determining what level of the security the device 
is able to provide. As illustrated Table 6.8, a security level of `excellent' is given to the 
device if the device is capable of providing a biometric authentication with a confidence 
level of B3. The PIN Only security level is used as an indication of secret knowledge level 
security only - it does not mean it has a lower security level than BO, but just that only 
PIN/password security is available. 
Security Level Confidence Level 
Excellent B3 
High B2 
Medium B1 
Low BO 
PIN Only PO 
Table 6.8: Security Level of Mobile Device 
The security level is only an indication of the potential security the device is able obtain 
and not of what the current security level is - this is achieved through the use of a System 
Integrity measure. The security level of a device could be used by manufacturers and/or 
7 Not on individual performances 
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network operators as a selling point. The System Integrity is one of two key processes 
working at the core of the framework to maintain security. It is a sliding numerical value 
between -5 and +58, with -5 indicating a low security, 0a normal `device switch-on' level 
and +5 indicating a high security level. The System Integrity changes depending upon the 
result of authentication requests and the time that has elapsed between them. Each of the 
confidence levels are given a number which is added or subtracted from the System 
Integrity dependent upon whether the technique has passed or failed the input sample, up 
to a defined maximum level. This System Integrity level is a continuous measure 
increasing and decreasing over the time of a user's session. Table 6.9 illustrates by how 
much the System Integrity level is to be increased or decreased for each of the confidence 
levels. The maximum System Integrity level is included to ensure a user is unable to 
achieve the higher integrity levels by utilising techniques with relatively high false 
acceptance rates (i. e. those with lower confidence levels - B1, BO). This ensures a user 
with a System Integrity Level of 5 has not only had consistent successful authentication 
requests during their session, but has also recently been authenticated by a biometric 
technique with a confidence value of B3. 
Confidence Level Increment/Decrement Value Maximum System Integrity Level 
P1 None - System Integrity set to 0 NA 
PO NA NA 
B3 2 5 
B2 1.5 4 
131 1 3 
BO 0.5 2 
Table 6.9: System Integrity Changes 
8 The boundaries defined on the numerical scale are only provided as a suggestion. Practical evaluation might 
result in a redefining of these limits. 
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The secret knowledge confidence levels have a somewhat different role. P1 has the effect 
of resetting the System Integrity level - since in a client-server topology, P1 represents the 
network administrators overriding the password (or PUK code in cellular terms). In a 
standalone topology, typing PI would either unlock the device or give access to the host 
administrative settings. The PO level is only required in two scenarios - if no biometric 
approaches are available for use (in which case the Authentication Manager will resort to 
providing a basic level of security through the use of the PIN, password or cognitive 
response), and secondly as a means of providing two-factor authentication - the PIN or 
password is used in conjunction with keystroke analysis to verify the authenticity of the 
user. In this special situation, whatever the confidence value of the respective keystroke 
analysis technique, if successful, the level is increased by 1 (up to the maximum of B3) - 
as this represents a multi-modal approach, referred to specifically as a hardened password. 
The period of time that has elapsed between authentication requests also affects the System 
Integrity level. In order to ensure that devices remaining unused for a period do not 
continue to have a high integrity level, which could be subsequently misused by an 
impostor to access more sensitive information and expensive services, the integrity level 
begins to decrease overtime. The actual period is to be configurable on a per user basis 
through the administrative settings - frequent users could benefit from a lower period 
(such as 30 minutes) and infrequent users with a slightly longer period (such as 50 
minutes). After each defined period of misuse the System Integrity level decreases until the 
normal security level of 0 is reached. In practical terms this means a mobile device with a 
period of 30 minutes set and the highest integrity level of 5 will take 2 hours 30 minutes to 
decrease down to a normal integrity level. Negative System Integrity values however 
remain until a subsequent authentication request changes 
it (for the better or worse) or the 
P1 level code is entered. 
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The Intrusion Interface is required on the occasions when the identity of the user needs to 
be verified before continuation of services. Although the framework is designed to operate 
in a non-intrusive manner, there are occasions when the user will be required to 
authenticate themselves, typically when the system has already non-intrusively and 
unsuccessfully attempted to authenticate the user several times - see section 6.4 for an 
explanation as to when these occasions arise. The interface itself, and how it operates, will 
vary between devices and operating systems depending how complex the system is and 
what resources are available to it - e. g. whether the device has the ability to control file 
accesses. On simple devices it might just remove the option of going into a specific sub 
menu with a subsequent message advising of the reason why. On more complex devices, 
where the underlying operating system is more complex, a more comprehensive interface 
will be required to lock out the necessary controls. 
6.3.2 Authentication Assets 
The Authentication Assets are a detailed breakdown of the authentication mechanisms 
available to the Authentication Manager for a particular mobile device, and include both 
biometric and secret knowledge based approaches. The information contained within the 
Authentication Assets is used by the Authentication Manager to determine which 
techniques are supported, and in particular, which techniques have templates generated and 
what the corresponding confidence levels are for the technique. This enables the Manager 
to decide upon which technique, given the contents of the Input Cache, would be most 
appropriate for use in subsequent authentication. Within the client-server topology the 
Authentication Assets for a client are stored within the Client Database. 
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As a wide range of mobile devices exist, which differ in terms of their hardware 
configuration and operating system, it becomes implausible to design an authentication 
mechanism that will automatically work on all devices. The difficulty is enabling the 
framework to plug-in to the different operating systems, particularly the software interfaces 
of the Data Collection Engine and the Intrusion Interface. Although the framework is 
system- and device-independent in its approach to authentication security, the practical 
nature of utilising different operating systems would require both OS and hardware 
vendors to co-operate on implementing the framework in the first instance. The 
Authentication Assets would represent a list of compatible authentication techniques for a 
mobile device, as illustrated in Table 6.10. The Authentication Assets table is populated as 
biometric samples are collected and templates created. 
ID Technique 
Technique 
"t-'Sub- J 
Cate or 
Topology Device/Network Compatibility 
'Template 
Gen Date 
Confidence 
, 
Level Intrusive 
I Cognitive Phrase # Both True - B2 True 
2 EAR - - - BO True 
3 Face - - - B1 True 
4 Fin er - - - BO True 
5 K t k Static # Both True - B2 False 
6 ro eys e Dynamic Both True 18/07/2003 B3 False 
7 PIN Both True 12/07/2003 PO True 
8 Signature - - - B2 False 
9 V i Static # Server True 15/07/2003 B2 False 
10 o ce Dynamic Server False - B3 True 
Table 6.10: Default Authentication Assets: Compatibility Table 
The Technique and Sub-Category columns of the table define all the BioAPI compatible 
devices along with the secret-knowledge approaches - although the Technique column is 
fixed by the number of BioAPI compatible devices. This list is able to grow in terms of the 
Sub-Category, as the framework captures more static input data. The Topology column 
determines where the authentication techniques are enabled (i. e. standalone, server, both) 
and are defined by the hardware vendor (as the OS is an integrated part of the device). The 
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Device/Network compatibility column enables the administrator (particularly in a client- 
server topology) to disable any of the techniques that are enabled by the Hardware 
Compatibility - this may be desirable for a user who has difficulty in using a particular 
technique or for network related reasons - the technique can then be disabled in order to 
improve user convenience. The remaining columns in the Compatibility table indicate 
whether a valid template has been generated, what the corresponding confidence levels are 
for the biometric techniques, and whether that technique can be utilised in an intrusive 
authentication request. 
The second table within the Authentication Assets is an Algorithm Location table, as 
illustrated in Table 6.11. The ID value within the Compatibility table corresponds to the ID 
value in the Algorithm Location table, which details the file location of each of the 
authentication techniques library file. It is these library files which contain the procedures 
for pre-processing, template generation and authentication. 
ID Server DLL Location Client DLL Location 
1 \\server\Iibra \secret. dII \\client\Iibra secret. dII 
2 \\server\Iibra \ear. dII \\client\Iibra \ear. dII 
3 \\server\libra \face. dll \\client\libra \face. dII 
4 \\server\Iibra \fin er. dII \\client\libra \fin er. dll 
5 \\server\Iibrary\secret. dII \\server\Iibra \ke stroke. dll 
\\client\library\secret. dII 
\\client\Iibra ke stroke. dII 
Table 6.11: Authentication Assets: Algorithm Location Table 
In a standalone topology the above tables are all that are required to provide the hardware 
dependent information to the framework. However, in a client-server topology, a network 
is very likely to consist of a varied number of different mobile devices to which the 
framework will have to adapt, ensuring a high level of security given any combination of 
hardware. To this end a Hardware Compatibility Database (HCD), as illustrated in Table 
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6.12, is included in the server architecture to provide a list of all compatible devices, along 
with specific information about which authentication techniques are available. 
Device # :..., .. ' Sever-Side ID Manufacturer,, Model Part Co nitive EAR Facial Finger, Keystroke Password Voice 
1 HP 3867 C5647A Enable Disabled Enabled Enabled Disabled Enabled Enabled 
2 Nokia 6210 543897 Disabled Enabled Enabled Disabled Enabled Enabled Enabled 
C, -,. oj Client-Side , 
Co nitive EAR 1 Facial al's ý Finger, Keystroke Password oice 
Enabled Disabled Disabled Disabled Disabled Enabled Disabled 
Disabled Disabled Enabled Disabled Enabled Enabled Enabled 
Table 6.12: Hardware Compatibility Database 
This will enable the framework to create an Authentication Asset tables on an individual 
basis, where each class of device will have an independent table, which the administrator is 
able to customise. 
6.3.3 System Administration & Authentication Response 
In order to achieve a commensurate level of security versus user convenience, for a given 
mobile device, the framework allows a device administrator to define a number of system 
parameters. These include: 
" enabling or disabling IAMS (per device or per user); 
" individual enabling/disabling of authentication techniques; 
" determining the processing split between client and server (in the network version 
only); 
" Input Cache raw data period; 
146 
Chapter 6-A Novel Mechanism for Composite Authentication 
" profile storage of raw data period; 
" System Integrity period; 
" manual template generation/re-training; 
" monitoring Authentication Requests; 
" monitoring System Integrity Levels; 
9 security level - high, medium, low (has an effect on the threshold values chosen for 
the biometric techniques); 
" topology - standalone or client-server. 
In addition to the above parameters, the device administrator is also permitted to define the 
Authentication Response table. The table, as illustrated in Table 6.13, defines a number of 
key services that the device can access, including bank accounts, share dealing, micro- 
payments and expensive video calls with a corresponding System Integrity, Confidence 
Level and (where applicable) Location Access. In order for a user to access any of the 
services listed they must have a System Integrity level greater or equal to that specified. If 
not, the user will be subsequently required to authenticate themselves using an 
authentication technique with the corresponding Confidence Level in order to proceed with 
the service. If they are unable to obtain the required Confidence Level, the service will 
remain inaccessible to the user. 
The purpose of the Authentication Response table is to ensure key services and file 
locations are protected with a higher level of security than less private information or 
cheaper services. For example, it is unlikely you would require the same level of security 
for preventing a user sending a text message than accessing their bank account details. 
Determining which service or what information the user is accessing at any particular 
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moment is achieved by the Authentication Manager, via the System Monitor in the Data 
Collection Engine. 
Service. ' System Integrity i Level' 
Confidence 
Level 
Location Access 
'I if applicable) 
Bank Account Access =>4 B3 http: //hsbc. co. uk 
Downloading Media Content 3 B2 
Media Message =>1 B1 
Micro a ments =>4 B3 
Share Dealing =>4 B3 htt: //sharedeal. com 
Text Message =>-1 BO 
Video Call International =>2 B2 
Video Call (National) =>1 B1 
Video Call (Other Cellular Networks) =>2 B2 
Voice Call International =>2 B2 
Voice Call (National) =>O BO 
Voice Call (Other Cellular Networks) =>1 B1 
Table 6.13: Authentication Response Table 
For mobile devices without a B3 level of security, the administrator is left with two 
possibilities: 
1. To lower the System Integrity levels within the Authentication Response table 
appropriately, although this is not recommended as it would lower the security of 
the device. 
2. To intrusively request the user to authenticate themselves each time they wish to 
use the most sensitive services, using a cognitive response and keystroke analysis 
approach (otherwise known as a hardened password). 
In a standalone topology, access to the administrative settings and Authentication 
Response table require the highest security setting, as unauthorised access would invalidate 
the integrity of the system and permit the impostor to set low security setting for sensitive 
and expensive services. As such, the user is required to pass either a technique with a B3 
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confidence level or a two-factor authentication mechanism, as previously described, in 
order to access this information. 
In a client-server topology, the administrative settings and authentication response table 
will be defined by the network administrator - thereby removing any chance of impostor 
misuse - optionally the client will still be able to view (in read only format) a number of 
security settings through the Security Status interface. 
6.4 Authentication Manager 
The Authentication Manager is the central controlling element of the framework, with 
control over the process engines and intrusion interface. The role of the Authentication 
Manager includes: 
" determining the topology and administrative setting; 
" generating and maintaining the System Integrity level; 
" requesting profile generation and retraining; 
" making authentication requests, both intrusive and non-intrusive; 
" determining what subsequent action should be taken, given the authentication 
result; 
" determining whether a user has the required System Integrity level; 
" requesting removal and lock down of services and file locations; 
" use and maintenance of the Authentication Assets. 
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However, the principal task of the Authentication Manager is to determine when to make 
an authentication request and decide on what subsequent action to take. The type of request 
is based upon two factors; what input samples have been captured recently - which the 
Authentication Manager knows via the Data Collection Engine, and which authentication 
mechanism would be best to use - this is determined from the Authentication Assets. The 
decision will be essentially based upon the most recent input sample with the best 
performance rate, with "recent" being defined administratively but suggestively in the 
region of 2-4 minutes - obviously a window of compromise exists between a technique 
with a higher confidence level and whose sample was taken earlier than a technique with a 
lower confidence level. This is solved by the Authentication Manager Process Algorithm, 
which also determines what action to take after the authentication request, as illustrated in 
Figure 6.5. 
The Process Algorithm is the second of the key security process working at the core of this 
framework (the System Integrity level being the other). The Process algorithm has four 
stages of authentication security (depicted in Table 6.14, and dependent upon the result of 
authentication responses) with the level of authentication security being increased until the 
device is locked (requiring an administrative password or PUK code from a cellular 
network provider). The number of stages was determined by a compromising between 
requiring a good level of user convenience and better security. Through mixing transparent 
and intrusive authentication requests into a single algorithm it is expected that the majority 
of authorised users will only experience the transparent stages of the Process algorithm. 
The intrusive stages of the algorithm are required to ensure the validity of the user utilising 
the stronger authentication tools before finally locking the device from use. The difference 
between intrusive and transparent authentication requests is identified in the algorithm. The 
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intrusive authentication requests require the user to provide a biometric sample of 
confidence value B3 or B2 (whichever is available and higher). 
Authentication Security 
Level Description of Alert 
1 Normal 
2 Authenticate on Users Next Input 
3 Request Entry of a B3/B2 Level or PIN/Cognitive Question 
4 Lock Handset - Requires Unlock code from Network Operator 
Table 6.14: Authentication Security Level Descriptions 
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AS - Authentication Security 
Transparent AS= I 
Authentication Request 
Most Recent Input Data from 
the Cache 
PASS 
Authentication 
Response 
FAIL 
I ransparent AS= I 
Authentication Request 
Remaining Data in Input 
Cache 
Authentication 
Response 
PASS 
FAIL 
Iransparen AS=2 
Authentication Request 
Next Input Data 
(Protected Services Locked Out) 
PASS 
Iransparen AS=2 
Authentication Request 
Next Input Data 
(Protected Services Locked Out) 
Authentication 
Response 
FAIL 
Intrusive AS=3 
Authentication Request 
User Required to Enter Biometric 
(B3/B2) or PIN/Cognitive Question (1 
PASS PASS 
Authentication 
Number Only 
Response 
Biometric (& Number) 
FAIL 
Intrusive AS=3 
Authentication Request 
User Required to Enter Biometric (113/132) 
or PIN/Cognitive Question (2°d) 
PASS PASS 
Authentication 
Number Only 
Response Biometric (& Number) 
FAIL 
Intrusive AS=4 
LOCK HANDSET 
Request Unlock Code from 
Administrator 
Figure 6.5: Authentication Manager: Process Algorithm 
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The general operation of the Authentication Manager is to periodically send an 
authentication request to the Authentication Engine, where periodically is definable 
administratively, but would by typically in the range of 10-25 minutes, and in practice also 
a function of usage. The Authentication Engine will subsequently retrieve the last and 
highest (in terms of confidence value) set of user's inputs (i. e. a camera image from a 
video conference call or a sound file from voice dialling) from the last x minutes (where x 
is also definable administratively, but would typically be in the region of 2 minutes). If the 
Authentication Engine passes the input, the Authentication Manager goes back into a 
monitoring mode. If not, then the Authentication Manager performs an authentication 
request again, but using the remaining data from the Input Cache from the last y minutes 
(where y is definable administratively, but would typically be in the region of 5 minutes) - 
using the highest confidence level technique. If no additional data is present or the 
response is a fail, the Authentication Manager increases the security level and will request 
authentication on the next input sample to the device - the user would now not be able to 
use any of the protected services until this stage had been completed. If the user passes 
this, or any of the previous stages, then the Authentication Manager goes back into a 
monitoring/collection mode. If the Authentication Engine responds with a fail then the 
Authentication Manager will request the user to authenticate themselves - the first 
intrusive authentication request. The Authentication Manager, via the Intrusion Interface, 
will use a biometric technique with a confidence value of B3 or B2 (whichever is higher) 
in order to minimise the risk of a false acceptance. If no biometric techniques or templates 
exist with a confidence value of B3 or B2, then the user will be requested to enter their 
PIN, password or answer a cognitive question. If they pass this, and the PIN or password 
has a corresponding keystroke analysis template, then this will also be utilised in order to 
provide a two-factor authentication mechanism. If the keystroke analysis template exists, 
and the user passes the biometric authentication, then the system will revert back to a 
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monitoring mode. If the biometric fails, or the template does not exist, then the technique 
will remain at a heighten security level of 2- where the Authentication Manager will 
request authentication on the next available input sample. If an intrusive authentication 
request is passed, the previous biometric samples that were failed are deemed to be in fact 
from the authorised user and incorrectly failed. As such, these samples are added to the 
Profile database for subsequent re-training and are not deleted. 
The Process algorithm is inherently biased toward the authorised user as they are given 
three non-intrusive chances to authenticate correctly, with two subsequent additional 
intrusive chances. This enables the system to minimise any user inconvenience from the 
authorised user aspect. However, due to the trade-off between the error rates, this has a 
detrimental effect on the false acceptance rate, increasing the probability of wrongfully 
accepting an impostor every time an authentication request is sent. With the Process 
algorithm in mind, for an impostor to be locked out of the device they must have their 
authentication request rejected a maximum of 5 consecutive times. However, this is where 
the System Integrity has a significant role. The probability of an impostor continually 
being accepted by the framework becomes very small as the number of authentication 
requests increase. This would indicate that the impostor will be identified correctly more 
often that not (even if not consecutively as required by the Process Algorithm), reducing 
the System Integrity value to a level where the majority if not all of the services and file 
access permissions have been removed - essentially locking the device from any practical 
use. 
The System Integrity comes into operation when a user attempts to access a protected 
service or file location. If they do not have the required integrity level, the Authentication 
Manager will intrusively request the user to authenticate themself using an authentication 
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technique with the required confidence value to permit access to the file or service - which 
is dependent upon the Authentication Response table. In this case, should the security level 
of the Process algorithm reside at 1 or 2, the authentication request can be used as the next 
authentication request in the Process algorithm. Should the request succeed then the user is 
given access to the information or service they require. However, should the request fail, 
the user will be blocked from using the file or service and the Process Algorithm will 
proceed to the next stage. The trade-off existing within this architecture is between user 
convenience and device misuse. Although an impostor will not be rejected from the system 
immediately under this process, the degree of misuse has been limited by the presence of 
the System Integrity. In a practical situation, it is likely an impostor will be able to make a 
telephone call or send a text message before the system locks down (the actual range of 
services available to the impostor will largely depend upon the Authentication Response 
table). However, all of the key sensitive and expensive services will be locked out of use. 
By permitting this limited misuse of the device, it is possible to achieve a much higher 
level of user convenience at minimal expense to the security. 
The remaining duties of the Authentication Manager are mainly concerned with control, 
such as sending a template generation and retraining request to the Biometric Profile 
Engine (during computational non-intensive periods in a standalone topology) to update 
the biometric profiles and subsequently updating the Authentication Assets as a result. The 
client side Authentication Manager will also monitor (via the Communications Engine) the 
network connectivity to the server - should connection be lost at any stage, the client-side 
will revert into a standalone configuration, thereby achieving autonomous operation. This 
could be useful in a number of situations, such as a poor network signal, network failure 
and when roaming on other networks - which might not have the framework implemented. 
155 
Chapter 6-A Novel Mechanism for Composite Authentication 
6.5 Conclusion 
The framework has been designed in a modular and robust manner to enable network 
administrators the flexibility and convenience of configuring a composite authentication 
mechanism to meet their specific requirements. 
The mechanism has been designed on the principle that no single authentication approach 
is 100% reliable, whether it is because of technical issues or even lack of use due to user 
inconvenience. Through adding a level of intelligence to the authentication process, it is no 
longer a matter of providing a pass or fail response to the identity of a user, but a 
probability level indicating the confidence the system has in the identity of the user, with 
the system's behaviour dependent upon the result. With a low probability, the system 
removes automatic access to key services and information and increases the level of 
monitoring of the user. With a high confidence level, the user has the ability to interact and 
access the complete range of services and applications provided by the mobile device 
without hindrance. 
The next chapter discusses a possible architecture for this composite authentication 
mechanism and proceeds to describe the implementation, design and evaluation of a 
functional prototype based upon this architecture. 
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7 IAMS Architecture & Prototype 
The Intelligent Authentication Management System (IAMS) is a comprehensive, robust 
and scalable user authentication architecture for mobile devices. Based upon the 
framework presented in Chapter 6, the architecture solves the problem of weak, insecure 
and inconvenient user authentication that typically resides on such devices by 
incorporating transparent biometric authentication of the user. This chapter discusses the 
architectural specification of the composite authentication mechanism, and proceeds to 
present a functional prototype of the system. 
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7.1 Introduction 
The focus of this thesis has been towards the development of a more secure authentication 
mechanism for mobile devices, capable of surpassing the hardware limitations imposed by 
such devices, to provide a flexible, transparent and continuous authentication approach. 
The sections that follow introduce a possible architecture for this framework and discuss 
the design and development of a functional prototype. 
7.2 IAMS Topology 
The architecture can operate in two topologies. It can operate as a client-server and as a 
standalone system, enabling IAMS to operate completely autonomously. As a client to the 
server, the device provides the input sample capturing and intrusion response interface 
(e. g. locking down a device in the presence of a suspected impostor) with all the 
computational power and control provided by the server. In a standalone mode, the device 
performs all of the IAMS operations by itself, with no network connection. The two 
topologies allow IAMS to be useful for both wireless and non-wireless devices, with the 
ability to dynamically switch between the two client modes. This permits wireless 
networks, such as cellular networks, to control authentication security by operating in a 
client-server mode, but also allow individual mobile users and cellular users with no 
network coverage the advantage of increased authentication security9. 
9 The security of the topology, in terms of being able to circumvent and by-pass this architecture will not be 
discussed. It is assumed that the architecture will be deployed in an environment that prevents this; for 
instance, through the encryption of biometric samples and correct integration of IAMS in the mobile devices 
own security architecture. 
158 
Chapter 7- IAMS Architecture & Prototype 
From an architectural perspective there are few differences between the two topologies, 
with the server-client configuration splitting the computational and control overhead from 
the client onto the server. However, it is worth noting that the standalone configuration is 
unlikely to support the same number of authentication techniques as the server-client due 
to the reduction in computing power. The degree of split in computation is dependent 
upon the implementation - with the network administrator determining how much 
processing gets done at the server and the client. 
7.2.1 IAMS Server Architecture 
The architecture, illustrated in Figure 7.1, outlines the functional components of the server 
topology. All of these components and their operation have been drawn directly from the 
composite authentication framework. The Authentication Manager has overall control of 
the authentication system, determining both when authentication should take place and 
what the current state of security is. The process engines provide the computational power 
of the system, with an Authentication Engine to authenticate users, a Biometric Profile 
Engine to generate and train the relevant biometric templates required for subsequent 
classification, and a Communications Engine to communicate and synchronise data with 
the client device. To supplement these process engines, a number of storage elements are 
utilised. As the OS and hardware on mobile devices tend to vary considerably, devices will 
not automatically be supported. The Hardware Compatibility database contains 
information about which mobile devices are configured to work with the architecture, 
along with a list of supported biometrics. The system administrator will utilise this 
information, in addition to a number of system parameters to generate a client profile, 
which is stored in the Client database. This database holds a master list of clients enabled, 
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along with individual user information such as performance rates, confidence levels and 
history of the relevant authentication techniques. 
System Administrator 
Client Device Hardware 
lrl ýýý1ýý 
Configuration Compatibility 
System Parameter 
Setting 
Client 
Database 
Authentication Communications 
Manager 1An 1. S 1 ki i, e- 
(Server) 
Engine 
Biometric Profile Authentication 
Engine Engine 
Profile Input Cache 
Bio/PIN/Coe 
Figure 7.1: IAMS Server Topology 
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7.2.2 IAMS Device Architecture 
The main bulk of the device topology, as illustrated in Figure 7.2, is identical to the server 
architecture, with the operation of the process engines, storage elements and 
Authentication Manager remaining (in principle) the same. 
Device Athmmstrutor 
Authentication ---------- Authentication 
Output Device Assets/History 
Response 
Security 
Status 
Authentication Intrusion 
Manager 
10 (Device) 
Interface 
------------ 
Input 
Biometric Profile Authentication i ('huruclrricr, c. r , Engine Engine 
Data Collection 
Profile Input Cache 
Bio/PIN/CoR 
Engine 
Communications /"aAlS. e'en rr Engine 
Figure 7.2: TAMS Device Architecture 
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The device topology does however introduce a number of additional components that 
provide the input and output functions of the system. The fourth process engine in the form 
of the Data Collection Engine is included on the device topology and provides the input 
mechanism, which collects and processes users' device interactions. The output 
components consist of an Intrusion Interface and Security Status. The former as described 
in Chapter 6 provides the IAMS to OS connection for restricting user access and provides 
user information as and when required, and the latter provides an overview to the system 
integrity and security of the device. 
Depending on which topology the device is in, the architecture will slightly differ with a 
number of the architectural components not required. For instance, in a standalone 
topology the device has no use for the Communications Engine - as no network exists to 
which it can connect. In a client-server topology the components not required will vary 
depending upon the processing split between the server and client. There are numerous 
reasons why a network administrator may wish to split the processing and control of IAMS 
differently, such as network bandwidth and availability, centralised biometric template 
storage and processing, and memory requirements of the mobile device. For example, in 
order to minimise network traffic, the network administrator may require the host device to 
perform the authentication process of user samples locally on the device, or conversely, the 
administrator may wish the device to only perform pre-processing of input samples and 
allow the server to perform the authentication, thus removing the majority of the 
computational overhead from the device, but still reducing the sample size before 
transmitting across the network. Figure 7.3 illustrates the device topology for the latter 
example, with the Biometric Profile Engine, Authentication Engine, both storage elements 
and the Authentication Assets not in use on the device architecture. 
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Many of the components within the architecture share similarities with other architectures 
in the authentication and intrusion detection fields (Denning, 1986; Anderson et al. 1995; 
Furnell et al. 1997). This is expected as many of the processes within these systems are 
identical to IAMS, for instance, data capture, profiling and authentication. IAMS is novel 
due to the type of information processed and when it is utilised, the underlying security 
mechanisms and the application of the system to mobile devices. 
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7.3 IAMS Prototype Implementation 
Given the flexibility of the aforementioned architecture, a number of decisions had to be 
made concerning which topology to use and what mobile devices to develop the 
architecture for. It was decided to utilise a client-server topology and simulate a mobile 
handset environment within a mobile device. This decision was based upon: 
" Mobile handsets represent the largest segment of the mobile device market. 
9 Discussions with Orange PCS, a leading mobile operator and industrial partner of 
the project, revealed clear preferences towards keeping the intelligence and 
administrative control within the network rather than the handset. The reason for 
this decision is based upon wanting to retain control and security over the network. 
" The aforementioned biometric approaches currently do not operate within a mobile 
device. Although IAMS is able to operate without biometrics, the inclusion of them 
would provide an illustration to the capability and transparency of IAMS. Without 
biometrics, IAMS can only provide authentication through cognitive responses. 
The prototype development of IAMS was divided into three constituent parts: 
1. Authentication Manger - providing the entire server-side operational functionality, 
including, biometric profiling, authentication and data synchronisation. 
2. Administrative Console - containing all the administrative and system settings. 
3. Client-Side Interface - providing the simulated mobile handset functionality, data 
capture and intrusion control. 
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In terms of hardware connectivity, the Authentication Manager runs on a standard PC, with 
the Administrative Console also able to run on the same PC or on any remote computer. It 
is an independent application that only requires connection to the IAMS databases. Figure 
7.4 illustrates the hardware configuration. 
IAMS Client 
------------------- 
7ý, 
L 
Wireless Connection 
i- -1 
Wireless 
Access Point 
IAMS 
Authenticator 
Fixed 
Network 
IAMS Console Manager 
(fixed or wireless) 
Figure 7.4: IAMS Hardware Configuration 
The client has been designed to operate on a HP iPAQ (H5450), with an additional camera 
and keyboard added to the device to permit facial recognition and keystroke analysis. This 
configuration was chosen primarily due to the stable development platform and the lack of 
applicable mobile handsets (or smart phones in particular). The iPAQ was chosen over 
other PDAs (with built in keypads and cameras) due to availability of the necessary camera 
Software Development Kit (SDK) that enables control of the camera. 
From a topology perspective, the client was developed based upon the topology as 
illustrated in Figure 7.3. The server-side applications are separated into two distinct 
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sections as illustrated in Figure 7.5, with the Administrative Console including all the 
control settings and the Authentication Manager composed of the remaining components. 
- ------------------------------------------------- Administrative Console 
St swin AJm, nisrrur r, 
 
Client Device Hardware 
Urd1ý1iý 
Configuration Compatibility 
System Parameter 
Setting 
................... "1 
Database 
------------- ------------------------------------ 
Authentication 
Manager 
Communications 
(Server) 
Engine 
Biometric Profile Authentication 
Engine Engine 
Profile Input Cache 
Blu/PIN/Cog 
IAMS Manager 
------" ------- -"------------------------------------------- ------ 
Figure 7.5: LAMS Manger and Console Components 
From a software perspective, the development split into the same components as described 
in the topology. For instance, it was possible to develop the biometric profiling engine 
independently of the remaining architecture. It was then only necessary to provide some 
interlinking code between modules to complete the functionality. As much of this 
interlinking is controlled by the Authentication Manager, this component was the last to be 
developed; along with the authentication processes. The Authentication Manger and 
Administrative Console were developed in Visual Basic (VB), and the client interface was 
principally developed in embedded VB, with specific elements developed in embedded 
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C++. The proceeding sections will illustrate the completed prototype. A copy of the 
application code can be found in Appendix E. 
7.3.1 Authentication Manager 
The Authentication Manager represents the largest element of development. Key 
development milestones included: 
" Database creation - IAMS Client, Biometric Profile & Input Cache, 
" Data synchronisation and biometric sample analysis - synchronising data and 
biometric samples. This stage also analysed the biometric samples in order to 
evaluate the specific type of sample, 
" Authentication Process - the connection of a number of data sources to ensure the 
correct decisions are made, 
" File manipulation and database entry and update, 
" Incorporation of biometric approaches - enrolment and authentication. 
The prototype has integrated two biometric techniques, keystroke analysis and facial 
recognition. The latter was generously provided by Imagis Technologies in the form of an 
SDK. Little effort was required in incorporating either technique within IAMS, as standard 
enrolment and authentication functions were utilised. However, as keystroke analysis on a 
keypad had not been developed previous to this research study, the technique had to be 
designed and developed from scratch, before inclusion within IAMS. MatLab was retained 
as the computational engine behind the technique, with a number of scripts generated to 
enrol and authenticate a user based upon: 
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9 Static and dynamic telephone numbers, 
" Cognitive responses, and 
" Text messages. 
A complete copy of the code scripts can be found in Appendix E. Development of the 
Manger was performed in a modular manner as prescribed by the specification. 
The Authentication Manager includes an output screen, as illustrated in Figure 7.6, 
providing feedback to the administrator. This screen is particularly useful as it provides 
real-time feedback to the administrator, but also assisted during debug and testing phases 
as it enabled the developer to assess where the problems were occurring. A copy of this 
output data is also created in a text file for subsequent off-line analysis. 
IAMS Client Database Connected 
IAMS Profile Database Connected 
LAMS Input Cache Database Connected 
Database Connections Complete. 
Initialising Biometric Modules... 
Initialised Facial Recognition 
Initialised Keystroke Analysis 
Initialisation Complete! 
Connection Request: 436 From 192.168.3.11 
Device Connected: 07976367359 
Client Parameters... 
System Integrity Level: 2 
Authentication Level: 1 
System Integrity Period: 20 
_- 
ExRAppbcatoo 
Figure 7.6: IAMS Manager: Output Screen 
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From a development perspective it was also necessary to control IAMS for debug and 
testing purposes. An interface was designed to permit the developer to change particular 
properties of a client and to initiate certain procedures, as illustrated in Figure 7.7. The 
developer is able to initiate enrolment procedures for both keystroke analysis and facial 
recognition biometrics, in addition to running the authentication process. The interface will 
also permit the system integrity and authentication levels to be defined manually - 
although levels 3 and 4 of the Authentication Process are not included, as this can only be 
obtained through the correct procedure. In order to validate the Authentication Process and 
System Integrity measure, the interface also provides the ability to artificially control the 
passing and failing of biometric samples. 
Manually Set System Integrity and Authentication Levels: 
System Integrity: 2 Authentication Level: 1 
A 
4 
12 
3 
2 Set Authentication Level 
1 
0 Run Authentication Process 
Set System Integrity J 
System Integrity Period: 20 mies 
__Set_ 
Biometric Errotlment: 
Facial Recognition Enrolment Keystroke Analysis ErwofinerN 
Manual Authentication Resuä 
Check to switch manual operation on 
Figure 7.7: TAMS Manager: Debug & Testing 
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7.3.2 Administrative Management Console 
The Administrative Console provides the system level monitoring and configuration of 
IAMS. The functionality of console can be split into: 
" Defining and adding authentication techniques; 
" Defining and adding compatible hardware devices; 
" Defining and adding client devices; 
" Monitoring and parameter settings of current clients. 
The application begins by giving an overview of IAMS clients, with information on 
System Integrity, Authentication Level and current connection status, as illustrated in 
Figure 7.8. 
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Figure 7.8: IAMS Administrative Console: Client Database 
One of the initial tasks after installing IAMS is to configure which authentication 
techniques are available and what the compatible hardware devices are. Figure 7.9 
illustrates current authentication approaches and permits new techniques to be added, 
assigning an associated confidence to the technique and whether the technique can be used 
intrusively. Viewing and adding hardware devices are illustrated in Figure 7.10, where 
authentication techniques are associated with the hardware and whether authentication of 
the technique can be performed on the server and/or the client. 
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Add Delete 
Figure 7.9: LAMS Administrative Console: Add Authentication Technique 
To view the properties of a device, select the narre of the device from 
the hardware Ist below. The model, part number and authentication 
techniques will be displayed an the right 
Herdware Device: Marwfacturer: Nethan Test 
Part Number: A000001 
NEC e606 
NEC e808 
Palm TUNGSTEN T2 
Sony CLIE PEG NX73V 
Sony CLIE PEG NZ90 
Sony CLIE PEG T625C 
Server-Side Techniques 
Cognitive Response 
Facial Recognition 
Passwad/PIN 
Speaker Verification 
To add e device to the Hardware CanpelbiYty Database, M out the 
appropriate information below and click submi. 
Men lfectwe : IDel 
Device Model 
Part Number A\J5 
AWwimcatlon Techniques 
Please hat compabb1o tecAnipwa: 
Serum-Side Cbrt-Side 
Loglive Response Coq *e Response 
Fºgepw t Recogr icn 
Specke Ve ratios 
Add Techigim3J ! Add TetMiques 
Remove Technwel 
Cierd-Side Techrnques 
Cogrotive Response 
Password/RN 
- CanceI 
Subma Cancel 
(a) View Hardware Compatibility (b) Add Hardware Device 
Figure 7.10: IAMS Administrative Console: Device Hardware 
The next stage of the process is to add clients to the system. This is achieved through the 
interface illustrated in Figure 7.11. The user's name, account number and device 
information is entered and selected. This interface will also permit the administrator to 
deselect any authentication techniques they might wish - due perhaps to under- 
performance. The confidence levels can also be fine-tuned at this stage should the 
administrator deem it necessary given past performance. 
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Please select the manufacturer and model of the client device you wish to add 
to IAMS. 
Name: Account Number: 
. John Smith 01752233521 
Manufacturer Device Model 
lip-VAN 
Motorola IPAQ H1940 
NEC 
Palm 
Sony 
Part Nwnber: A123ESX 
Authentication Techniques 
Please s -select any techniques you do not wish to include: 
P1 
Q Cognitive Response (Client) P1 
Q EAR (Server) B2 
Q EAR (Client) B2 
Q Facial RecognRion (Server) B2 
Q Facial RecognRion (Client) B2 
Q Fingerprint Recognition (Server) B3 
Q Fingerprint Recognition (Client) B3 
Change Confidence L 
__J 
Add C 
Figure 7.11: LAMS Administrative Console: Add Client 
The monitoring and parameter settings of current clients are achieved through selecting 
and viewing a client, from the initial overview of the clients' interface. The resultant 
interface, as illustrated in Figure 7.12, gives a detailed breakdown of individual client 
performance. The interface initially provides an overview of client performance, however, 
by selecting a particular technique, a detailed overview of the technique (and any sub- 
categories, should they exist) are displayed. The lower half of the interface provides a 
graphical illustration of the System Integrity and Authentication Levels experienced by the 
client. High levels of Authentication Level and low System Integrity level would indicate 
either the potential presence of an impostor, or poor performance of the authentication 
technique. Individual confidence levels for each technique can then be altered if the 
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administrator is concerned over the performance of the technique. An authentication 
history is also available, providing detailed information regarding the authentication 
requests for that client. As illustrated in Figure 7.13, the history profile includes the 
biometric output figure -a guide to the performance of the technique. 
Cicrt AiAhenticetian Tecin . es 
- Smver A, 9h gcaro Tongues 
cmerlwm 
Fac Recoyi 
Spedcer Recogndon 
Cogritrre Re, p e 
Dais Sfalm Pela. ance 
AuW«&, ahm TecMqýle 
Tech N e: Ktyslrake Anwy- N sth AWhmticaÜm Repjesls: 81 
Authe, aüm RU Passrad: 6911X 
API. -F1e3 
Tech/Sub-Categay Tenplete Gen Gm Date U 
Tdeghune_012486184 Yes 12-Mm-2004 81 
Tdephone_212486184 Y. 12-Mm-2004 81 
Tebphme_Dyr n. e Ye, 12Mx1-2004 BD 
Taa_et Yes 12-Mar-2004 80 
March 2004 u-n -; rm4 -5---------- 
4 15 16 2- 
78i 113 
Ö 
14 15 16 r7 6 -19 IL 1 -1 123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
21 2L- 04 7 _3 
J 20 29 
-5_ _ -------_ -- 
Lee: "A uüv9 , i5i , Levd - 5y. Ir4e y AuA lsca on HWay 
Figure 7.12: TAMS Administrative Console: Client Information 
Complete Client Hist ory 
Date AutherAicetion Tech_f_Server/Cfent J_ Pau/Fel Bio TecMique Output ;_ Syilem Ir y I AulhenUc , Leval 
Fand R--g, -[- Save True 2 _ -4 
... 2 
25/03/2(0415: 47: 33 Cogave Rewonse Server False NA -2 3 25/03/20041547.12 Fe M Recogrdan Server Floe -2 -2 3 25/03/200415: 46: 35 Co *e Response Serval False 4874100029468536 -2 2 
25/03/200114: 40 34 Co1)* e Raw- Serve. Tne NA -2.5 3 
25/03/2004 1446 11 Facial Reco1)140n Serve Falte -2 -3 3 
25/03/200414: 41.16 Co1Ylrve Response Serve T1ue 0.920700013637543 -1 2 
25/03/200414: 41.11 CoW*ve Response Serve True NA -2.5 3 
25/03/200414: 40: 27 Facial Reco1WOn Server False -2 -3 3 
25/03/2(X14 1436.41 Facial Reco1Ran Server True -2 1 2 
25/03/200414: 36: 12 Cogeve Respome Server Fake -0 . 
874100029468536 .1 2 
25/03/200414: 36: 12 Cognitive Response Server True NA 05 3 
25/03/200414: 3543 Co1wve Raparoe Serve False NA 0 3 
Figure 7.13: TAMS Administrative Console: Authentication History 
Each client also has a device settings interface, as illustrated in Figure 7.14, which allows 
the administrator to define the Authentication Response table, the security level, and a 
number of other system parameters. The security level is tied directly to the threshold 
levels utilised by the biometric techniques of the particular client -a high setting will force 
174 
Chapter 7- IAMS Architecture & Prototype 
the technique to be more discriminative (at the cost of increasing the probability of 
rejecting the authorised user). 
Security Level " #li¢ Input Cache Period () Update Settings 
Meth, n Raw Data Storage Period '30 (days) Cancel 
Low System Integrity Period: 20 (mors) 
Authenbcation Response Table 
Sei Ce System Inte yi Confidence Level ] Locelion Access---- 
Barking =>5 80 
Corporate Storage ->3 BO 
Local Storage ->2 B1 
Manual Dial ->0 BO 
MMS Text ->0 B3 
Network Operator ->4 81 
Phonebook ->-2 81 
Secure Storage ->4 B0 
SMS Text ->3 B3 
Stock Trading =>3 BIT 
Video Conference ->1 B2 
Voice Did ->1 B2 
Add Service Debte Sewice 
Figure 7.14: LAMS Administrative Console: Device Settings 
The Administrative Console will also permit the removal of clients, hardware devices and 
authentication techniques. The information used by the console is derived from data stored 
in the Hardware Compatibility database and the Client database only. The console manager 
does not require the Authentication Manager to be operable, nor does it have access to the 
Biometric Profile and Input Cache databases. 
7.3.3 Client Interface 
The client interface, as previously described, has been designed to simulate a mobile 
handset, in terms of functionality and appearance. The initial interface and resultant 
functionality of the client is illustrated in Figure 7.15. With each function of the handset, 
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one or more biometric samples are captured transparently by the device and sent to the 
Authentication Manager. Table 7.1 illustrates the association between handset functionality 
and the biometric sample(s) captured. Voice dialling is an exception, as it captures voice 
samples that could be used for voice verification. However, it was not possible to obtain 
the algorithms required for this technique1°, so was omitted in the Authentication Manager. 
Network Conne 
Manual Dial 
Voice Dial 
Phonebook 
Local Storage 
Secure Storage 
Corporate Storage 
Figure 7.15: IAMS Client Interface 
Text Message 
Multimedia Message 
Banking 
Share Dealing 
Operator Info 
10 Anovea SVLite Speaker Authentication SDK had been identified as providing suitable static based 
authentication (Anovea, 2004b). However the financial cost (in excess of £1500) made its inclusion not 
possible. The prototype has been developed with voice verification in mind, and all that is required is the 
inclusion of the enrolment and authentication modules, should they become available some point in the 
future. 
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F 
Biometric Sample Captured 
unction Keystroke Analysis Facial Recognition 
Manual Dial  
Voice Dial 
Phonebook  
Text Message  
Multi-Media Message   
Video Conference  
Banking  
Share Dealing  
Operator Information  
Local Storage  
Secure Storage  
Corporate Storage  
Table 7.1: LAMS Client Functionality & Associated Biometric Sample 
Figure 7.16 illustrates a number of screenshots from the client interface, such as, dialing a 
telephone number and composing a text message. It should be reiterated that none of the 
interactions actually perform the function. The client interface is purely simulating the look 
and feel of a mobile handset. 
1 
01752354 
i 
(a) Dialing a Telephone Number (b) Compose a Multimedia (c) Obtaining File Access 
Message 
Figure 7.16: Screenshots of JAMS Client Interface 
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When a user attempts to access a service for which they do not have a sufficient level of 
System Integrity, they are requested to intrusively authenticate themselves before access is 
given. An example of this challenge interface is illustrated in Figure 7.17. The choice of 
cognitive response, as shown in Figure 7.17(a) is determined at random from the available 
options in the Biometric Profile database. These cognitive responses are configured when 
the user initially registers with the device, and is controlled via the Authentication 
Manager. 
(a) Cognitive Response 
i 
Figure 7.17: Screenshot of IAMS Client Challenge Interfaces 
The client interface also provides feedback indicating the level of System Integrity the 
device currently has. An excellent rating is given to system integrity levels +4 and above, 
with the ratings decreasing to limited services available at a level of -4. 
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7.4 Conclusion 
The development of IAMS from architecture to development has addressed the 
requirement of an advanced authentication mechanism. The use of a composite 
authentication approach provides a robust, transparent method of increasing authentication 
security beyond traditional point-of-entry systems. The level of authentication security is, 
however, dependent upon the device and the authentication techniques that can be 
deployed within it. 
From a comprehensive analysis of authentication mechanisms currently available, such as 
SecureSuite (I/0 Software, 2004), AccessMaster (Evidian, 2004), SAFSolution (SafLink, 
2004) and BNX's Idenitity Management Suite (2004), IAMS is the only mechanism 
capable of providing a continuous and often transparent confidence measure for the 
identity of the user. Although the aforementioned techniques are capable of utilising a 
number of authentication techniques under a wider authentication mechanism, none are 
designed for use on mobile devices, and more importantly none are capable of dynamically 
adjusting to the wide range of techniques across the diverse range of hardware devices. 
Having established and developed a composite authentication mechanism, the proceeding 
chapter will address the validation and evaluation, comparing and contrasting its 
performance against a number of commercial available authentication techniques. 
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8 IAMS Evaluation 
The chapter evaluates the architecture both theoretically and practically, providing 
illustrations of typical system behaviour and performance. The chapter concludes by 
discussing the advantages of IAMS over existing biometric authentication techniques. 
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8.1 Introduction 
Unfortunately, due to the limitations on the prototype development, it was not possible to 
provide a thorough evaluation of the authentication architecture. In particular, it was not 
possible to practically deploy and evaluate the mechanism, as the client-side prototype 
only mimicked the functionality of a mobile handset, so it would not be possible to obtain 
a user's true interaction with the device, which would subsequently affect the System 
Integrity level and behaviour of the mechanism. In addition, the lack of available PDAs 
and restricted network coverage would make a practical deployment difficult and arguably 
artificial. 
The validation of IAMS was therefore achieved by two approaches: 
1. The performance of IAMS was evaluated theoretically given predefined 
performance rates of a number of typical biometric approaches that could be found 
on mobile devices. A cross section of devices was chosen and the probability of an 
authorised user and an impostor being rejected and accepted is calculated at a 
number of key stages in the authentication mechanism. 
2. The authentication processes were validated by putting the prototype through a 
number of prescribed scenarios. Through manually controlling the success or 
failure of authentication requests, it was possible to validate the underlying security 
processes working within IAMS. 
The proceeding two sections will present the findings of these two processes. 
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8.2 Theoretical System Performance 
IAMS has been designed to operate on a wide variety of mobile devices with differing 
hardware configurations, subsequently requiring it to utilise a number of different 
authentication techniques. Some devices will support a multitude of biometric techniques, 
whereas others will have a limited number of techniques available to IAMS. The varied 
nature of the authentication techniques on different devices gives rise to IAMS achieving 
differing levels of non-intrusive and intrusive security. This section describes a number of 
scenarios involving different hardware configurations in order to demonstrate what levels 
of authentication security can be expected from IAMS. The hardware configurations 
chosen are based upon broad examples of mobile device available today, and include a 
typical 2.5G cellular handset and two PDAs with quite differing hardware features. 
In order to make a fair comparison between hardware scenarios, the FAR and FRR will be 
fixed across the devices, with typical values, as illustrated in Table 8.1, for each of the 
biometric techniques. The figures for the keystroke analysis techniques were obtained from 
the results of Chapters 4 and 5, with the remaining results taken from the National Physical 
Laboratory Biometric Test Report (2001). The number of compatible biometrics was 
increased beyond the two techniques included within this practical prototype in order to 
give a clearer illustration of system behaviour and performance. 
Biometric Technique Sub-Category- FAR (%) FRR % 
Facial Recognition 0.2 7 
Fingerprint - 0.1 6 
Keystroke Dynamics PIN/Cognitive 3 40 
Keystroke Dynamics Text 15, 28 
Keystroke Dynamics Telephone 18 29 
Voice Verification - 0.7 4 
Table 8.1: Typical Biometric Performance Rates 
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The analysis will be broken down into two constituent parts - the probability of an 
authorised user and an impostor reaching the end of the non-intrusive and phone lock 
stages of the Process algorithm, as indicated by Authentication Levels 2 and 4 respectively 
in Figure 6.5; and the probabilities involved with the authorised and unauthorised access 
on the System Integrity measure. 
8.2.1 Sony Ericsson T68 Mobile Handset 
The hardware found on the T68, as illustrated in Figure 8.1, will permit IAMS to use the 
following biometric techniques: 
" Keystroke Analysis - PIN/Cognitive, Telephone#, Text# 
" Voice Verification# 
*Non-Intrusive Techniques 
Figure 8.1 Sony Ericsson T68i Mobile Handset 
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All biometric techniques can perform authentication intrusively. However, those indicated 
with a hash can also perform non-intrusive authentication - which will be required for the 
early stage of the Process algorithm. For instance, in this particular example the only 
intrusive technique is the keystroke analysis technique with PIN/Cognitive entry. 
The analysis of the non-intrusive stage of the process algorithm, up to Authentication level 
2, is illustrated in Table 8.1, with the three scenarios showing a best case; with the 
probabilities of a user being rejected three consecutive times using the biometric technique 
with the lowest FAR; a worst case, utilising the biometric technique with the highest FAR, 
and an intermediate scenario, demonstrating a more practical level of device usage and 
subsequent probabilities. An example of how these calculations are achieved is given 
below. These probabilities reduce further after the intrusive stage of the Process algorithm 
to give a 0.05% probability of an authorised user rejection and 65% probability of an 
impostor rejection, as illustrated in Table 8.3. 
Probability Calculations - Worked Example: 
(Intermediate Mode) 
Authentication Techniques: Tele - FAR=18%, FRR=29% 
Text - FAR=15%, FRR=28% 
Voice - FAR=O. 7%, FRR=4% 
PIN - FAR=3%, FRR=40% Authorised User Being Rejected at AS 2 
Probability = Tele FRR x Text FRR x Voice FRR 
= 0.29 x 0.28 x 0.04 
= 0.0032 
= 0.3% 
Impostor User Being Rejected at AS 2 
Probability = (1-Tele FAR) x (1- Text FAR) x (1-Voice FAR) 
(1-0.18)x(1-0.15)x(1-0.007) 
= 0.6921 
= 69% 
Authorised User Being Rejected at AS 4 
Probability = Tele FRR x Text FRR x Voice FRR x PIN FRR x PIN FRR 
=0.29x0.28x0.04x0.4x0.4 
= 0.00052 
= 0.05% 
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Impostor User Being Rejected at AS 4 
Probability = (1-Tele FAR) x (1-Text FAR) x (1-Voice FAR) x (1-PIN FAR) x (1-PIN FAR) 
= (1-0.18) x (1-0.15) x (1-0.007) x (1-0.03) x (1-0.03) 
= 0.6512 
=65% 
Taking the intermediate scenario, it can be seen the probability of an authorised user being 
rejected from the system is 0.3% and the probability of an unauthorised user being 
correctly rejected by the system three consecutive times is 69%. 
S i f Bi i t ity (%) Scenario er es o r c ome Techniques Authorised User 
Being Rejected at AS 2 
Impostor User 
Being Rejected at AS 2 
Best Voice, Voice, Voice 0.006 98 
Intermediate Tele, Text, Voice 0.3 69 
Worst Tele, Tele, Tele 2 55 
Table 8.2: Performance Probabilities of Non-Intrusive Stage of Process Algorithm 
S i f Bi t i Probabi lit Scenario er es o r c ome Techniques Authorised User 
Being Rejected at AS 4 
Impostor User 
Being Rejected at AS 4 
Best Voice, Voice, Voice, PIN, PIN 0.001 92 
Intermediate Tele, Text, Voice, PIN, PIN 0.05 65 
Worst Tele, Tele, Tele, PIN, PIN 0.4 52 
Table 8.3: Performance Probabilities of Complete Process Algorithm 
The effect of the Process algorithm is to ensure authorised users are not rejected from their 
own mobile device, however at the detriment of increasing the subsequent false acceptance 
rate. The probability of an impostor being rejected decreases as they need to be correctly 
identified five times. However, this is offset by the interaction of the System Integrity 
monitor. IAMS will only permit access to file locations and services upon certain System 
Integrity levels - which are only obtainable with a number of consecutively successful 
authentication requests. Table 8.4 and Table 8.5 illustrate the probabilities of an impostor 
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obtaining various System Integrity levels given a series of authentication requests by 
certain biometrics. 
Table 8.4 illustrates an impostor's best chance of being accepted and obtaining a +5 
integrity level. This is achieved through three voice verifications and a PIN authentication 
and has a corresponding probability of 0.000001%, or a1 in 100 million chance. So 
99.999999% of impostors will be rejected by the system by that stage - making 
unauthorised access to a +5 level a highly unlikely event. The probabilities also 
demonstrate the likelihood of an impostor being continually rejected by the system, with an 
95% chance that the impostor will reach an integrity level of -5 - essentially locking the 
device down. These probabilities also do not take into account the secret knowledge aspect 
of the PIN authentication; in that the user must have knowledge of the PIN/Cognitive 
before keystroke analysis is enabled, to provide the two-factor authentication, and thus 
would further improve the probabilities in practice. 
Bi t i Impostor Accepted Impostor Rejected ome r c 
Techni ue 
System Integrity p bili b System Integrity p bilit b (%) q Before After a ty (%) ro Before After a y ro 
Voice 0 +1.5 0.7 0 -1.5 99 
Voice +1.5 +3 0.005 -1.5 -3 99 
Voice +3 +4 0.00003 -3 -4 98 
PIN +4 +5 0.000001 -4 -5 95 
Table 8.4: System Integrity Probabilities: Easiest Impostor Scenario 
Impostor Accepted Impostor Rejected Biometric 
i h System Inte rit % bilit P b System Integrity p b bilit % que n Tec Before After y( a 
) ro Before After ro a y( 
) 
Tele 0 +0.5 18 0 -0.5 82 
Text +0.5 +1 2.7 -0.5 -1 70 
Text +1 +1.5 0.4 -1 -2.5 60 
Tele +1.5 +2 0.07 -2.5 -3 49 
Voice +2 +3.5 0.0005 -3 -4 48 
PIN +3.5 +5 0.00002 -4 -5 47 
Table 8.5: System Integrity Probabilities: Hardest Impostor Scenario 
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Biometric techniques with higher FARs can enable an impostor to obtain the lower 
positive integrity levels, where they can misuse some services for a short period. 
In addition to the Process algorithm and System Integrity measure, should an impostor 
request a service or file location that the integrity level is too low to allow, the user will be 
immediately requested to authenticate themselves. Upon failure of this request, the service 
or file location will be refused, the integrity level decreases and the process algorithm will 
be invoked. 
8.2.2 HP IPAQ H5550 PDA 
The hardware found on the HP iPAQ (model H5555), as illustrated in Figure 8.2, with 
additional camera and cellular network access will permit IAMS to utilise the following 
biometric techniques: 
" Facial Recognition# 
9 Voice Verification# 
" Fingerprint Recognition 
"Non-Intrusive Techniques 
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Figure 8.2 HP IPAQ H5550 PDA 
The performance analysis of the HP iPAQ raises a number of interesting points, due to the 
ability of IAMS to utilise stronger authentication methods available through the hardware 
configuration. The Process algorithm probabilities, as illustrated in Table 8.6 and Table 
8.7, are much improved, with an intermediate rejection probability of 0.02% and 99% for 
the authorised and unauthorised users respectively. It can be seen, however, that the 
authorised user rejection probability in the best case scenario is actually higher than the 
worst case. This is due to FAR and FRR trade-off between individual techniques, where a 
weighting towards a lower FAR resulted in a corresponding high FRR, as shown in Table 
8.1. The probability of an authorised user being incorrectly rejected by the end of the 
Process algorithm is (for intermediate scenario) I in 1.2 million, with a corresponding 
probability of an unauthorised user being correctly rejected of 99%. 
fB i 
Probabi li % 
Scenario 
iometr Series o c 
Techniques Authorised 
User 
Being Rejected at AS 2 
Impostor User 
Being Rejected at AS 2 
Best Face Face, Face 0.03 99 
Intermediate Face, Voice, Face 0.02 99 
Worst voice, voice, Voice 0.006 98 
Table 8.6: Performance Probabilities of Non-Intrusive Stage of Process Algorithm 
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Series of Biometric 
Probabi lit 
Scenario Techniques Authorised User 
Being Rejected at AS 4 
Impostor User 
Being Rejected at AS 4 
Best Face, Face, Face, Finger, Finger 0.0001 99 
Intermediate Face, Voice, Face, Face, Finger 0.00008 99 
Worst Voice, Voice, Voice, Face, Face 0.00003 98 
Table 8.7: Performance Probabilities of Complete Process Algorithm 
As the stronger biometric techniques have higher confidence levels, the number of 
authentication requests required for an impostor to reach a +5 integrity level has decreased, 
with the subsequent effect of increasing the probability of an impostor reaching the higher 
+5 level (in relation to the previous cellular handset example). Conversely however, the 
higher confidence levels lower the probability of an impostor reaching the lower integrity 
levels, and significantly increase the probability of negative integrity values - with a 99% 
probability of a -5 System Integrity value, which would lock the device from use. 
Biometric Im ostor Accepted Impostor Rejected 
Techni ue 
System Inte rit System Integrity q Before After probability (%) Before After probability 
(%) 
Face 0 +2 0.2 0 -2 100 Face +2 +4 0.0004 -2 -4 100 Face +4 +5 0.0000008 -4 -5 99 
Table 8.8: System Integrity Probabilities: Easiest Impostor Scenario 
Biometric Impostor Accepted Impostor Rejected 
hni e T 
System Integrity System Inte rit p bilit % b qu ec Before After probability (%) Before After a y( ro 
) 
Voice 0 +1.5 0.7 0 -1.5 99 
Voice +1.5 +3 0.005 -1.5 -3 99 
Voice +3 +4 0.00003 -3 -4 98 
Face +4 +5 0.00000007 -4 -5 98 
Table 8.9: System Integrity Probabilities: Hardest Impostor Scenario 
With this particular device IAMS is able to utilise very strong authentication techniques 
giving rise to excellent false rejection and false acceptance probabilities. However, a 
down-side to a device such as this is the inability for IAMS to obtain the necessary samples 
non-intrusively - thereby possibly increasing the user inconvenience aspect. 
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8.2.3 Sony Clie PEG NZ90 PDA 
The third scenario involves a particular model within the Sony Clie PDA that includes a 
thumb-based keyboard - very similar in size and tactile quality of a keypad. Figure 8.3 
presents an illustration of the device. 
Figure 8.3 Sony Clie PEG NZ90 PDA 
The following biometric techniques are enabled on this device: 
9 Facial Recognition# 
Keystroke Analysis - PIN/Cognitive, Telephone#, Text# 
Voice Verification# 
Non-Intrusive Techniques 
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This device fits somewhere in between the two previous examples in terms of the 
authentication techniques available to IAMS. In its best case scenarios the device can 
achieve the same non-intrusive results as the HP iPAQ, but with a worst case scenario 
identical to the cellular handset. This device does, however, offer more combinations of 
non-intrusive technique, as indicated previously, with three techniques (4 algorithms) 
available for use. As such, a couple of intermediate scenarios have been included so that a 
more comprehensive result can be shown. The two intermediate scenarios illustrate a 
difference in probabilities that can be obtained non-intrusively, depending upon what input 
samples are available, with an authorised user rejection probability ranging from of 0.06% 
to 0.08%, and an impostor rejection probability ranging from 70% to 81%. With the 
addition of the intrusive stage of authentication these probabilities reduce to 0.0002-0.02% 
and 81-67% respectively. These intermediate results are better than the results from the 
cellular handset and are achievable in a larger number of non-intrusive approaches, 
suggesting the more techniques available to IAMS the better level of security it is able to 
provide for a given level of user inconvenience. 
S i f Bi t i Probabi lity (%) Scenario er es o ome r c Techniques Authorised User 
Being Rejected at AS 2 
Impostor User 
Being Rejected at AS 2 
Best Face, Face, Face 0.03 99 
Intermediate 1 Tele, Voice, Face 0.08 81 
Intermediate 2 Tele, Text, Face 0.06 70 
Worst Tele, Tele, Tele 2 55 
Table 8.10: Performance Probabilities of Non-Intrusive Stage of Process Algorithm 
i f Bi i S Probabi 
lit (%) 
Scenario er es o ometr c Techniques Authorised User Being Rejected at AS 4 
Impostor User 
Being Rejected at AS 4 
Best Face, Face, Face, Face, Face 0.0002 99 
Intermediate 1 Tele, Voice, Face, Face, voice 0.0002 81 
Intermediate 2 Tele, Text, Face, Face, PIN 0.02 67 
Worst Tele, Tele, Tele, PIN, PIN 0.4 52 
Table 8.11: Performance Probabilities of Complete Process Algorithm 
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The probabilities associated with the System Integrity level are identical to results in 
previous devices, with the easiest impostor scenario obtaining a +5 level identical to the 
HP iPAQ (refer to Table 8.8), and the hardest impostor scenario achieving a +5 level 
identical to the cellular handset example (refer to Table 8.5). The best result showing a 
probability of 0.0000008% (1 in 125 million) of achieving a +5 integrity level and a 99% 
of chance of achieving the opposite -5 level, thus the ability for an impostor to obtain a 
system integrity level at which significant harm could be experienced is theoretically 
small. 
An analysis of the probabilities across all three hardware configurations raises the question 
regarding how much an impostor can misuse a device using only the lower System 
Integrity levels - since as previously discussed, the lower the confidence value associated 
with a biometric technique, the higher the probability an impostor is able to achieve the 
lower integrity levels. The amount of misuse is solely dependent upon the Authentication 
Response table, which describes what integrity level is required to access a particular 
service and or file location. 
It has been demonstrated, that although the Authentication Process algorithm has the effect 
of minimising the inconvenience factor from authentication of the authorised user, it has 
the subsequent effect of increasing the false acceptance rate. The use of a System Integrity 
measure in addition to the Authentication Response table will assist in minimising the 
amount of unauthorised access before the system effectively shuts the user out. Having 
theoretically illustrated the operation of these security mechanisms, the next stage is to 
ensure their correct deployment within the prototype. 
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8.3 Practical Validation of Prototype 
The validation of the prototype involves ensuring both the security mechanisms operating 
within IAMS are functioning as specified. Unfortunately, given the flexibility of IAMS and 
the numerous combinations of intrusive and transparent authentication requests and 
different authentication tools, it would not be plausible to test every configuration. The 
particular mechanisms tested are: 
" the Authentication Process, and 
" the System Integrity level. 
To validate these processes, IAMS was put through four predefined procedures to ensure 
the system performed as expected. The procedures were designed to test the extremities of 
the security mechanisms. The first three were used to monitor the behaviour of both 
processes, with a fourth aimed at specifically monitoring the system integrity measure. 
These procedures are defined below: 
1. Repeatedly dial a telephone number, passing all authentication requests. This 
procedure was re-run with every authentication request failing. This test 
represented a typical telephony interaction, where under the IAMS architecture the 
System Integrity measure would not be permitted to obtain the higher values due to 
the lower confidence level assigned to the keystroke analysis technique. 
2. Repeatedly initiate a video conference call, passing all authentication requests. This 
procedure was re-run with every authentication request failing. This test permitted 
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the validation of the facial recognition technique and its affects upon the System 
Integrity level and Authentication level. 
3. Perform a series of handset interactions, passing all authentication requests. This 
procedure was re-run with every authentication request failing. 
a. Dial a telephone number 
b. Check your bank balance 
c. Compose a text message and send by dialling a number 
d. Make a video conference call 
This procedure represented a series of typical handset interactions that would 
validate the intrusive authentication process (the user will not have the appropriate 
System Integrity level to access their bank balance without intrusively 
authenticating themselves). 
4. Repeat procedure 3, failing all non-intrusive authentication requests but passing the 
intrusive requests. This test represented a user having difficult with the transparent 
authentication process and ensured the intrusive authentication process was 
operational. 
An example of the output generated by IAMS, given the first procedure, is illustrated 
below. 
Any non-essential output, such as the database connections and initialisation of the biometric 
modules has been removed. The authentication process has, for debug purposes, been set to 20 
seconds. This permits the procedures to be executed rapidly and accounts for a large number of 
authentication requests present. The system starts with the Authentication Level set to 1 and a 
System Integrity of 0. 
System Integrity Level: 0 
Processing Biometric Input Sample... 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Request - No Sample Present to Authenticate 
Authentication Level: 2 
Authentication request - but no sample present to authenticate, so the authentication level is set to 
2 
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System Integrity Level: 0 
Biometric Technique: Keystroke Analysis Sub Category: Telephone_Dynamic 
Biometric Sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area 
Input Cache Updated 
A keystroke analysis sample has been captured. Defined as a dynamic telephone entry, the 
sample is moved into the input cache for subsequent classification. 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique Utilised: Keystroke Analysis 
Biometric Passed 
System Integrity Level: 0.5 
Authentication Level: 1 
The authentication request has taken the telephone sample and passed the sample (this procedure 
will pass all samples). The system integrity is increased by 0.5 - the correct amount assigned by 
the BO confidence level. The authentication level is reset to 1. 
Processing Biometric Input Sample... 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Request - No Sample Present to Authenticate 
Authentication Level: 2 
The authentication process initiates, but as no samples are present, the authentication level is set 
to 2 again. 
System Integrity Level: 0.5 
Biometric Technique: Keystroke Analysis Sub Category: 
Telephone_01248618453 
Biometric Sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area 
Input Cache Updated 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique Utilised: Keystroke Analysis 
Biometric Passed 
System Integrity Level: 1.5 
Authentication Level: 1 
A static telephone number sample has been captured. Subsequent classification passed the 
sample and the system integrity is increased to 1.5. The increase of 1 is due to the higher 
confidence level assigned to static telephone numbers over dynamic. The authentication level is 
set back to 1. 
Processing Biometric Input Sample... 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Request - No Sample Present to Authenticate 
Authentication Level: 2 
System Integrity Level: 1.5 
Biometric Technique: Keystroke Analysis Sub Category: Telephone-Dynamic 
Biometric Sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area 
Input Cache Updated 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique Utilised: Keystroke Analysis 
Biometric Passed 
System Integrity Level: 2 
Authentication Level: 1 
Again, a dynamic telephone number is entered and subsequent classification increases the system 
integrity level by 0.5 to 2. 
Processing Biometric Input Sample... 
Authentication Request... 
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Authentication Request - No Sample Present to Authenticate 
Authentication Level: 2 
System Integrity Level: 2 
Biometric Technique: Keystroke Analysis Sub Category: Telephone_Dynamic 
Biometric Sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area 
Input Cache Updated 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique Utilised: Keystroke Analysis 
Biometric Passed 
System Integrity Level: 2 
Authentication Level: 1 
Once more a dynamic telephone number is entered and passed. The authentication level is set 
back to 1, however the system integrity level does not increase. This is due to the upper limit 
placed on each confidence level. The user is unable to achieve the higher system integrity levels 
using a dynamic telephone number - as correctly defined by the specification. The complete output 
script for this procedure, in addition to the remaining procedures can be found in Appendix E. 
As illustrated by Table 8.12 all of the procedures functioned as specified by the 
architecture. 
Procedure # Authentication 
Request 
Authentication 
Level 
System Integrity 
Level 
Procedure 
Successful 
I Pass 1 2  
I Fail 4 -4.5  2 Pass 1 5  
2 Fail 4 _5  3 Pass 1 5  
3 Fail 4 -4.5  4 NA 1 4  
Table 8.12: IAMS Validation Results 
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8.4 Conclusion 
The results from the theoretical system performance have illustrated how difficult 
obtaining access to sensitive services (with System Integrity levels of +5) is for 
unauthorised users, with a false acceptance probability in the range of 0.00000007- 
0.000001 % compared with the best FAR of 0.1 % using a fingerprint technique. The false 
rejection probability has also shown an improvement with a worst case probability of 
incorrectly rejecting an authorised user of 0.4% and a best case of 0.00003%. Although it 
is difficult to directly compare the performance of IAMS against individual techniques as 
the probability of successfully authenticating a person depends on various stages of the 
security algorithms, a comparison of these results against individual results, as presented in 
Table 8.1, illustrates the improvement in performance IAMS experiences. 
It is clear from these results, that system performance is largely dependent upon the 
authentication tools available to IAMS. Devices with stronger authentication tools are 
more capable of successfully detecting an authorised and unauthorised user than their 
counterparts. However, even those devices, such as the cellular handset, with limited 
authentication tools, the levels of FAR and FRR achieved are sill stronger than many 
individual authentication techniques, with a (worst case) probability of an authorised user 
incorrectly being rejected of 0.4% (equivalent FRR) and a (worst case) probability of an 
unauthorised user gaining entry to the most sensitive services of 0.00002% (equivalent 
FAR). 
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The results from the practical validation of the prototype have demonstrated IAMS is 
operating as defined by the architecture, with the System Integrity level and Process 
algorithm requesting intrusive authentication request as and when necessary. 
IAMS has successfully achieved the objectives of providing an advanced authentication 
mechanism which increases the level of authentication security but without increasing the 
level of user inconvenience. Through utilising a suite of authentication tools within an 
intelligent framework, the weaknesses of one technique are overcome by the strengths of 
others. 
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9 Conclusions & Future Work 
This chapter concludes the thesis by summarising the achievements of the research 
programme. The chapter proceeds to discuss the limitations of the research, and considers 
areas for further refinement. 
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9.1 Achievements of the Research 
The growth and popularity of mobile devices and wireless networking technologies has 
increased the need to ensure the validity of the user. Chapter 2 illustrated that this trend of 
increasing services and mobile computing is set to continue as users integrate technology 
within their lives and unlock themselves from the desktop computer. However it was 
identified that current secret-knowledge based approaches were lacking in the necessary 
authentication security. This was subsequently reinforced through an end-user survey, 
which found that a large number of users are not using the PIN and almost a third had 
experienced handset theft or misuse. 
On the basis of these findings, it is evident that alternative and stronger authentication 
approaches are required for mobile devices. Of the remaining approaches, biometrics was 
identified as the only approach that does not reply upon the user remembering something, 
but just on who they are. It was acknowledged that this technique must be capable of 
securing access to sensitive services and information throughout the duration of a session, 
in a user-friendly and convenient fashion. 
Through the intelligent application of biometric techniques, Chapter 3 identified that 
authentication of the user can take place transparently enabling users to be authenticated 
numerous times without inconvenience, as biometric samples are captured during a user's 
normal interaction with the mobile device. The deployment of biometrics to mobile 
devices was supported by the end-user survey, with 83% in favour. However, in order to 
achieve transparent and subsequent convenient authentication, only a subset of biometric 
techniques were found to be suitable. Of those available, keystroke analysis represented the 
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most intriguing proposal given the wide availability of keypads and keyboards on mobile 
devices and the transparent fashion of obtaining the biometric samples. 
Although the application of keystroke analysis had been established for keyboards, its 
deployment to a mobile device with fewer, smaller keys and a different tactile environment 
had until this research not been documented. Chapters 4 and 5 sought to evaluate the novel 
application of keystroke analysis to a mobile handset, utilising the two main keystroke 
characteristics of keystroke latency and hold-time. Both studies concluded successfully 
with promising results when compared to typical results achieved by other biometric 
techniques. This technique would permit transparent authentication of users whilst they 
enter telephone numbers, PINs and compose text messages. Although the performance of 
keystroke analysis was not as good when compared to some physiological biometrics such 
as fingerprints, its transparent nature would permit an increase in the level of 
authentication security that could be provided by a mobile device. 
However, the results from the feasibility study must be considered in context. Both studies 
were performed in controlled conditions, with users entering data repeatedly. Within a 
practical environment, the variability of the users' input data is likely to be larger, as users 
may be walking whilst typing, consuming alcohol or performing other tasks, making the 
process of authentication more difficult. Therefore, it would not be viable to use this 
technique, where a user is accepted or rejected based upon a single keystroke analysis 
result. However, due to its transparent nature, it would be possible to use an unsuccessful 
authentication request as a trigger for a heightened level of monitoring on the device. In 
addition, from an analysis of the expected performances of biometric techniques in 
conjunction with the weaknesses of other approaches and the differing hardware 
configurations of mobile devices it was evident that no single authentication technique 
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would suffice. What was evident however was the availability of a suite of authentication 
techniques, both biometric and secret-knowledge based that could be utilised together. 
An appropriate framework was therefore required to adapt to the differing hardware 
configurations of mobile devices providing authentication techniques which adjusted to the 
available hardware and the level of security required. To this end, a composite 
authentication mechanism was specified in Chapter 6, along with the security processes 
required to maintain security and system integrity. The mechanism was designed in a 
modular and robust manner to enable network administrators the flexibility and 
convenience of configuring a composite authentication mechanism to meet their specific 
requirements. 
Through adding a level of intelligence to the authentication process, it is no longer a matter 
of providing a pass or fail response to the identity of a user, but a probability level 
indicating the confidence the system has in the identity of the user, with the system's 
behaviour dependent upon the result. With a low probability, the system removes 
automatic access to key services and information and increases the level of monitoring of 
the user. With a high confidence level, the user has the ability to interact and access the 
complete range of services and applications provided by the mobile device without 
hindrance. 
Chapters 7 proposed an architecture for the composite authentication mechanism, known 
as IAMS and proceeded to develop a functional prototype based upon the specification, 
illustrating its functionality and transparency of operation. A comparison of commercially 
available authentication mechanisms 
found IAMS to be the only mechanism capable of 
providing a continuous and transparent confidence measure for the identity of the user. 
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Although many of the commercial approaches are capable of utilising a number of 
authentication techniques under a wider authentication mechanism, none are designed for 
use on mobile devices and more importantly none are capable of dynamically adjusting to 
the available authentication techniques across the diverse range of hardware devices. 
Chapter 8 subsequently evaluated the mechanism both theoretically and practically. 
System performance was calculated theoretically and found to be largely dependent upon 
which authentication techniques were available to IAMS. It was found that IAMS was 
capable of protecting and securing services and information beyond what a single 
authentication technique was able to achieve, for instance, the FAR of a user obtaining a 
System Integrity level of +5 (a level at which users can access all services and information) 
is in the range of 0.00000007-0.000001% against a one-off FAR of 0.1% for a fingerprint 
technique. The FRR has also improved with a worst case of 0.4% and a best case 
0.00003% across the range of mobile devices evaluated. 
The research has met all of the objectives originally outlined in chapter 1 and has resulted 
in the design and development of an advanced authentication architecture for mobile 
devices. In addition, a number of papers relating to the research programme have been 
published in internationally recognised journals and presented at refereed conferences. In 
particular, the author has been awarded a best paper prize at the 3'd Australian Information 
Warfare and Security Conference, and a best student poster prize at the 5th World 
Conference and Exhibition on the Practical Application of Biometrics. Aspects of the 
project have also led to commercial prototyping and development for Orange PCS. 
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9.2 Limitations of the Research 
Although the objectives of the research programme have been met, a number of decisions 
had to be made which imposed limitations upon the work. These decisions were typically 
either practically based or due to financial restrictions. The key limitations of the research 
are summarised below. 
1. A number of practical limitations exist with the keystroke analysis study. The 
limited number of participants and input data hindered a more thorough evaluation 
of the technique. In particular, the controlled environment in which user's input 
data was captured may not have simulated the real variations in input data that 
might be seen in practice. Having said this, the option of monitoring user's real 
handset interactions is only now becoming more plausible due to the introduction 
of smart phones, which are programmable. Previously, handsets utilised propriety 
operating systems requiring collaboration from handset manufacturers. 
2. Insufficient time and resources were available to further assess the applicability of 
keystroke analysis to thumb-sized keyboards - an interface similar in size to 
keypads but with full keyboard functionality. This interface does represent a 
different tactile environment from the previous two mentioned earlier, although not 
completely dissimilar to keypads. Given the successful study of keystroke analysis 
on keypads, in addition to the previous work performed on keyboards, it was 
considered that the technique would arguably be functional on thumb-sized 
keyboards as well. 
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3. The development of IAMS was only performed using a simulated mobile handset 
interface on a PDA. Due to the lack of programmable handsets, and the immaturity 
of the technology, it was decide that a more stable platform would be suitable. 
4. IAMS was only able to utilise two biometrics in the final prototype. Unfortunately, 
voice verification, a technique that would lend itself to a mobile handset, was not 
incorporated in to the prototype due to financial restrictions. 
5. The lack of a practical evaluation of IAMS with real participants. This would have 
enabled a comprehensive analysis of system performance in real time. 
Unfortunately, the lack of available handsets, and the subsequent cost had the 
handsets existed, meant system evaluation could only be performed theoretically. 
Despite these limitations, the research programme has made valid contributions to 
knowledge and provided sufficient proof of concept for the ideas proposed. 
9.3 Suggestions & Scope for Future Work 
This research programme has advanced the field of authentication for mobile devices. 
However, a number of areas of scope for future work exist, specifically related to this 
research and more generally within the area of authentication on mobile devices. These 
suggestions are detailed below: 
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1. A wider and practical deployment of keystroke analysis capturing software. This 
would permit a comprehensive and thorough evaluation of the technique with real 
handset interactions. 
2. Further resource could be spent into optimising the neural network configurations 
and training stages. In particular, reducing the computational requirements of 
classification for deployment on mobile devices. One key development would be 
the creation of artificial impostor data to successfully train against the authorised 
users' data. In a standalone topology the mobile device will have no access to other 
user's data, to use as impostor data - as was the procedure in this research study. 
Successful training of a network will therefore depend upon the creation of 
artificial impostor data that is able to successfully create decision boundaries 
around an authorised user's input samples. Some work has already been performed 
in this area by an MSc project supervised by the author (Lecomte et al. 2003). 
3. Further research and development is required into providing biometric techniques 
applicable to a mobile device. In particular, developing dynamic voice verification 
techniques for use in telephony applications, and signature recognition for mobile 
devices with no keypad or keyboard present - capable of authenticating a person 
based upon words rather than a signature. An additional technique of interest, if the 
transparency issues were overcome, is fingerprint recognition as the technique is 
not only popular with users but is one of the more secure biometric approaches. 
4. One of the more controversial sides to this research is with regard to the use and 
storage of biometric templates and samples. For wide adoption of biometrics and 
IAMS, it is imperative that network administrators consider the opinions of end- 
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users, since the wide scale implementation of biometric solutions to date has 
proved to be an emotive issue for the public (BBC News, 2004). 
5. A comprehensive evaluation of IAMS is required from both a system security 
performance perspective, but also considering the practicalities of implementation 
in client-server and standalone topologies. What are the computational 
requirements of the system on a per user basis, and can this be scaled successfully 
across all users on a mobile network? What effect will this have upon network 
bandwidth, and what degree of personal mobility exists for the user? 
6. Research and software development is required on the operating systems of mobile 
devices, in order to capture and process the biometric samples. It will be necessary 
to embed IAMS monitoring software within the device to transparently capture this 
information without any significant degradation of system performance. 
9.4 The Future of Authentication for Mobile Devices 
Wireless mobile computing is here to stay, with people beginning to utilise a wide range of 
services to assist their everyday lives, from email to video conferencing. This is set to 
continue as new services become available providing information at our finger tips. Future 
services have the potential to become more sensitive as access, for example, to medical 
records and home intranets becomes available. However, this increase in functionality and 
storage capacity of mobile devices has the subsequent effect of increasing the financial and 
personal cost incurred should the device be misused. It can be argued at this stage that 
identity authentication no longer becomes an option but a necessity. 
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Although many mechanisms currently exist for authenticating users, this research has 
highlighted the need to provide increased security, in a continuous and user friendly 
fashion. The research programme has, through a comprehensive analysis, designed and 
developed an authentication architecture capable of providing transparent and continuous 
authentication of the user, independent of the hardware or network configuration. 
Authentication is no longer a one-off process but a continual confidence based measure, 
capable of utilising a wide range of authentication techniques to maintain system integrity. 
In conclusion, authentication on mobile devices will become an increasingly important 
consideration for users, as the cost and functionality of devices make them desirable targets 
for misuse. The ability to perform authentication continuously and conveniently will be 
fundamental to the successful deployment of future mechanisms. 
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Part 1- Survey Questionnaire 
Hypothesis 
Mobile Phone users are either not security aware or are unaware of the dangers in regard to the protection of 
both their handsets and their network subscription. 
Objective 
A survey to assess the security awareness of mobile phone users. 
Mobile Phone Security Survey - How Aware Are You? 
Section 1- About you 
I What gender are you? 
Male Q Female Q 
2 To which age group do you belong? 
< 16 Q 17-24 Q 25-34 Q 35-44 0 
45-54 Q 55-65 Q> 65 Q 
3. Are you an employee or student at the University of Plymouth? 
Yes Q No Q 
Section 2- Services 
A. About your mobile phone subscription: 
4. To which network provider do you subscribe? 
Vodafone Q Orange Q BT Cellnet Q One2One Q 
Virgin Q Other Q (Please State: 
................................................ ) 
5. How do you pay for your phone calls? 
Contract Q Pre-Pay 0 
6. Who is the manufacturer of your current mobile phone? 
Nokia Q Sony/Ericsson 0 Motorola 0 Samsung 0 
Siemens Q Bosche 0 Trium 0 Other 0 (Please state ................... ) 
7. When choosing your network operator, please rank the considerations below in order of importance to you. 
Low Medium High 
Choice of handset(s) Q Q Q 
Network Coverage Q 0 Q 
Operator loyalty Q Q 0 
Prices, Deals etc 0 0 Q 
Reliability 0 Q Q 
Security feature(s) Q 0 Q 
8. When selecting your handset, please rank the considerations below in order of importance to you. 
Low Medium High 
Available Accessories Q Q Q 
Battery Life Q Q Q 
Brand Loyalty Q Q Q 
Games Q Q Q 
Infra-Red/Bluetooth 
Connectivity 
Q Q Q 
Security feature(s) Q Q Q 
Swappable fascias Q Q Q 
B. About your mobile phone usage: 
9. Approximately, how many hours a day is your phone switched on? 
<1 0 2-5 Q 6-10 0 >10 Q 
10. Approximately, how many times in a typical day, do you use your mobile? 
a. For making voice calls 
<1Q 2-5 Q 6-10 Q> 10 0 
b. All services (except voice calls) including, WAP, SMS, email etc. 
<1Q 2-5 Q 6-10 Q> 10 Q 
c. Using "inbuilt" features, such as games or the calendar 
<1Q 2-5 Q 6-10 Q> 10 0 
11. Please indicate which services you use on your mobile phone? 
Yes No Not 
Available 
Voice/Talking 0 Q 0 
Text Messages (SMS) 0 0 Q 
Voice or SMS-based Information Services (e. g. football scores, Q Q Q 
news, lottery, traffic information) 
WAP services 0 0 Q 
Email Q Q 0 
International Roaming Q Q Q 
12. Please indicate any additional services you would like to see on a mobile phone in the future? 
Yes No 
Video calls/conferencing Q Q 
eCommerce (On-Line Shopping) Q 0 
On-line Personal Organiser Q Q 
Music downloading, playing Q Q 
Video On Demand (VOD). (i. e. Short video clips, e. g. News, Q Q 
Sports results, Movie previews etc. ) 
Multimedia Message Service (MMS). (i. e. SMS with sound, Q Q 
video etc. ) 
Global Positioning System (GPS) services. Q Q 
Additional Games Q Q 
Other (please state): ....................................................... .............. ............. 
Section 3- Security 
A. About your existing mobile phone security: 
13. Please indicate which of the following statements applies to you: 
Note: The use of the term `calls' in the following question includes all communications; voice, text, WAP etc. 
My mobile phone has :- Tick if 
true 
" been borrowed and tampered with without my permission Q 
" been borrowed and calls were made without my permission Q 
" been stolen, but no calls were made Q 
" been stolen and calls were made Q 
" never been abused or stolen to my knowledge 0 
14. Are you aware of the existence of the International Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEI) of your handset? 
Yes Q No Q 
15. Do you use any of the Personal Identification Number (PIN) authentication facilities on your mobile phone? 
Yes 0 No 0 What is a PIN? Q 
If yes, please indicate which facilities you use, otherwise please go to Q 17. 
SIM Access at phone switch-on only 
(Default security on all phones) 
Keypad unlock 
SIM removal only 
16. How often do you change ANY of your mobile phone PINs? 
Never Q Only initially after purchase (once) Q 
Yearly Q 
17. How do you consider PIN authentication? 
Convenient Q Inconvenient Q 
Yes No 
Not 
Available 
Q Q Q 
Q 0 Q 
Q Q Q 
Monthly Q 
18. How do you feel generally about the protection the PIN provides against mobile phone misuse? 
Very confident Q Confident 0 Adequate Q Inadequate Q 
Indifferent 0 
19. Have you ever had to use the Pin Unlock Code (PUK) on your mobile phone, because you forgot your PIN? 
Yes 0 No 0 
20. Do you use the same PIN for multiple services, such as your mobile phone, bank cards, PC access etc? 
Yes 0 No Q 
21. Do you think, in principal, additional mobile phone security is: - 
A good idea QA bad idea Q Indifferent Q 
B. About future mobile phone authentication: 
Note: Biometrics' are the measurement of unique personal characteristics (e. g. Fingerprints, Voice Recognition 
and Hand Geometry), in our case for authentication purposes. 
22. How do you feel about biometric authentication in general? 
Good idea Q Bad idea Q Indifferent Q 
23. Please indicate in the table below which of the following methods of security authentication you are aware of 
and which you would consider using on a mobile phone? 
Security Technique Aware Of? Would use on a 
Mobile Phone? 
Yes No 
QQ 
0Q 
Q0 
QQ 
QQ 
QQ 
Yes No 
Finger Print Q Q 
Voice Print Q Q 
Hand Geometry Q Q 
Facial Recognition Q Q 
Iris Scanning Q Q 
Typing Style (the way in which you dial numbers) Q Q 
24. How would you feel about your mobile phone continuously and transparently authenticating who is using 
it? 
Good idea Q Bad idea Q Indifferent Q 
25. For any authentication technique to work, a security profile or signature about you has to exist somewhere. 
Where would you prefer this security profile to reside? 
In the phone (User responsibility*) Q In the network (Operator responsibility**) Q Don't mindO 
* The personal biometric information about the user would only reside in the mobile phone handset, thus it 
would not be available to authenticate the user on other mobile phones/devices. The privacy of the information 
stays with the user. If the phone was lost or stolen, any replacement would require re-configuration of the 
biometric. 
** A subscriber's biometric information resides within the network, trusting the privacy to the network operator, 
thus enabling the network to authenticate the user not only on their mobile phone but any other mobile 
phone/device they wish to gain access to and have permission to do so. 
Section 4- About your mobile knowledge in general: 
26. Which of the following is NOT a UK Network Operator? 
Vodafone Q 
Orange Q 
Nokia Q 
One2One Q 
Don't know Q 
27. Which of the following is NOT a mobile phone "buzzword"? 
GPRS 0 
WAP 0 
ADSL 0 
3G 0 
Don't know 0 
28. What is the operating bandwidth of a standard GSM connection? 
9.6Kbps 0 14.4Kbps Q 56Kbps Q 64Kbps Q Don't know Q 
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Literature Review of Keystroke Analysis 
The concept of identity verification based upon the manner in which a person types was 
first suggested by Spillane (1975), in a paper entitled "Keyboard Apparatus for Personal 
Identification". Since then, a number of researchers using techniques ranging from simple 
descriptive statistics to artificial intelligence, have investigated the feasibility of keystroke 
analysis as a means to authenticate a person. This literature review includes a cross section 
of the twenty papers reviewed including, papers from the early days where the researchers 
involved were attempting to prove the concept, to the more recent papers that have tried to 
use dynamic authentication techniques in order to achieve more non-intrusive 
authentication. All the papers in this review, with the exemption of the last, discuss 
keystroke analysis with respect to a full Qwerty keyboard. 
A paper by Umphress and Williams (1985) was, for Williams, the first of three papers on 
the subject of keystroke dynamics spanning five years. The study performed two tests, 
firstly, to determine how closely the test profile matches the reference profile and 
secondly, appraising the overall typing characteristics. The reference profile was generated 
by calculating the latencies for the first six keystrokes in each word and eliminating 
anomalous keystroke latencies. Two measures of key patterns were produced from the 
filtered keystrokes, the first was a mean and standard deviation keystroke latency, and the 
second described the latency between all adjacent letter combinations by defining a 26x26 
matrix. The test profile was devised with real-time performance in mind and used the same 
principles as the reference profile; latencies over 0.75s were ignored, only the first six 
characters of each word were considered and if a backspace character occurred the word 
was also ignored. The first test compared the keystroke latency to the appropriate cell in 
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the digraph matrix of the reference profile. If the test latency was within 0.5 standard 
deviations of the corresponding latency then the test keystroke is considered valid. A count 
of those passing the pattern matching process is kept so that a ratio can be computed at any 
time. In the second test, a count was kept of all the test keystrokes that pass the filtering 
stage, so that at any time the mean and standard deviation could be calculated and 
compared to the reference profile using a standard two-tailed t-test for a population mean 
(assuming normal distribution). The results showed that when the reference profile and test 
profile were typed by the same person, the ratio of valid latencies to total latencies is 
greater than 0.6. A total of seventeen participants took part in the study and the overall 
results were evaluated by designating a degree of confidence to each person. A high 
confidence being given to participants passing both tests, a medium confidence for passing 
one, and a low confidence for failing both. Only two of the seventeen were not assessed 
with a high confidence score, leading to a false rejection rate of 11.7%. The false 
acceptance rate was calculated by summing all the medium and high confidences of the 
unauthorised users and dividing by the total to give a false acceptance rate of 5.8%. 
Umphress and Williams concluded by suggesting the use of keystroke characteristics is not 
in itself sufficient for personal identification. 
Williams' second paper (1987), aimed principally to refine his first experiment, but to also 
increase the number of participants and the number of filtering methods in an effort to find 
the smallest amount of data necessary to characterise a person. The filtering methods 
consisted of three high-pass values of 0.75s (same as previous), 0.5s and 0.3s (obtained 
from analysis of the input data), and a mixture of valid digraphs. The test sample size was 
537 characters, versus 300 for the previous experiment, allowing a more precise reference 
profile to be generated. The most successful filter method used all lowercase letters 
including blank with a high-pass filter of 0.5s. The only difference between this filter and 
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the one used in Williams' (1985) was the inclusion of the blanks as valid characters and the 
lowering of the high-pass filter. The new filter produced results of 5.5% FRR and 5.0% 
FAR, indicating a significant improvement in the performance. Although much of this 
improvement can be attributed to the almost doubling in size of the input data used to 
generate the reference profile. 
In 1990, Williams established a fundamentally different approach to keystroke analysis, 
namely dynamic identity verification. The major steps in the dynamic identification 
algorithm were first to generate a reference profile for each person. This was done by 
computing the frequency, mean and standard deviation for each digraph. The next step was 
for each of the profiles to be computed with the following reference profile: (a) consider 
the next keystroke and time value; (b) apply sequential statistics theory to compare the 
digraph against the reference profile; (c) if possible, determine whether the typist has either 
passed or failed the test for that particular digraph; (d) compute the number of individual 
digraph tests that have been passed or failed; (e) depending upon how many digraph tests 
have been passed or failed, take one of the following actions: (1) accept the typist as valid, 
(2) reject the typist, (3) neither accept or reject, but continue testing. Under ideal situations 
every digraph would be used as part of the authentication. However, a number of the 
digraph pairs were under-represented - the final analysis was based on the top eight 
digraphs in a 500 character set. A primary goal of this experiment was to accelerate the 
process of accepting or rejecting a typist in real time and in the final experiment many 
impostors were rejected less than 100 keystrokes into the document. All but four typists (of 
36) were correctly identified giving rise to a FRR of 11.1% and a FAR of 12.8%. 
Although, as the authors comment, increasing the reference text so as to include more 
digraph pairs would accelerate the decision process, 100 keystrokes is a considerable 
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amount of text to be typing before you get authenticated. Whereas static keystroke 
techniques usually only require 10-20 keystrokes. 
Joyce and Gupta (1990) published a paper on a static authentication system with a degree 
of success not seen in keystroke analysis before. The experiment managed to achieve the 
first ground breaking results for a keystroke verifier, achieving a FRR of 16.36% and a 
FAR of 0.25% with a short input string. The reference profile is generated from the user 
entering his/her username, password, first name and last name eight times. The mean 
reference signature is then computed by calculating the mean and standard deviation of the 
eight values for each latency after having removed the outliers. The test profile data is 
compared with the reference profile, and if the values are above the threshold then the user 
is rejected (the threshold is defined as being the mean plus 1.5 standard deviations). The 
evaluation of the verifier was achieved using 33 participants. Once the reference profile 
was obtained, the user attempted to log on five times and six impostors were randomly 
selected to attempt to log on for a further five times. Impostors were given the log on data 
required to successful log on, but had not been present whilst the valid user had logged on. 
However, the FAR results largely depend on the six randomly chosen impostors and could, 
under a difference six users, vary the results considerably. Also, an arguable weakness of 
this approach is concerned with those users who have a large standard deviation and thus 
large threshold value. Valid users may well find their false rejection rates low but are also 
likely to find the false acceptance rates also higher, as it would be easier for unauthorised 
users to gain access due to the wider boundaries of acceptance. An approach which 
adaptively sets the threshold boundary on a per user basis would likely improve the 
performance further. 
4 
Appendix B 
Based principally upon Joyce and Gupta's work, a number of researchers began to more 
thoroughly research the application of keystroke analysis. One notable investigation came 
in the form of Brown and Rogers (1993), one of the first papers to use a branch of artificial 
intelligence referred to as neural networks in order to solve the verification problem. 
Brown's and Rogers use a number of techniques in their experiment including two 
different neural networks, the Adaline neural network and the backpropagation neural 
network, as well as a simple geometric distance measure (for comparative reasons). The 
key difference between the two neural network topologies is the Adaline network is 
restricted to a linear problem space, whereas the backpropagation network is capable of 
performing non-linear problems. The investigation measured both the key hold time and 
digraph latency, and 25 participants were used in the generation of reference profiles with 
a further 15 participants used to generate the test impostor data. The investigation is a static 
based verifier, with authentication based on participant's names. The techniques were all 
designed in order to minimise the FAR, as a result all three techniques gave a FAR of 0% 
with the distance measure producing a FRR of 14.9%, the Adaline technique producing a 
FRR of 17.4% and the backpropagation network producing a FRR of 12.0%. The authors 
interestingly conclude their paper with the following comment. 
"An interesting aspect which deserves more attention is the disparity between 
the results for given individuals using different techniques. One possible 
explanation is that one technique may be sensitive to some set of identifiable 
traits in an individual's typing patterns which another technique is missing, 
while the sensitivities are reversed for a different individual. " 
This suggests that a particular technique is more successful with some users than others 
and that if particular users were able to be identified as being more successful with one 
technique over another, then multiple techniques could be used in any one verification 
system in order to decrease the error rates individually. This investigation is similar to 
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Joyce and Gupta's (1990) research but has introduced the concept of multivariate data 
(keystroke latency and hold-time) and the use of neural networks which has resulted in a 
higher performance rate. The extent to which these two factors contributed to the improved 
performance is unknown. 
A paper by Napier, Laverty, Mahar, Henderson, Hiron and Wagner (1995), details two 
studies. The first reproduced the initial experiment by Leggett and Williams (1987), but 
with a number of proposed improvements. The first was to use multivariate measure of 
latency as compared to the single measure and secondly a chi-square based distance 
between test digraphs and reference profiles instead of a z-test. The procedure followed 
that of Leggett and Williams (1988), with 67 participants and the results did show an 
improvement with the multivariate measure producing significantly lower error rates, 
combined FAR and FRR of 4% (z-test) and 2% (chi-square) compared to the univariate 
measure of 24% (z-test) and 11 % (chi-square). Indicating the measurement of latency in 
terms of its two orthogonal components of keystroke latency and hold-time significantly 
increase the sensitivity of the approach. An additional improvement was the use of the chi- 
square rule which also produced fewer errors over the simpler z-test. 
The second study looked at the need to examine the verification algorithm under more 
ecologically valid conditions and more specifically to test for temporal stability. This 
involved implementing the new algorithm again, but with independent data that had been 
collected a week later. It was expected that the performance would be poorer than in the 
first study (having used a bootstrapping method), and the results obtained have proven this 
with a combined FAR and FRR of 3.8%. 
Interestingly, these results were obtained by 
using a test sample of only 50 
digraphs, in comparison to Leggett and Williams requiring 
more in the region of 100 digraphs 
before verification. 
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A paper by Obaidat and Macchairolo (1994) entitled "A Multilayer Neural Network 
System for Computer Access Security" describes an investigation into a static keystroke 
analysis authentication system based on a number of neural network configurations. The 
number of participants in this study is relatively small in comparison to the other papers 
reviewed with only 16 people. Nevertheless this paper does implement some novel 
approaches to the pattern classification problem. The input data consisted of 40 input 
vectors obtained from the username or ID, each of which consisted off 15 values collected 
over a six week period. The networks used in the classification were a traditional Back 
Propagation network, a Sum-of-Products network and a novel hybrid Sum-of-Products 
network. The hybrid network takes the Back Propagation network for the first layer and the 
Sum-of-Products network for subsequent layers. For the training of the networks the raw 
data set was separated into two parts, all the even-numbered and odd-numbered patterns of 
each user, and for any given simulation only half of the data set was used for training. This 
would ensure the networks were being tested on their ability to generalise, rather than to 
memorise the training set. An argumentative pitfall of this study arises with the evaluation 
of the networks where the complete dataset is used, including data that was used for the 
training of the networks. It would be unlikely for a neural network to misclassify an input 
that has been used during the training phase, and as such would provide an exaggerated 
increase in performance. In both the back propagation and hybrid sum-of-products 
networks, the lowest error rates achieved in one of the simulations was 2.5% and 4.2% 
respectively (cumulative error rate). The sum-of-products network performed only as well 
as 6.3%. Conversely, the networks performed as 
badly as 10.8%, 10.8% and 18.8% for the 
back propagation, hybrid sum-of-products and sum-of-products respectively. Although the 
back-propagation network performed best, taking other considerations such as training 
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time and complexity the hybrid sum-of-products network represents a good compromise, 
due to the simpler structure of the sum-of-products layer. 
A second paper by Obaidat, co-authored by Sadoun (1997) entitled "Verification of 
Computer Users Using Keystroke Dynamics" builds on his first paper by looking at 
classifying users not only on the inter-key latencies but also on the hold times. The paper 
also considers a number of further classification algorithms, both pattern classification and 
neural network techniques. 
The pattern classification techniques include: 
1. K-Means Algorithm, 
2. Cosine Measure, 
3. Minimum Distance Algorithm, 
4. Bayes' Decision Rule and 
S. Potential Function Rule. 
The neural network techniques include: 
1. Back Propagation Network (BPNN), 
2. Counterpropagation Network (CPNN), 
3. Fuzzy ARTMAP, 
4. Radial Basis Function Network (RBFN), 
5. Learning Vector Quantisation Network (LVQ), 
6. Reinforcement Neural Network (RNN), 
7. Sum-of-Products (SOP) and 
8. Hybrid Sum-of-Products (HSOP). 
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This paper is to the authors' knowledge, the most comprehensive study in terms of 
classification techniques and classification features implemented. However, similarly to 
the first study the number of participants is rather low, with only 15 subjects. The data was 
collected by each user giving 225 sequences a day over an eight week period, and 
consisted of user's ID or username. Unlike the first study this study uses a different dataset 
for training than for testing, resulting in a theoretically more accurate result. The most 
successful pattern recognition technique was the potential function algorithm followed by 
Bayes' rule. The minimum distance and K-means gave a similar performance with the least 
successful algorithm being the cosine measure. The hold time-based classification gave 
relatively better results as compared to the inter-key time-based classification. For instance 
the potential function algorithm performed for the inter-key based classification a FRR of 
4.7% and FAR of 2.2%, the hold time classification a FRR of 2.9% and FAR of 1.6% and 
a combination of hold time and inter-key classification a FRR of 1.9% and FAR of 0.7%. 
In comparison however, the neural network techniques overall performed better. The 
results have shown the hold-time based classification is superior to the inter-key time- 
based classification, although the combined inter-key and hold time based classifications 
result in the lowest error rates. The most successful networks were the LVQ, RBFN and 
Fuzzy ARTMAP which gave a misclassification error of 0% for both the FAR and FRR. 
Other successful paradigms included the BP with sigmoid transfer function, HSOP and 
SOP which gave misclassification errors of (FRR/FAR) 00/o/1%, 1%10.5%, 4%/2.5% 
respectively. The least successful neural networks were the CPNN and BP with sine-delta 
transfer function. In all cases the hold time-based classification gave better performance 
accuracy than the inter-key based approach. The author concludes the paper by 
commenting about the use of neural networks to identify computer users is not just 
plausible but is very successful. So the opinion of the researchers, in comparison to 
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previous studies, is that keystroke analysis is indeed a plausible technique for 
discriminating users. 
Two papers by Monrose and Rubin (1997,1999) explore the use keystroke dynamics as a 
biometric for authentication. The main difference between the two papers was the duration 
of data collection, with the first paper collecting data over a seven week period compared 
to the more recent paper having collected data over an eleven month period. As such, the 
results from the more recent paper will be included here. The investigations were designed 
surrounding four classification algorithms and managed to acquire 63 participants for the 
study. The four algorithms were a Euclidean distance measure, a non-weighted probability 
method, a weighted probability method and a Bayesian classifier. The Euclidean distance 
measure is a straight forward distance comparison between a reference vector, typically a 
mean vector calculated from the reference profile, and a test vector. Given the test vector 
resides within a certain distance from the reference vector then the test vector is considered 
valid. The value of the distance between valid and invalid test vectors is definable by the 
designer of the verification system and can by variable between users. In the non-weighted 
probability method a score is obtained based on the probability of observing the test vector 
in the reference profile, given the reference mean and standard deviation. Higher 
probabilities are given to test vectors that are closer to the reference mean. The weighted 
probability measure comes from the understanding that some features are more reliable 
than others simply because they come from a larger sample set or have a relatively higher 
frequency in the written language, so it would be reasonable to attach weights to those 
features. Therefore the notion of weights is added to the non-weighted probability 
formulae. The Bayesian approach used a standard Bayesian classifier, assuming the input 
data is distributed according to a Gaussian distribution. The participants were asked to 
retype a few sentences from a list of available phrases. 
The paper evaluated the results by 
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combining the acceptance of the authentic user and the rejection of the impostor, i. e. 
combining all the correct results together. The correct identification rate using the 
Euclidean distance was 85.63%, the non-weighted probability was 85.63%, the weighted 
probability was 87.13% and the Bayesian classifier was 92.14% representing an 
improvement of almost 5% over the next best result. The paper however includes no 
information as to the length of the sentences and the number of characters required to 
provide the authentication. Interestingly, the study also included the use of "free-text" (text 
independent authentication) as a dynamic approach to authentication but the results were 
found to vary too significantly to be of reliable use. 
Cho, Han, Hee Han and Kim (2000) also included the multivariate input data (hold time 
and inter key latency) and neural networks. This study essentially repeats the previous 
Obaidat (1997) study with slight modifications to the procedure. Twenty five participants 
were used in the study, each being asked to enter a password of 7 characters. The 
participants entered the password between 150 to 400 times with the last 75 being used to 
test the network. The authors did however remove 4 participants from the study due to the 
large variance of their input data, which will artificially bias the results when considering 
the plausibility of the approach towards the general population, as the other studies have 
done. The network implemented was a Multi Layered Perceptron model and it was 
compared against a K-NN approach. The K-NN approach with K equal to one gave an 
average FRR of 19.5% with a FAR 0% whereas the multi-layered perceptron model gave a 
FRR of 1.0% with a FAR of 0%, representing a significant improvement. The results 
achieved here are very encouraging for static authentication, although care must be taken 
considering the relative artificial selection of participants. 
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The final paper reviewed was the only paper that looked at using the numeric keypad of a 
full-sized alpha numeric keyboard. Ord and Furnell (2000) looked at authenticating a 
person using a static keystroke analysis approach. The study had 14 participants which 
each inputted the same numerical code on the keypad 50 times over a period of 6 months. 
The dataset was split into two with 30 input samples being used to generate the reference 
profile and 20 samples to test the classifier. The authors decided on a neural network 
approach to classification, implementing a Multi-Layered Perceptron model with back 
propagation learning. The results are not as good as previous research into keystroke 
analysis has suggested, but of course the different input medium must also be considered. 
The classifier achieved a FAR of 9.9% with a fixed FRR of 30%. The authors described 
the cause of this higher error rate to be due to a minority of users with very high error rates, 
and as such it could be concluded that this technique may only be applicable to users that 
can enter the input data within certain tolerances. This is a finding that has been reiterated 
by the exclusion of certain poor performing users from Cho et al's (2000) investigation. 
It is very difficult to directly compare and contrast many of these studies in terms of their 
verification system and performance as their method for evaluating (and calculating) the 
error rates differ depending upon the aim of the study. For example, while some were 
static-based verifiers, others were dynamic-based with varying character lengths inputted. 
However overall the studies have in a number of cases shown encouraging results in the 
ability of pattern classifiers to correctly discriminate between users. It can been seen from 
the studies that neural network classifiers have on a number occasions performed both well 
in their own respect and better in comparison to the more traditional statistical and pattern 
recognition techniques. Notably, the original idea of keystroke analysis proposed that a 
persons typing rhythm is distinctive and all the original studies focussed upon the 
keystroke latency (the time between two successive keystrokes), however, more recent 
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studies have identified the hold time (the time between pressing and releasing a single key) 
as being as discriminative. The most successful networks implemented a combination of 
both inter key and hold time measures, illustrating the use of both measures have a 
cumulative and constructive effect upon performance. Another conclusion that can be 
drawn from the reviewed papers is the inability for keystroke analysis to perform 
successfully for a minority cross section of users. These users tend to have high inter- 
sample variances and have few distinctive typing rhythms. As such, any authentication 
system that implements a keystroke analysis technique would also have to consider the 
small number of users that will exhibit too higher an error rate in order to ensure both the 
security and user convenience factors required by the overall system are met. 
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Appendix C 
Theory of Pattern Recognition 
Appendix C 
Theory of Pattern Classification 
Pattern classification or pattern recognition is an area of science with connections to 
many subjects such as engineering, computing and medical diagnosis. Due to its wide 
application, the development of pattern recognition techniques has varied greatly 
depending upon the background discipline of the researcher. Consequently, many 
different techniques have been created from what would typically have been 
orthogonal research areas, from statistics to artificial intelligence. 
This section describes the prerequisites required for a pattern recognition system, 
before continuing to describe an overview of the statistical and neural network theory 
required to design a pattern classifier. 
I Development of a Pattern Recognition System 
Although, many different pattern recognition techniques have been developed, the 
majority of them utilise a common framework, as illustrated in Figure 1. They begin 
with a method of reading or sensing the pattern to be classified. The sensor can take 
various forms and will largely depend on the pattern classification problem itself. In 
this particular situation it takes the form of sensing keypad interactions. The pre- 
processing and post-processing stages are optional and will manipulate the sensor data 
into a more usable or functional form if necessary, such as removing outliers and 
scaling the input. Feature extraction is the process of removing the actual 
discriminative information from the pre-processed data and is one of the curial stages 
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in the pattern classification design. The pre-processed data is likely to contain 
information that is one of three types: 
1. Positive discriminative information 
2. Negative discriminative information 
3. No discriminative information 
When working correctly the feature extraction process should extract the positive 
discriminative information. Negative discrimination contains the information that 
hinders the pattern classification process, and no discrimination information makes 
the task of pattern classification more difficult, typically by placing the problem in a 
higher dimensionality. This is known as the curse of dimensionality (Bishop, 1995), 
and thus requires a more complex pattern classification technique, but adds nothing in 
terms of improving performance to the classifier. 
Sensor 
Pre-Processing 
ý------^-----r 
Feature Extraction 
Classification 
1---------------1 
Post-Processing , -- 
1------- ------1 , Optional Process 
i 
T 1--------------' 
Mandatory Process 
Figure 1A Pattern Classification System 
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The classification stage utilises a particular pattern recognition technique, and is the 
key stage in the pattern recognition process. The choice of pattern recognition 
technique can often determine the success or failure of pattern recognition system. A 
system too simple for the problem will not discriminate enough, whereas a system too 
complex for the problem will create far too complex discriminative boundaries 
enabling poor generalisation to new data (the concept of generalisation and the issues 
arising from not controlling it are addressed in section 3.1). Finally, in the pattern 
recognition system, a final decision is to be made which determines which class of 
object the input belongs too. This typically can take the form of a threshold function, 
for instance, above the threshold the input is class 1 and below, class 2. 
2 Statistical Pattern Classification 
The traditional approach of solving a pattern recognition problem is through the use 
of a statistically based technique, with much of the work on keystroke analysis pre- 
1990 being completed using such techniques. Although a wide range of statistical 
techniques have been developed over the years this report focuses on three principal 
techniques: 
1. Mean & Standard Deviation Technique 
2. Minimum Distance Techniques 
3. Hypothesis Techniques 
These three techniques encompass a range of approaches that have been implemented 
in previous pattern classification research, from the simple mean and standard 
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deviation technique utilised by Umphress and Williams (1985), to the more complex 
hypothesis techniques utilised by Napier et al (1995). The reason for their inclusion in 
this study is two-fold - as a means to evaluate the performance of statistical 
techniques in their own right, but also as a means of comparison against the more 
modem neural networks approaches. 
2.1 Mean & Standard Deviation Technique 
A traditional pattern classifier, this technique utilises a user's mean and standard 
deviation, calculated from their reference profile to determine whether an input 
sample is from an authorised user or an impostor. The authentication decision is based 
upon the principal that an authorised users input will fall within the profile mean plus 
or minus a predefined number of standard deviations and an unauthorised users input 
vectors will not (Umphress & Williams, 1985). The technique assumes a user's input 
data is normally distributed, so a probability exists that 68% of an authorised users 
input will fall within 1 standard deviation and 95% within 2. Figure 2 illustrates a 
fictitious example of normal distribution plots for a number of users. 
4 
Appendix C 
User 3 
Figure 2 Normal Distribution Plot 
Although this technique has many application advantages such as the lower 
processing requirements and fitster speed of training, it is also the simplest algorithm 
implemented in this study and as such is not overly powerful. For instance, if a user 
had a large standard deviation then the classifier would naturally have a high false 
acceptance due to impostor input vectors residing within the mean and standard 
deviation envelope. This would however he tied to a lower false rejection rate. 
2.2 Minimum Distance Technique 
The minimum distance technique calculates the distance between twos vectors, a 
reference mean vector and the input sample vector. If' the resulting distance is 
considered small enough then the input sample is deemed to have come from an 
authorised user, if not then from an impostor. 
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Figure 3 Vector Distance Calculation 
Figure 3 illustrates this vector distance calculation, between the reference vector x and 
a number of input vectors m. The shorter the distance between these two vectors, the 
higher the probability of both input vectors belonging to the same person. 
Distance is calculated using: 
II x- mk 11 where x= input vector; Mk = reference profile vector 
Here 11 u 11 is called the norm of the vector u and corresponds to different ways of 
measuring distance. In this study a linear distance metric is shown (Duda & Hart, 
1973): 
. Euclidean Metric (Linear) 
1 
Iý u ýý- lul i- Lý2 +U2 i- ... Ltd 
2 
I 
U II=((xi -mk, )z +(x2 _mk2)z +(xd _mkd)2)i 
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Where, x1=1 s` component of the input vector 
x2 = 2nd component of the input vector 
xd = d'th component of the input vector 
and = d'th component of the reference template 
From an investigative perspective the distance permitted to be acceptable as an 
authorised user can be varied for each user in order to achieve the most optimal 
results. 
2.3 Hypothesis Technique 
Statistical hypothesis tests are used to test a hypothesis that some variable differs 
between two groups (Hogg & Ledolter, 1989). In this study, the hypothesis test is to 
determine that an input sample comes from the authorised user or not. The specific 
hypothesis test described in this study is the t-test. 
The t-test is used when the sample size is typically small and the standard deviations 
are unknown but assumed equal. As the sample sizes in a keystroke analysis approach 
might well reside in either case, it is appropriate to describe 
both tests. 
The null and alternative hypotheses for the t-test is: 
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Null Hypothesis, Ho: Input Vector = Reference Profile Mean 
Mean 
PO - lix 
Alternative Hypothesis, Input Vector Reference Profile Mean 
Hi: Mean 
PO Px 
As the alternative hypothesis is "not equal to" a two-tailed z and t test are required 
and the level of significance, a, will vary in order to determine the most efficient level 
in terms of the performance rates. The test statistics for both tests are:. 
x-f[o 
sx 
Where, x= Mean input vector; 
uo = Mean reference vector or template 
Ss = Sample variance of input vector 
n= Population size 
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3 Neural Network Pattern Classification 
Neural Networks, known originally as Artificial Neural Networks in order not to get 
confused with their biological counterparts, is a branch of artificial intelligence 
concerned with mimicking the functionality of biological neurons. The background 
work in neural networks occurred in the late 19`h and early 20`h centuries, however the 
modern view of neural networks began with McCulloch and Pitts (1943) who 
demonstrated that networks of artificial neurons could theoretically compute any 
arithmetic or logical function. However, it was not until 1958 that the first practical 
application of neural networks was created (Rosenblatt, 1958), with the invention of 
the perceptron network, and its ability to perform pattern recognition. However this 
first network suffered from some inherent weaknesses, which were identified in an 
infamous book by Minsky et al (1969) called Perceptrons. For instance, single layer 
perceptron networks were unable to solve non-linear problems and although 
Rosenblatt et al. designed multi-layer networks to overcome this issue they were not 
able to modify their learning algorithms to train the network. This new learning rule 
did not arrive until 1986 when the backpropagation algorithm was invented by 
Rumelhart and McClelland. It was at this stage where the field of neural networks 
opened up and found real interest in a large number of applications and industries. 
In this section, a number of network topographies will be introduced that have in past 
experience proven successful and exemplify pattern associative problems such as this 
(Looney, 1997; Obaidat et al., 1997). 
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In particular this section will describe the following neural network topologies: 
1. Feed-Forward Multi-Layered Perceptron Model 
2. Radial Basis Function Model 
3. Generalised Regression Model 
3.1 Feed-Forward Multi-Layered Perceptron 
The multi-layered perceptron (MLP) network as the name might suggest is 
constructed using a number of perceptron layers with the key advantage of being able 
to perform non-linear problem solving. The feed-forward multi-layer perceptron 
network is built up with an input layer, an output layer and one or more hidden layers, 
although when counting the number of layers in a network the input layer is omitted 
as it provides no processing of data - so a3 layer network would consist of an input 
layer, 2 hidden layers and an output layer. Every input is connected to every neuron in 
the layer, with each connection containing an associated weight. It is these weights 
that store and provide the neural network with their apparent memory. Figure 4 
illustrates a3 layer MLP and each layer essentially consists of the same repeating 
layer connected to the output of the previous layer. 
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Figure 4 Three Layer Feed-Forward MLP 
The network is comprised of the following components. 
p- Input vector 
R- Dimension of input vector P 
S'x - Number of neurons in layer x 
------------------------- 
LW3a 3 
a3 
S3XS2 
n f3 
S3X1 
Sax1 
------------------------- 
Layer 3 
LW3,2 a 3 
. 
ý3XS2 
n f3 i 
b, 
:: 
ý Sax I 
ýJ 
S3xI 
------------------------- 
, V, b - Input Weight - `a' indicates destination, `b' indicates source 
LW "- Layer Weight - `a' indicates destination, `b' indicates source 
bx - Bias value in layer x. 
cX - Output from layer x. 
x-A number from 1 to 3 
When constructing a MLP network a number of decisions need to be made regarding 
the network variables, which depend largely upon the complexity of the problem the 
network is to solve. Unfortunately very few guidelines or instructions exist to indicate 
what the value of these design variables should be given a certain complexity of 
problem, so a process of trial and error, in combination with previous investigations 
and experience, is often used as a guide for construction. The main design variables 
are: 
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1. Number of neurons in each layer 
2. Number of layers in the network 
3. Transfer function 
4. Training/Learning algorithm 
5. Number of epochs (training cycles) 
Given sufficient neurons and a good training strategy, a single hidden layer MLP 
network is able to mathematically approximate any function to an arbitrary accuracy 
(Bishop, 1995), so an argument exists as to whether networks with more than one 
hidden layer are ever required. The reasoning behind networks needing more than one 
hidden layer has been suggested by Looney (1997) and Bishop (1995), amongst 
others, is that the extra layers might make a more efficient approximation in the sense 
of achieving the same level of accuracy but with fewer neurons, weights and biases. 
However, care needs to be taken as adding too many hidden layers will cause network 
performance to degrade rather than improve. Care needs to be taken to ensure the 
network has sufficient neurons to solve the problem, but not too many to make 
training computation too difficult and time consuming. Intertwined with the problem 
of the number of neurons is the number of training epochs you train the network with. 
Too few and the network cannot solved the problem and too many and the network 
does not generalise very well. The problem of generalisation is a wider issue for MLP 
networks and will be discussed shortly. The choice of transfer function is very 
problem dependant, if the problem to be solved 
is inherently linear then linear transfer 
functions would suffice, whereas more complex and non-linear problems would be 
suited to a non-linear transfer such as the 
hyperbolic tangent sigmoid function. This 
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transfer function is particularly useful due partly, for its non-linear properties and 
ability to squash the input into a +1 to -1 range, and also, from its success in previous 
neural network investigations (Obaidat et al., 1997; Ord et al, 2000). 
MLP networks have a number of different training algorithms (or learning 
algorithms), although the most common utilised is the Backpropagation algorithm 
(Haykin, 1999; Hagan et al., 1996). Figure 5 illustrates the training process of the 
MLP network. Training is performed first by a forward sweep of the network, 
generating the output. The output is then compared to a known or desired output and 
an error is generated. This error is then, through a backward sweep of the network, fed 
back to the individual weights and biases. The proportion of the error given to each 
weight is dependent on the contribution made by that weight to the final result. 
Error back -propagated 
through the network 
Updated network 
Network 
& weights 
41111111111111111 
Error 
CT& 
Target - Output 
arget Data 
NETWORK 
=Error 
Training Output 
Sample Batch 
I® IIIIII&II1011. 
Generated 
Feed forward through 
the network 
10 Target Output 
Figure 5 MLP Training Process 
The simplest backpropagation method is an approximate steepest descent algorithm, 
in which the performance index is a mean square value, causing the convergence 
towards expected outcomes (Hagan et al. 1996). Hence the importance of the training 
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data and why it must be representative of the problem to be solved. A particular 
problem of backpropagation algorithms is they have a tendency to converge towards a 
local minimum rather than the desired global minima and as such a variation on the 
steepest descent algorithm has been design to include a momentum term. The 
momentum term allows a network to respond not only to the local gradient, but also to 
movements in the error surface, acting like a low pass filter allowing the network to 
ignore small features in the error surface. A second term can also be added to speed 
up the process of convergence. By adding an adaptive learning rate, the training 
process can maximise the rate without causing oscillations, changing the rate 
dependant upon the local error surface. Too small learning rate would result in long 
convergence times (Demuth & Beale, 2001). 
The problem of generalisation, as highlighted previously, describes the ability of a 
network to successfully output the correct response given an unseen or new input. 
When you train the network to perform a task, only a finite amount of training data 
exists and the network learns the problem from that dataset. A fictitious example of 
generalisation is illustrated in Figure 6. As the complexity of model is increased, so 
the decision boundary can become more complex, and hence give a better fit to the 
training data. However the best generalisation performance can often be obtained 
from an intermediate level of complexity. 
14 
Appendix C 
------------------------------------------------------------------------; 
Linear Non-Linear Non-Linear 
X2 
" 
xZ 
" 
x2 
" 
o0000000 
ý* 
0 
ý\O! 
xl X, xl 
Network Performance after Training using the Training Data 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------; 
X2 /0. XZ X2 "o"oo"o00"o00 
10 10 1 XI XI XI 
Network Performance after Training using Unseen Data 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
o Class 1" Class 2 
Increasing Network Complexity 
Figure 6 Problem of Poor Generalisation 
Generalisation is less of an issue for situations where the number of network 
parameters is small compared to the training data, as the network is able to refine the 
network weights and biases to a broader spectrum of input data. For networks without 
enough training data, the test of the network comes when presenting the network with 
new and unseen data and for the network to successfully classify the input. In order 
for a network to achieve this, it needs to be able to generalise well. One method for 
ensuring good generalisation is to construct a network that is just large enough to 
provide an adequate fit, since the larger the network in use the more complex 
functions it can approximate, as demonstrated in Figure 6. This is a difficult task to 
achieve in practicality as there are no guidelines defining the size of a network given a 
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problem of given complexity. Alternatively, the designer could choose an oversized 
network configuration and control the complexity of the decision boundaries formed 
through the number of epochs the network is trained with - the more a network is 
trained, the more complex the decision boundaries will become in an attempt to 
minimise the error. 
3.2 Radial Basis Function Networks 
Radial basis function (RBF) networks are very similar mathematically to MLP 
networks in that they both provide techniques for approximating arbitrary non-linear 
functional mappings between multi-dimensional spaces (Bishop, 1995). The RBF 
network consists of two layers, plus an input stage, illustrated in Figure 7. The first 
layer, again often referred to as the hidden layer, is the radial basis layer. This layer 
applies a non-linear transformation from the input space to the hidden space, which in 
most applications is of higher dimensionality. This is achieved by first calculating the 
Euclidean distance between the input vector and the weight matrix, which in turn, 
through matrix multiplication is combined with a bias to provide an extra element of 
sensitivity. The next stage in the layer is to present the result the matrix multiplication 
to the radial basis transfer function, which acts as a detector producing a1 whenever 
the input vector is identical to its weight vector. An illustration of the radial basis 
transfer function is shown in Figure 8. The second layer or output layer is a linear 
layer which is capable of linear separation of the classes. The rationale behind such a 
paradigm is that a pattern classification problem cast 
in high dimensional space is 
more likely to be linearly separable than in low dimensional space (Cover, 1965). 
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Figure 7 Radial Basis Network 
p Input vector 
R- Dimension of input vector P 
S` - Number of neurons in layer x 
W, - Input Weight - `a' indicates destination, 'b' indicates source 
I W" - Layer Weight - `a' indicates destination, `b' indicates source 
b' - Bias value in layer x. 
a' - Output from layer x. 
x-A number from I to 2 
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Figure 8 Radial Basis Transfer Function 
The training process tier the RBF network is to iteratively add one neuron at a time 
until the sum-squared error falls beneath an error goal or the maximum number of' 
neurons has been reached. This tends to lead to one of the major disadvantages of 
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RBF networks in that even when designed efficiently they may have many times more 
neurons than a comparable feed-forward MLP with sigmoid transfer functions. The 
reason for this is that sigmoid transfer functions can have outputs over a large region 
of the input space, whereas radial basis neurons only respond to a relatively small 
region of the input space, resulting in more neurons being required the larger the input 
space is. Conversely however, RBF networks often take far less time to train than 
their MLP counterparts and do not get stuck in local minima as MLP networks often 
do, as the input data need only be presented to the network once. 
Additionally, from an implementation perspective RBF networks have far fewer 
network variables to define than MLP networks with no decisions over network 
layers, number of training epochs or even number of neurons, culminating in fewer 
network combinations to design and test. The design variables are: 
1. Goal - mean squared error, defaulted to zero 
2. Spread - Radial Basis function spread 
3. Maximum number of neurons - defaulted to equal up to the number of input 
vectors (also referred to as an Exact RBF network) 
However, RBF networks suffer the same generalisation problem as MLP networks 
with large spread values allowing for a smoother function approximation and better 
generalisation, by allowing a number of the radial basis neurons to overlap thus giving 
a number of neurons fairly large outputs at any given moment. However, if the spread 
value is too large, each neuron is effectively responding to the same large area of 
input space, too small and the network does not generalise well (Hassoum, 1995). 
18 
Appendix C 
3.3 Generalised Regression Networks 
A Generalised Regression Neural Network (GRNN) is a network that utilises the 
radial basis layer. GRNN is described as a universal approximator for smooth 
functions, given enough training data (Sarle, 2002). The GRNN can be thought of as a 
normalised RBF network and is very similar to the Exact RBF network, with a second 
linear layer replaced by a special linear layer. This special layer provides a weighted 
average of the target values of training vectors close to the given input vector. 
The network topology is illustrated in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9 Generalised Regression Network 
p- Input vector 
R- Dimension of input vector P 
Q- Number of neurons in layer x- number of training vectors 
IV, b - Input Weight - `a' indicates destination, `b' indicates source 
LW 'b - Layer Weight - `a' indicates destination, `b' indicates source 
bX - Bias value in layer x. 
cX - Output from layer x. 
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x-A number from 1 to 2 
The main drawbacks of GRNNs is that it suffers badly from the curse of 
dimensionality (Bishop, 1995) - network complexity increases exponentially with the 
dimension of the input space - and the one-to-one mappings of training vectors to 
neurons can give rise to large and complex networks. 
However, GRNNs are amongst the fastest trained neural networks and only require a 
single network parameter to be defined, the spread. As with RBF networks, the larger 
the value of spread, the smoother the function approximation will be. Typically to fit 
data closely, the use of a spread value smaller than the distance between input vectors 
should be used (Demuth & Beale, 2001). As only a single parameter needs to be 
defined, iteratively training GRNNs with varying values for spread in order to 
optimise network performance, is far less time consuming than for MLP networks. 
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Feasibility Study of Keystroke Analysis 
Part 1- Numeric Input Data 
Part 2- Alphabetic Input Data 
Part 3- Keystroke Analysis Prototype 
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Part 1- Numeric Input Data 
This appendix is divided into the following sub-sections: 
1. List of Input data utilised by participants in the study 
2. Data Collection application - Source code 
3. MatLab pattern classification - Source code 
4. Pattern Classification Results 
This appendix can be located on the CD-ROM 
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Part 2- Alphabetic Input Data 
This appendix is divided into the following sub-sections: 
1. List of Input data utilised by participants in the study 
2. Data Collection application - Source code 
3. MatLab pattern classification - Source code 
4. Pattern Classification Results 
This appendix can be located on the CD-ROM 
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Part 3- Keystroke Analysis Prototype 
This appendix can be located on the CD-ROM 
Appendix E 
Appendix E 
IAMS Software Prototype 
Part 1- IAMS Software Code 
Part 2- IAMS Validation Output 
Part 3- Keystroke Analysis Implementation 
Appendix E 
Appendix E 
Part 1- TAMS Software Code 
This appendix is divided into the following sub-sections: 
1. IAMS Authentication Manager software code 
2. Administrative Console software code 
3. Client Interface software code 
This appendix can be located on the CD-ROM 
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Part 2- IAMS Validation Output 
Test la - IAMS_Output_Log. txt Initialising Database connections... 
IAMS Client Database Connected 
IAMS Profile Database Connected 
IAMS Input Cache Database Connected 
Database connections complete. 
Initialising Biometric Modules... 
Initialised Facial Recognition 
Initialised Keystroke Analysis 
Initialisation Complete! 
Device connected: 07976367359 
Client Parameters... 
System Integrity Level: 0 
Authentication Level: 1 
System integrity Period: 20 
System integrity Level: 0 
Processing Biometric Input Sample... 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Request - No Sample Present to Authenticate 
Authentication Level: 2 
system Integrity Level: 0 
Biometric Technique: Keystroke Analysis sub Category: Telephone_Dynamic 
Biometric Sample has been moved into the Tempaory Caching Area Input cache updated 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique utilised: Keystroke Analysis 
Biometric Passed 
System Integrity Level: 0.5 
Processing Biometric Input Sample... 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Request - No Sample Present to Authenticate 
Authentication Level: 2 
system Integrity Level: 0.5 
Biometric Technique: Keystroke Analysis Sub Category: Telephone_01248618453 
Biometric Sample has been moved into the Tempaory Caching Area 
Input cache updated 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique Utilised: Keystroke Analysis 
Biometric Passed 
System integrity Level: 1.5 
Processing Biometric Input Sample... 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Request - No Sample Present to Authenticate 
Authentication Level: 2 
system Integrity Level: 1.5 
Page 1 
Test la - IAMS_Output_Log. txt 
Biometric Technique: Keystroke Analysis sub category: Telephone_Dynamic 
Biometric sample has been moved into the Tempaory Caching Area 
Input cache updated 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique utilised: Keystroke Analysis 
Biometric Passed 
System integrity Level: 2 
Processing Biometric Input Sample... 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Request - No Sample Present to Authenticate 
Authentication Level: 2 
System Integrity Level: 2 
Biometric Technique: Keystroke Analysis sub Category: Telephone_Dynamic 
Biometric sample has been moved into the Tempaory Caching Area 
Input Cache updated 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique utilised: Keystroke Analysis 
Biometric Passed 
System Integrity Level: 2 
Connection closed: 192.168.3.11 
Page 2 
Test lb - IAMS_Output_Log. txt 
Initialising Database Connections... 
IAMS Client Database Connected 
IAMS Profile Database Connected 
IAMS Input Cache Database Connected 
Database Connections Complete. 
Initialising Biometric Modules... 
Initialised Facial Recognition 
Initialised Keystroke Analysis 
Initialisation Complete! 
Device Connected: 07976367359 
Client Parameters... 
System Integrity Level: 0 
Authentication Level: 1 
System Integrity Period: 20 
System Integrity Level: 0 
Processing Biometric Input Sample... 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Request - No Sample Present to Authenticate 
Authentication Level: 2 
system Integrity Level: 0 
Biometric Technique: Keystroke Analysis sub Category: Telephone_Dynamic 
Biometric Sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area 
Input Cache updated 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique Utilised: Keystroke Analysis 
Biometric Failed 
Authentication Level: 3 
system Integrity Level: -0.5 
Processing Intrusive Biometric input sample... 
Biometric Technique: Intrusion Sub Category: Facial Recognition 
Biometric Sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area 
Input Cache updated 
Intrusive Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique utilised: Facial Recognition 
unable to locate Facial Print within Image with sufficient detail 
Biometric Failed 
Authentication Level: 3 
System integrity Level: -2.5 
Processing Intrusive Biometric Input Sample... 
Biometric Technique: Intrusion Sub Category: Cognitive Response 
Biometric sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area 
Input Cache updated 
Intrusive Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique utilised: Cognitive Response 
Authentication Result: Password Failed 
Authentication Level: 4 
Page 1 
Test lb - IAMS_Output_Log. txt 
System Integrity Level: -4.5 
Processing Intrusive Biometric Input Sample... 
Device unlock code Entered Correctly! 
Authentication Level: 1 
Authentication Level: 1 
System Integrity Level: 0 
Page 2 
Test 2a - IAMS_Output_Log. txt 
Initialising Database Connections... 
IAMS Client Database Connected 
IAMS Profile Database Connected 
IAMS Input Cache Database Connected 
Database Connections Complete. 
Initialising Biometric Modules... 
Initialised Facial Recognition 
Initialised Keystroke Analysis 
Initialisation Complete! 
Device connected: 07976367359 
Client Parameters... 
System Integrity Level: 0 
Authentication Level: 1 
System Integrity Period: 20 
System Integrity Level: 0 
Processing Intrusive Biometric Input Sample... 
Authentication Level: 1 
System Integrity Level: 0 
Biometric Technique: Intrusion sub category: Facial Recognition 
Biometric Sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area 
Input cache updated 
Intrusive Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique Utilised: Facial Recognition 
Facial Authentication Result: Success 
Biometric Passed 
Authentication Level: 1 
System Integrity Level: 2 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Request - No Sample Present to Authenticate 
Authentication Level: 2 
System Integrity Level: 2 
Processing Intrusive Biometric Input Sample... 
Biometric Technique: Intrusion Sub Category: Facial Recognition 
Biometric Sample has been moved into the Temporary caching Area 
Input Cache updated 
Intrusive Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique Utilised: Facial Recognition 
Facial Authentication Result: Success 
Biometric Passed 
Authentication Level: 1 
System Integrity Level: 4 
Processing Biometric Input Sample... 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Request - No Sample Present to Authenticate 
Page 1 
Test 2a - IAMS_Output_Log. txt 
Authentication Level: 2 
System integrity Level: 4 
Biometric Technique: Facial Recognition sub category: None 
Biometric sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area 
Input cache updated 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique utilised: Facial Recognition 
Facial Authentication Result: Success 
Biometric Passed 
Authentication Level: 1 
System integrity Level: 5 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Request - No Sample Present to Authenticate 
Authentication Level: 2 
System Integrity Level: 5 
Processing Biometric Input Sample... 
Biometric Technique: Facial Recognition sub category: None 
Biometric Sample has been moved into the Temporary caching Area 
Input Cache updated 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique utilised: Facial Recognition 
Facial Authentication Result: Success 
Biometric Passed 
Authentication Level: 1 
System Integrity Level: 5 
Page 2 
Authentication Level: 1 
Test 2b - IAMS_Output_Log. txt 
System integrity Level: 0 
Initialising Database Connections... 
IAMS Client Database connected 
IAMS Profile Database Connected 
IAMS Input Cache Database connected 
Database Connections Complete. 
Initialising Biometric Modules... 
Initialised Facial Recognition 
Initialised Keystroke Analysis 
Initialisation Complete! 
Device connected: 07976367359 
Client Parameters... 
System integrity Level: 0 
Authentication Level: 1 
system integrity Period: 20 
System integrity Level: 0 
Processing Intrusive Biometric Input Sample... 
Authentication Level: 1 
System integrity Level: 0 
Biometric Technique: Intrusion sub Category: Facial Recognition 
Biometric Sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area 
Input Cache updated 
Intrusive Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique Utilised: Facial Recognition 
unable to locate Facial Print within Image with sufficient detail 
Biometric Failed 
Authentication Level: 2 
System Integrity Level: -2 
Processing Intrusive Biometric Input Sample... 
Biometric Technique: Intrusion Sub Category: Cognitive Response 
Biometric Sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area 
Input Cache Updated 
Intrusive Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique utilised: Cognitive Response 
Authentication Result: Password Failed 
Authentication Level: 3 
System Integrity Level: -4 
Processing Intrusive Biometric Input Sample... 
Biometric Technique: Intrusion sub Category: Cognitive Response 
Biometric Sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area 
Input Cache Updated 
Intrusive Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique utilised: Cognitive Response 
Authentication Result: Password Failed 
Authentication Level: 3 
Page 1 
Test 2b - IAMS_output_Log. txt 
System integrity Level: -5 
Processing Intrusive Biometric Input Sample... 
Biometric Technique: Intrusion Sub Category: Cognitive Response 
Biometric Sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching area 
Input cache updated 
Intrusive Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique Utilised: Cognitive Response 
Authentication Result: Password Failed 
Authentication Level: 4 
system Integrity Level: -5 
Processing Intrusive Biometric Input Sample... 
Device unlock Code Entered Correctly! 
Authentication Level: 1 
Authentication Level: 1 
System integrity Level: 0 
Page 2 
Test 3a - IAMS_output_Log. txt 
Initialising Database Connections... 
IAMS Client Database Connected 
IAMS Profile Database Connected 
IAMS Input cache Database Connected 
Database connections complete. 
Initialising Biometric Modules... 
Initialised Facial Recognition 
Initialised Keystroke Analysis 
Initialisation Complete! 
Device Connected: 07976367359 
Client Parameters... 
System Integrity Level: 0 
Authentication Level: 1 
System Integrity Period: 20 
System integrity Level: 0 
Processing Biometric input sample... 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Request - No Sample Present to Authenticate 
Authentication Level: 2 
System Integrity Level: 0 
Biometric Technique: Keystroke Analysis sub Category: Telephone_Dynamic 
Biometric sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area 
Input cache updated 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique Utilised: Keystroke Analysis 
Biometric Passed 
Authentication Level: 1 
System Integrity Level: 0.5 
Processing Intrusive Biometric Input Sample... 
Authentication Level: 1 
System Integrity Level: 0.5 
Biometric Technique: Intrusion Sub Category: Facial Recognition 
Biometric Sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area 
Input Cache updated 
Intrusive Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique Utilised: Facial Recognition 
Facial Authentication Result: success 
Biometric Passed 
Authentication Level: 1 
System Integrity Level: 2.5 
Processing Biometric Input sample... 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Request - No Sample Present to Authenticate 
Authentication Level: 2 
Page 1 
Test 3a - IAMS_Output_Log. txt 
System integrity Level: 2.5 
Biometric Technique: Keystroke Analysis sub category: Text-eta 
Biometric sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area 
Input Cache updated 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique utilised: Keystroke Analysis 
Biometric Passed 
Authentication Level: 1 
System Integrity Level: 2.5 
Processing Biometric Input Sample... 
Biometric Technique: Keystroke Analysis Sub Category: Telephone_01248618453 
Biometric sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area 
Input Cache updated 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique utilised: Keystroke Analysis 
Biometric Passed 
Authentication Level: 1 
System Integrity Level: 3 
Processing Biometric Input Sample... 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Request - No Sample Present to Authenticate 
Authentication Level: 2 
System Integrity Level: 3 
Biometric Technique: Facial Recognition sub category: None 
Biometric sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area 
Input cache updated 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique utilised: Facial Recognition 
Facial Authentication Result: success 
Biometric Passed 
Authentication Level: 1 
system Integrity Level: 5 
Page 2 
Test 3b - IAMS_Output_Log. txt 
Initialising Database connections... 
IAMS Client Database Connected 
IAMS Profile Database connected 
IAMS Input Cache Database Connected 
Database Connections Complete. 
Initialising Biometric Modules... 
Initialised Facial Recognition 
Initialised Keystroke Analysis 
Initialisation Complete! 
Device Connected: 07976367359 
Client Parameters... 
System integrity Level: 0 
Authentication Level: 2 
System Integrity Period: 20 
System Integrity Level: 0 
Processing Biometric Input Sample... 
Authentication Level: 2 
System Integrity Level: 0 
Biometric Technique: Keystroke Analysis sub category: Telephone-Dynamic 
Biometric sample has been moved into the Temporary caching Area Input cache updated 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique utilised: Keystroke Analysis 
Biometric Failed 
Authentication Level: 3 
System integrity Level: -0.5 
Processing Intrusive Biometric Input Sample... 
Biometric Technique: Intrusion Sub Category: Facial Recognition 
Biometric sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area 
Input Cache updated 
Intrusive Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique utilised: Facial Recognition 
unable to locate Facial Print within Image with sufficient detail 
Biometric Failed 
Authentication Level: 3 
System Integrity Level: -2.5 
processing Intrusive Biometric Input Sample... 
Biometric Technique: Intrusion Sub Category: Cognitive Response 
Biometric Sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area 
Input Cache updated 
Intrusive Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique utilised: Cognitive Response 
Authentication Result: Password Failed 
Authentication Level: 4 
system Integrity Level: -4.5 
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Test 3b - IAMS_output_Log. txt 
Processing Intrusive Biometric Input Sample... 
Device Unlock code Entered correctly! 
Authentication Level: 1 
Authentication Level: 1 
System integrity Level: 0 
connection closed: 192.168.3.11 
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Test 4- IAMS_Output_LOg. txt 
Initialising Database Connections... 
IAMS Client Database connected 
IAMS Profile Database Connected 
IAMS Input Cache Database Connected 
Database connections complete. 
Initialising Biometric Modules... 
Initialised Facial Recognition 
Initialised Keystroke Analysis 
Initialisation Complete! 
Device Connected: 07976367359 
Client Parameters... 
System Integrity Level: 0 
Authentication Level: 1 
System Integrity Period: 20 
System integrity Level: 0 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Request - No Sample Present to Authenticate 
Authentication Level: 2 
System Integrity Level: 0 
Processing Biometric input sample... 
Biometric Technique: Keystroke Analysis sub category: Telephone Dynamic 
Biometric sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area 
Input cache updated 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication -Technique Utilised: Keystroke Analysis Biometric Failed 
Authentication Level: 3 
system Integrity Level: -0.5 
Processing Intrusive Biometric input sample... 
Biometric Technique: Intrusion Sub Category: Facial Recognition 
Biometric sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area 
Input Cache Updated 
Intrusive Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique Utilised: Facial Recognition 
Facial Authentication Result: Success 
Biometric Passed 
Authentication Level: 1 
System Integrity Level: 1.5 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Request - No Sample Present to Authenticate 
Authentication Level: 2 
System Integrity Level: 1.5 
Processing Intrusive Biometric Input Sample... 
Biometric Technique: Intrusion Sub Category: Facial Recognition 
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Test 4- IAMS_output_Log. txt 
Biometric sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area 
Input cache updated 
Intrusive Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique utilised: Facial Recognition 
Facial Authentication Result: success 
Biometric Passed 
Authentication Level: 1 
System Integrity Level: 3.5 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Request - No Sample Present to Authenticate 
Authentication Level: 2 
System integrity Level: 3.5 
Processing Biometric Input Sample... 
Processing Biometric Input Sample... 
Biometric Technique: Keystroke Analysis sub category: Telephone-01248618453 Biometric sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area Input cache updated 
Biometric Technique: Keystroke Analysis sub category: Text-eta 
Biometric sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area Input Cache updated 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique utilised: Keystroke Analysis 
Biometric Failed 
Authentication Level: 3 
System Integrity Level: 3 
Processing Intrusive Biometric Input sample... 
Biometric Technique: Intrusion Sub Category: Facial Recognition 
Biometric sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area 
Input cache updated 
Intrusive Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique utilised: Facial Recognition 
Facial Authentication Result: Fail 
Biometric Passed 
Authentication Level: 1 
System Integrity Level: 5 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique utilised: Keystroke Analysis 
Biometric Failed 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Request - No Sample Present to Authenticate 
Authentication Level: 2 
System Integrity Level: 4 
Processing Biometric Input Sample... 
Biometric Technique: Facial Recognition sub category: None 
Biometric Sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area 
Input Cache updated 
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Test 4- IAMS_Output_Log. txt 
Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique Utilised: Facial Recognition 
Facial Authentication Result: Success 
Biometric Failed 
Authentication Level: 3 
system integrity Level: 2 
Processing Intrusive Biometric input sample... 
Biometric Technique: Intrusion Sub Category: Facial Recognition 
Biometric sample has been moved into the Temporary Caching Area 
Input Cache updated 
Intrusive Authentication Request... 
Authentication Technique Utilised: Facial Recognition 
Facial Authentication Result: Success 
Biometric Passed 
Authentication Level: 1 
System Integrity Level: 4 
Connection closed: 192.168.3.11 
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Appendix E 
Part 3- Keystroke Analysis Implementation 
This appendix can be located on the CD-ROM 
Appendix F 
Appendix F 
Publications 
Appendix F 
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 
Those marked with a* are included for reference. A copy of all publications can be 
found on the CD-ROM under "Publications". 
Journal & Conference Papers 
Clarke, N., Furnell, S., Lines B., Reynolds, P. 2004. "Application of Keystroke 
Analysis to Mobile Text Messaging". Proceeding of the 3rd Security Conference, 
Las Vegas, USA. 
Lemote, J., Clarke, N., Furnell, S. 2004. "Artificial Impostor Profiling for Keystroke 
Analysis on a Mobile Handset". Advances in Network & Communication 
Engineering 
Clarke, N., Furnell, S., Lines B., Reynolds, P. 2003. "Keystroke Dynamics on a 
Mobile Handset: A Feasibility Study". Information Management & Computer 
Security. * 
Clarke, N., Furnell, S., Lines B., Reynolds, P. 2003. "Using Keystroke Analysis as 
a mechanism for Subscriber Authentication Mobile Handsets". Proceedings of the 
IFIP SEC 2003 Conference, Athens, Greece. * 
Appendix F 
Clarke, N., Furnell, S., Reynolds, P. 2002. "Biometric Authentication for Mobile 
Devices". 2002. Proceedings of the 3td Australian Information Warfare and 
Security Conference, Perth, Australia. (Recipient of Best Paper Award). * 
Clarke, N., Furnell, S., Lines B., Reynolds, P. 2002. "Subscriber Authentication of 
Mobile Phones through the Implementation of Keystroke Dynamics". 2002. 
Proceedings of the 3rd International Network Conference (INC 2002), UK. 
Clarke, N., Furnell, S., Lines B., Reynolds, P. 2002. "Advanced Subscriber 
Authentication Approaches for Third Generation Mobile Systems". Proceedings of 
the 3rd International Conference on 3G Mobile Communication Technologies, IEE, 
UK. 
Clarke, N., Furnell, S., Rodwell, P., Reynolds, P. 2002. "Acceptance of Subscriber 
Authentication Methods for Mobile Telephony Devices". Computer & Security. * 
Appendix F 
Poster Presentations 
Clarke, N., Furnell, S., Rodwell, P., Reynolds, P. 2002. " Non-Intrusive Biometric 
Authentication for Mobile Device". 5th World Conference & Exhibition on the 
Practical Application of Biometrics, UK. (Recipient of Best Student Poster). 
Clarke, N., Furnell, S., Rodwell, P., Reynolds, P., Dowland, P. 2001. "Non- 
Intrusive Subscriber Authentication for 3G Mobile Systems". Britain's Younger 
Engineers, House of Commons, UK. 
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